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Abstract: 
 
This thesis is an effort to apply Elias’s thinking on social development to the Chinese 
social situation. At first glance his account of the civilizing process would appear 
incompatible with this context, in that, after state formation with the Qin and Han 
dynasties beginning in 221 BC, Chinese civilization remained both stable and highly 
traditional for well over two millennia. It is argued, however, that closer scrutiny reveals 
a process that was merely interrupted for a considerable period. The traditional system 
relied upon a symbiotic relationship between local society and the centre whereby the 
centre remained relatively small and aloof, not interfering with local social relations, as 
long as local society provided the required taxes and labour. In this situation the state 
had the monopolies of both violence and taxation that Elias would look for, but left 
local society to its own devices primarily because it was already pacified. This self-
reinforcing system was enshrined and codified in the Confucian cannon over the course 
of centuries from the Han dynasty. Central control of the distribution of resources was 
eventually required to re-start the Chinese civilizing process, for this was the 
mechanism through which the local social structure would finally be altered.  This only 
happened within the past century as the Chinese people struggled to grapple with their 
own ‘backwardness’ in the face of incessant Western and Japanese incursions. At this 
point the old system was toppled and replaced by progressively more aggressive central 
governments who saw as their most important task the destruction of the traditional 
social order in the interest of modernization. As the Chinese state consciously and 
forcibly took control of the distribution of resources at all levels of society, traditional 
social relations were stretched and warped, and the Chinese civilizing process re-  
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commenced its long-stalled march toward modernization. This has been evidenced both 
by the dramatic growth in mobility and the rapidly extending chains of interdependence 
in the form of guanxi connections primarily during the Post-Opening period after 1978. 
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Part One – Norbert Elias 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis falls into two distinct parts. In the first part, the thought of Norbert Elias will 
be examined in some depth specifically focusing on those aspects or concepts that are 
felt to be of value in the analysis of the Chinese culture making up the second part.
1 The 
goal of this first more theoretical part is to show how Elias’s theory of civilizing 
processes is fundamentally rooted in the concepts of competition and power. Through 
the state formation process and the attendant changing locus of control of the 
distribution of resources came increasing integration, differentiation, and extending 
chains of interdependence. With all of this, social relations at the local figurational level 
began to change, until finally social constraint was internalized as self-restraint. This 
whole process was fuelled by competition for power chances. 
 
Elias and Sociology 
According to Richard Kilminster, the very conditions under which sociology was born 
in academia dictated that certain intractable difficulties would arise. 
 
                                                 
1 A note should be made on the nature of this thesis before digging into the content. It is intended that this 
effort will use the ideas of Norbert Elias as both a framework and a boundary through which to examine 
China’s social context. As such it is a sociological analysis of the subject. While some historical sources 
will necessarily be used it is not intended to be in any way an historical analysis of China (though it is 
probably also worth pointing out that the line between history and sociology is not that distinct, especially 
for a project covering such long spans of time). It is, on the contrary, intended to be a purely sociological 
endeavour with the dual purpose of expanding the horizons of the use of Elias’s ideas within the field as 
well as gaining greater insight into the Chinese social situation. 
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Sociology emerged when European peoples became aware in the late 
eighteenth century that the patterns that their far-flung interdependent 
social relations made were increasingly exceeding the scope of 
individual action on a large scale. In terminology developed by later 
sociologists for understanding the structure of these developments, these 
interdependencies constituted an emergent level of social organization 
sui generis. Groups of social scientific practitioners, propelled  by 
various interests and purposes, began to investigate its autonomous 
patterns empirically - initially in the realm of economic regularities 
(Kilminster 1998: 3). 
 
According to Kilminster, society was for the first time seen as an entity in some sense 
above and beyond the individuals making it up, and for that reason an object to be 
studied as such. This formulation obviously begs the question as to how to go about the 
investigation.  
  
There are two perceived problems resulting directly and indirectly from this dilemma 
that Norbert Elias addressed with his theory of civilizing processes.  
 
The first problem broadly speaking, relates to the fact that there have for a long time 
been two approaches to the discipline of sociology. Does one study individuals, or the 
totality they collectively seem to comprise? “Indeed it has been argued, for example by 
Dawe (1970), that not only do the ‘individual centred’ and ‘society centred’ approaches 
represent two distinct traditions in the history of sociology but that it is impossible in  
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principle to bridge the gulf between them” (Mennell 1989: 94). Norbert Elias has a 
different view on this. In talking about social theory Elias says  
 
it is quite easy to overlook the fact that the concept of figuration is 
expressly coined to bypass the ingrained polarization of sociological 
theories, by which they are divided into those which place the 
‘individual’ above ‘society’, and those which place ‘society’ above the 
‘individual’ - a polarization which used to correspond to the main axis 
of the conflicts of beliefs and interests in the wider world (Elias 1994b: 
135).  
 
He seemed to feel that if social theory were to find a way to proceed in an effective 
manner it would first have to resolve this issue, and the idea of figurations was central to 
achieving this goal. 
 
Arguably, Elias’s notion of figuration has avoided the pitfalls of 
exaggeration to either side of the dualism... In this model the 
indubitable self-experience of the modern individual is acknowledged in 
its authenticity and relative autonomy and explained sociologically. At 
the same time, but without the reification of ‘society’, the figurational 
compulsion of the networks of human interdependencies of which that 
individual is a part are shown empirically to possess regularities which 
in the long run exceed the scope of individual actions, even though 
inclusive of them. Instead of starting with individuals and trying to 
bridge the gap to that which is apparently ‘beyond’ them - ‘society’ -  
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Elias deals from the outset with interdependent people in the plural… 
Working from this starting point makes it harder for ideological over-
extensions… to be smuggled into the analysis (Kilminster 1998: 91). 
 
Elias’s reliance upon figurations effectively bridges the gap between the micro 
(individual centred) and the macro (society centred) approaches. According to 
Kilminster it also provides a more or less inbuilt protection against straying too far into 
one camp or the other.  
 
Van Krieken says that it was Simmel’s How is Society Possible? and its view of the 
individual and society that “stimulated a profoundly relational understanding of human 
intersubjectivity and sociality which underlay much of the social theory and research 
which followed, but by no means all of it” (van Krieken 2003: 2). He continues by 
saying that it was Parsons’ The Structure of Social Action (1937) that changed this view 
within the discipline. Without going into too much detail, the effect of Parson’s work 
“was to entrench an individual/society opposition within sociological thought” (van 
Krieken 2003: 4). Elias consciously attempted to reverse the damage, as he saw it, 
seeking to put things back on a more relational basis. He believed the individual/society 
opposition was the source of many difficulties within the discipline. For Elias it was 
“networks of people acting” that had to take the central position in sociological thought 
(van Krieken 2003: 4).  
 
Dualisms like individual/society, or agency/structure and the ‘Parsonian 
problem of order’ are integrally linked, bound to each other like 
Siamese twins. Accept the latter and we are condemned to forever  
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recycling individual/society dualisms in their various guises, and their 
supposed transcendence (van Krieken 2003: 4). 
 
Van Krieken goes on to make the point that even though it is generally agreed in the 
field of sociology that people are social beings, these dualisms keep creeping back into 
sociological thought, often in disguised forms (van Krieken 2003: 5). 
 
By the very nature of his ideas, Elias occupies an important position in this debate. 
Quilley and Loyal express the main points of Elias’s ideas on civilizing processes fairly 
effectively with the following: 
 
Analysing civilising processes in Western Europe, Elias’s argument is 
basically that social differentiation and the extension of the division of 
labour engendered a progressive ordering of social relations that 
compelled more and more people to attune their conduct to that of 
others. Over time, external controls to this effect were increasingly 
complemented by internalized patterns of self-restraint, discernable as a 
particular psychological trait (Quilley 2004:51).  
 
And 
 
the internalization of progressively more restrained codes of conduct, 
greater and more or less automatic patterns of self control, the 
increasing mediation of affective drives and short-term impulses - by 
processes of calculation and foresight - and in short the formation of a  
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more complex ‘super-ego’ agency in the psychical structure (Quilley 
2004: 49).  
 
Stephen Mennell also succinctly captures the debate and Elias’s position on the main 
issue of the individual versus society. Mennell starts off by saying that as society 
becomes more differentiated and complex more and more people become entwined in 
webs of interdependence that are beyond anyone’s control. Elias attempted to show why 
people experienced these figurations as something constraining and beyond them. As far 
as the ‘Individual vs. Society’ debate goes:  
 
Elias cuts across all this. He argues that it is as much a nonsense to try 
to understand the ‘individual’ in isolation from figurations in which he 
is entangled as it is to try to study ‘society’ as something separate from 
the people who comprise it. The repercussions of a person’s actions for 
those with whom he is interdependent can only be understood by tracing 
them through the structure and dynamics of the encompassing figuration 
(Mennell 1977: 100).  
 
Mennell takes this a step further when he argues that Elias has effectively bridged the 
‘unbridgeable’ gap between the macro and micro approaches to the discipline. “Because 
interdependence has always been Elias’s central category, he has always been able to 
bridge the gap between micro and macro-sociology with seeming ease” (Mennell 1990: 
369). It is his focus on interdependence, or social relations that enables Elias, according 
to Mennell, to more or less bypass this previously intractable obstacle.  
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The second problem area within sociology has been the tendency to view society in very 
static, unchanging terms as opposed to taking the more process oriented perspective. 
Elias does suggest that the pendulum has swung back and forth between the two but that 
a corrective to the static view was necessary at the time.  
 
While a considerable proportion of last century’s sociological theorists 
concerned themselves with process-theories covering the past, the 
present and equally the possible future, their current successors concern 
themselves with a type of law-like theory which, like classical physics, 
ignores all changes in the course of unrepeatable time (Elias 1977: 364).  
 
This, according to Elias, was not always true. In the past, a continuity of generations 
was seen to link past, present and future. For this reason, neither time frame could be 
explained without reference to the others (Elias 1977: 366). 
 
For Elias it was Comte and Marx, the “ancestors of sociology” (Elias 1977: 355), who 
helped in establishing the more process oriented approach, making a break from what 
was at their time a more popular philosophical perspective. “Both unambiguously 
placed the problem of change in human society, or in other words, the immanent order 
of the sequence of societal stages at the centre of their research programmes” (Elias 
1977: 356-357). Elias argued that Comte provided the necessary orientation to facilitate 
the break with classical thinking. 
 
Comte pointed out that the classical philosophical idea of an eternal 
reason, an unchanging mind supposedly shared by people in all  
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historical periods and places, was a reified abstraction, a fable. He tried 
to show that human reason changes in the course of time, that in 
people’s social life it goes – just like that social life, like human society 
– through a specific, empirically verifiable series of stages (Elias 1977: 
355). 
 
Elias holds to a very similar view to Comte of sociology on this issue. 
 
It is probably also worth pointing out early on that Elias saw his description of 
the civilizing process as in no way complete. As Kilminster puts it:   
 
As the German title Uber den Prozess der Zivilisation makes clear, the 
book was intended to be ‘on’ or ‘about’ the process of civilization. The 
emphasis is on the Prozess of civilization... The provisional character of 
Elias’s theory became lost in the rather bald and compressed title of The 
Civilizing Process. By using the word Uber Elias signalled that he 
wanted to demonstrate something in a preliminary fashion (Kilminster 
2007: 73). 
 
He wanted to show, according to Kilminster, that Western self-restraint emerged out of 
changing figurations of people over an extended period that were themselves part of 
“wider social transformations” such as state formation, and that the process was ongoing 
(Kilminster 2007: 73). 
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These characteristics also make Elias’s framework a good candidate for a sociological 
examination of China. This will become clearer in the second section of the thesis, but 
for the moment, it is enough it to say that China remains a very traditional culture with 
small, tightly knit figurations, and at the same time one in which these same 
characteristics are changing rapidly.
2   
 
Elias feels that the two major problems with sociology, individual/society and 
static/changing (process), need addressing in order for the discipline to head in the right 
direction, and that the way to do this is to focus on interdependence.  
 
Using an Eliasian analogy one might say that the shifting balance of power in the 
figuration of the sociological community has recently tipped in favour of the ‘social’ 
side of the equation. Elias arrived on the scene when this was anything but the case, 
however. This is probably explanation enough for the fact that his thought was long 
overlooked in academic circles. As the balance has tipped in his favor, Elias might be 
said to be both a cause and the beneficiary of this turn of events in that the worth of his 
work has been increasingly recognized in recent years. 
 
While certainly not without its critics, the explanatory power of Elias’s civilizing 
process in the European context (and beyond) has proven significant. The Eliasian 
understanding of civilizing processes has been used in many other contexts and to 
explain many social phenomena
3 but one culture to which it has not been applied in 
                                                 
2 The written Chinese word for person, ren, which joins the characters meaning ‘human being’ and ‘two’, 
might offer some insight into the starting point for understanding this assertion (Renard 2002: 434). The 
Chinese do not think in terms of the individual, but in terms of the person in relation with others. 
3 Stephen Mennell recently made a valuable contribution along these lines, in this case applying Elias’s 
framework to the United States (Mennell 2007). Craig Calhoun of New York University refers to it as 
‘long overdue’ and Bruce Mazlish of MIT calls it a ‘splendid contribution to history, sociology and  
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great depth is that of China (Brandstadter (2000) being one exception). Given the 
obvious size and growing impact of Chinese culture as well as the growing popularity of 
Eliasian thought, it would seem an opportune, if not overdue time for such an effort. It is 
hoped that through such an investigation further insight will be gained into both the 
Chinese culture and the general applicability of the thought of Norbert Elias. As Stephen 
Mennell pointed out, concerning the verification of the “theory of civilizing processes… 
The best test - urgently needed - of whether the specific pattern of development first 
sketched for Western Europe represents a more generally valid model would be to 
investigate other historic civilizations - India, China, Japan for instance” (Mennell 1989: 
237). That is exactly the direction this thesis intends to take. 
 
Biographical Background 
The background of Norbert Elias’s life and thought have been fairly well fleshed out in 
the writing not only of Elias himself, but in work by a number of other writers who all 
touch on the subject in greater or lesser detail (Mennell 1989, 1992, Cavalletto 2007; 
Goudsblom 1977, 1995; van Kreiken 1998, 2001). But it is still worthwhile spending a 
few moments looking at relevant aspects of his background in order to better situate the 
argument to be put forward in this thesis. It is hoped that in doing so some of his 
motivations and therefore his entire oeuvre will be a more comfortable fit in the second 
part of this thesis. 
 
Elias struggled throughout his professional life to put forward a particular view of social 
science. That view was never entirely accepted. In the introduction to one of Elias’s 
articles, Mennell says that Elias objected to being called a social theorist simply because 
                                                                                                                                                        
international relations.’ The present thesis would not pretend to be anything like so comprehensive an 
effort with regard to China, but it is hoped that it is a step along that path.   
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for him social science had to be empirical as well. According to Mennell, Elias “argued 
that good sociology was always and necessarily simultaneously empirical and 
theoretical” (Mennell 1995: 1).  In meeting his own standard, he used documentary and 
historical evidence throughout his work, the most obvious example being his use of 
medieval manners books. Mennell says that by the mid 80s, when Elias’s 
aforementioned article was written, it had become acceptable to speak in terms of 
habitus, but not in terms of long term developmental perspectives (Mennell 1995: 3). 
 
Elias seemed to have a profound sense that the accepted wisdom within the discipline of 
sociology on the nature of man and social reality was fundamentally flawed. In fact, 
Stephen Mennell points out that his whole master work, The Civilizing Process, was 
really a “model of a sociology which represents a radical rejection of many of the basic 
assumptions of conventional sociology” (Mennell 1989: 4). Elias remained consistent in 
this stance throughout his career. Goudsblom points out that The Civilizing Process, 
  
and Elias’s subsequent writings are marked by the consistent application 
and elaboration, of one central perspective. At the core of this 
perspective is the concept of interdependence. Whether he is dealing 
with the naval profession, with the dynamics of sports groups, with a 
community study or with the abstract concept of time, in all of his work 
Elias is concerned with the manifold ways in which people are bonded 
to each other, in cooperation as well as in conflict. In this respect his 
work represents an implicit running polemic against the tendencies both 
to treat human beings as homines clausi, and to isolate the various 
aspects of what they do, feel and think (Goudsblom 1977: 79).   
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Elias had very strong and definite views about the historical nature of the social and 
psychic make-up. He had a well documented dispute with his doctoral supervisor, 
Richard Honigswald, over his own thesis along these lines, which was only resolved 
when Elias acquiesced in making the ‘necessary’ changes. Interestingly enough, 
Honigswald was himself apparently not one to pander to fashionable lines of thought, 
but was, unfortunately for Elias, not quite so tolerant of the same attribute in his 
charges. Honigswald stood staunchly in the neo-Kantian camp and was thus unable to 
reconcile Elias’s shift to the heretical position of holding “that mental categories are 
historical products of long-term intellectual development” (Cavalletto 2007: 180).  
 
Whether or not Elias ever got over this disagreement with his supervisor - Cavelletto 
suggests it should be obvious to any student of Elias that it “continued to vex him until 
his dying days” - is open to question, but it can certainly be argued that, at the very least, 
the experience provided him with further motivation in pursuit of his goal (Cavalletto 
2007: 181). This is confirmed when Elias later made the initial discovery of Courtin’s 
Nouveau Traite de civilité that provided him “a way to substantiate notions he had long 
held about the historicity of the human psyche”  (Cavalletto 2007: 178). This ‘epiphany’ 
is described by Cavalletto as a seminal moment in Elias’s thinking (Cavalletto 2007: 
178). Cavaletto says Elias was seeking “a way to overthrow academic psychology’s 
scientisitic methods and ahistoricist conception of the human mind” (Cavalletto 2007: 
179). According to Cavalletto, Elias’s goal was ‘to overturn the dominant idea of the 
psyche as ‘static and unchangeable’ and ‘mak[e] the rules of the historical change in the 
psychical accessible to our understanding’” (Cavalletto 2007: 194).      
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 In that this goes to the very heart of Elias’s conflict with Honigswald, Cavalletto’s point 
is well taken. Regardless, Elias’s thesis does seem to have set him on the track that he 
would continue to follow, more or less, for the rest of his career. Mennell sums this 
focus up as; “long-term social processes as a form of order sui generis” (Mennell 1989: 
8). From this point forward Elias would consistently focus on the process nature of 
social reality in attempting to develop a more historically informed sociology. It is 
arguable that the rest of his thought flows rather naturally from of this starting point. 
 
The Six ‘Antis’  
The investigation will begin by first viewing Elias’s ideas in terms of what they are not. 
It is hoped that this will aid in bracketing, or further situating, his thinking to make its 
use in the rest of the thesis more easily accessible. As noted, Elias early on railed against 
the then current approach to social science which he considered to be both static and a-
historical, and hence gravely misleading (and misled). He had significant difficulty with 
numerous other closely intertwined concepts which might be said to emerge from these 
two. Johann Arnason’s description of Elias’s ideas in negative terms provides a good 
outline of these issues (Arnason 1987). The following are his six ‘antis’ formulated in an 
effort to describe what Elias felt to be areas of misconception within the sociological 
cannon and in proposing Eliasian theory as a ‘Counter-Paradigm’.
4 Each will be 
described only briefly here in an effort to set the stage for what will come after. 
 
1. Anti-Economistic  
With his figurational sociology, Elias was not looking at “…a common denominator of 
social action and social relations” as had Marx (Arnason 1987: 433). He was focussing 
                                                 
4 It is acknowledged that, as Arnason points out in several cases in his paper, there are problems with 
some of Elias’s assertions; however those issues are not the primary concern here. For further elucidation, 
see Arnason, 1987.  
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much more on a relational view of society as a better way of coming to an 
understanding of power, and in this way moved beyond Marx. He felt that Marx had 
tried to explain all of social development by using only one aspect of it and that this 
approach was destined to lead to misconceptions. 
 
‘relations of production’ is a misconstruction; it obscures the all-
important point that the internal logic of social relations as such always 
transcends the functional correspondence to or dependence on 
purposeful activity (Arnason 1987: 432).  
 
Arnason seems to feel that by failing to move beyond economics the field was left too 
open to more dogmatic followers of Marx to develop a sort of economism. For Arnason, 
and for Elias, the unplanned aspect – unintentional outcomes - of social relations is 
always more important than the planned functional aspects.   
 
2. Anti-Normative  
Elias held that in an effort to come to terms with social reality one had to dig down to a 
more basic level than social norms. “Norms should, in other words, be understood as a 
superimposed layer of social reality, varying in strength and scope but always partial 
and derivative” (Arnason 1987: 435). They are not a priori fixtures of the social world. 
Instead, they emerge out of the social world. That being the case, how can one come to 
an understanding of how relations not governed by such norms came to be so? The only 
way to achieve the necessary depth of analysis for Elias was to look at long-term social 
processes. This more basic level of social analysis upon which Elias focussed, and upon 
which he urged the sociological community to focus, was specifically that of “power  
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balances and power chances” as they played out within this new, longer term 
perspective (Arnason 1987: 435).  
 
Elias’ aim is to show that the civilizational periphery of normative 
structures is in the last instance reducible to configurations of power, 
and that this infrastructure also determines the overall framework of 
social life - including its normative patterns: the ‘social constraint 
towards self-constraint’ is seen as one aspect of the more 
comprehensive network of controls and constraints, arising from the 
interdependence of people (Arnason 1989: 46).  
 
This, for Elias, is the “more fundamental layer” to be examined in any effort to 
understand social reality (Arnason 1987: 435). Blok stands fairly decidedly in Elias’s 
and Arnason’s corner on this point. “Theories emphasizing ‘values,’ ‘ethos,’ 
‘subculture,’ and so on, are inherently circular; they fail to account for the values 
themselves and, by ignoring the realities of power and power resources, they beg the 
very question they claim to answer” (Blok 1977: 179). The more appropriate starting 
point for all such theorizing is, argue Blok and Arnason, with power or, at the very least 
somewhere other than with norms. 
 
In that some of the sociological classics were clearly more concerned with norms 
(acknowledging, as Arnason does, Durkheim’s growing awareness of the problematic 
aspect of a one-sided emphasis on norms), Arnason suggests that Elias was a “more 
concrete and decisive step beyond the classics” (Arnason 1987: 437).  
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3. Anti Reductionistic   
Elias advocated that the social world was something to be studied in and of itself, and as 
such argued against the “tendency to subsume the social system under a common 
denominator of living systems” (Arnason 1987: 438). Sociological theory should, 
therefore, focus on the social. “According to Elias, the overall evolutionary process 
generates increasingly complex forms of integration” from inorganic to organic to social 
(Arnason 1987: 438). In this development it is the form of organization that gains in 
explanatory force. For this reason the latter cannot be explained in terms of the former. 
This is theoretically a far cry from the more reductionistic conceptions of social theory. 
He was clearly opposed to the search by Parsons for a model that would cover 
everything from amoebas to Chinese civilization. “As Elias sees it, the social level of 
integration adds new forms and dimensions to the pre-social ones, and social theory 
should focus on these innovations, rather than on the search for invariant aspects” 
(Arnason 1987: 438, 439). Elias looked at invariants as part of a bigger evolutionary 
process: “all apparent invariants are in reality relativised through the incorporation into 
a more comprehensive and complex figuration” (Arnason 1987: 439). Once one moves 
on to the social, one is looking at something not only vastly more complex, but 
categorically different, and which cannot be explained simply in terms of the less 
complex. 
 
For Elias, to search out social reality as part of any other discipline or under any other 
guise than the social could lead only to mistaken understanding. Sociological research 
necessarily focuses on an object at an entirely different level of complexity which 
therefore has to be analysed in a very different fashion. 
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4. Anti-Functionalistic 
For Elias, functionalism is “both one-sided and value laden” (Arnason 1987: 440). As 
the term function is most commonly understood it simply reintroduces teleology with 
regard to social relations and thus redirects the focus away from relations back in the 
direction of individualism by encouraging “an image of society as the individual writ 
large” (Arnason 1987: 440). The point for Elias is that all social relations necessarily 
entail perspective as an essential element and that certain conclusions flow directly out 
of this fact. When talking about functions it is all too often the case that this element is 
neglected and the “figurations of empirical individuals upon which the institutional 
patterns are imposed” are ignored (Arnason 1987: 441). ‘Functions’ cannot be 
adequately described without taking their perspectival character into account. 
 
Arnason points out that;  
 
From a strictly relational point of view, the concept of function is to all 
intents and purposes synonymous with that of interdependence… to 
acknowledge the pluri-perspectival character of social relations is to 
relativise all systemic centres and boundaries. Systems are always 
superimposed on more fundamental, more extensive and only partially 
controllable figurations, and every systemic pattern interacts, overlaps 
and competes with others of a comparable kind (Arnason 1987: 441). 
 
Within Elias’s overall understanding of the social milieu, function properly understood 
is simply another word for interdependence, and as such is both superfluous and 
misunderstood within sociology.  
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5. Anti-Structural  
The notion of structure at the very least downplays and may even eliminate process 
from social thought. Arnason suggests that Elias’s pointed remarks about this are 
probably primarily directed at the limitations inherent in those conceptions of society 
put forward by both Marx and Durkheim. Within the structural approach the more 
dynamic historical aspect of structure, if there can be said to be one, is something to be 
considered only after an understanding of the ‘internal constitution’ is reached. This 
limiting of the elemental notion of process is, of course, unacceptable to Elias. Jackson 
suggests that Elias goes a bit too far in this direction and in this he may have a valid 
point. “Theories that recognize both institutional and figurational structures can provide 
a fuller picture of human behavior” (Jackson 2003: 733). That some significant 
correction in this direction was necessary is evident, however. Elias insists on the 
starting point of analysis being change, or, as we will see, the “processual patterns 
embedded in historical contexts” (Arnason 1987: 442). These patterns of change emerge 
out of the central position of power within the social nexus. 
 
For Elias the universality of process in social life seems to be a direct 
consequence of the omnipresence of power: because of the plurality of 
centres, the diversity of resources, and the asymmetry of balances, the 
structure of power can only exist in a state of flux, and the only order 
that can be imposed on them is that of durable patterns of change… The 
fusion of structure and process is thus achieved by the means of a 
redefined and generalized concept of power (Arnason 1987: 442-443).  
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Because power is so fundamental an aspect of social relations, in fact for Elias the 
object of sociological inquiry, and because the power balances that are relationships are 
so constantly and necessarily shifting, any proposed focus on the more static concept of 
structures is misguided at best. “Elias sensitizes the sociological imagination to 
problems of language and particularly the dominant conceptual vocabulary that reduces 
processes to states” (Quilley and Loyal 2004: 6). This is undoubtedly one of his most 
enduring contributions to the field. The importance of the concept of power will emerge 
with greater clarity later but for present purposes it is enough to say that all relations are 
indeed, in one fashion or another, power relations in the sense that they are rarely 
(never) equal and there is always a power balance between the actors involved. It is for 
the reason of its ‘omnipresence’ that power is mentioned at this point. As Olofsson 
makes clear in his chapter in the book Norbert Elias, everything is about negotiating 
power balances in relationships (Olofsson 2000: 361 - 375). Elias holds that the more 
equal the relations are, the more tightly enmeshed the actors are. These relations, the 
effect the actors have on each other, the power over, and hence fear that can be instilled 
from one to the other, represent the social constraints that are so important in Eliasian 
thinking.  
 
6. Anti-Individualist  
Eliasian theory moves strongly against what he refers to as ‘homo clausus’ (closed man) 
and towards ‘homines aperti’ (open man). This is probably the most basic of his 
objections to the then accepted paradigms. The notion of homo clausus will for that 
reason be discussed in somewhat more detail later but for now it is enough to say that it 
represents the idea of the individual somehow isolated within the biological box of his 
body from the outside environment. For Elias this was unacceptable in that “individual  
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and society cannot be separated, that they merely represent two different levels of 
observation. Group processes have certain peculiarities that are distinct from individual 
processes, but one must always consider both levels” (Elias 1994b: 64). 
 
In holding that scholars should never go too far towards either end of the individual-
society spectrum Elias seems to be, according to Arnason, pointing his criticism first 
and foremost at Max Weber, whom he considered to have held a strongly individualistic 
sociological perspective. Having said that, Elias, in The Symbol Theory, also fingers 
Parsons and Habermas for the same misperceived individualism (Elias 1991b: 20). He 
does go on to point out however, that they are not primarily at fault for the “knowledge 
blockage” evidenced in their theories. It is actually a result of the then current idea of 
human beings as individual actors. The social theorists mentioned “are spokespersons 
and representatives of a distinctive social habitus which is characteristic of our age” 
(Elias 1991b: 20). With this, he is pointing to a concrete example of his theoretical 
position. There is another important aspect of this same problem that Elias wants us to 
be aware of. Approaching the study of society as a collection of individuals hides the 
fact that larger units and/or organizations have characteristics of their own which are 
categorically different from the individuals making them up (Elias 1987: 29-31). This is 
not to say that organizations have an existence apart from the individuals making them 
up, but that they are not reducible to and far more complex than individuals.  
 
Arnason suggests that while power is central to all of Eliasian thinking, “it is here 
[within homines aperti, the social aspect of man] that we can grasp its most basic 
meaning: the re-conceptualization of the social nexus in terms of power” (Arnason 
1987: 444). For Elias, individuals are, throughout their lives, part of figurations (loosely  
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described as webs of relations) which they ‘co-determine’, in relation with others also 
part of the same figurations. This co-determination is worked out through “the network 
of controls and constraints” of the figuration (Arnason 1987: 444). In other words, they 
are worked out through the balances of power that are the relations that make up the 
figurations. It is only by starting with the figuration that one can understand either the 
individual or society. Once again power comes to centre stage as also fundamentally 
necessary in understanding this formulation. 
 
Norbert Elias was clearly seeking to change the way the entire field of social science 
was pursued. This fact is reflected in all of his work; from the most basic of his premises 
to his grandest conclusions. As the above implies, Elias formed a system for 
understanding social development that went against much of the accepted wisdom, 
starting with Marx’s economic theory, and moving through a number of the various 
other figures and schools of the time. All of the above objections can ultimately be 
traced back to his starting point in interdependence and long-term historical process 
(Arnason 1987: 442). How successful he was in consistently adhering to all these ‘anti’ 
positions is a matter of some debate, but that he did advocate such a position overall is 
fairly apparent in his work.  
 
Having looked at Arnason’s ‘Six Antis’ the focus now shifts to what it was that Elias 
was trying to put forward. This will be done first through an examination of his 
historical perspective, to be followed by a more specific study of his concepts and ideas. 
This is clearly not intended to be a thorough examination of Norbert Elias’s entire body 
of work, but it is proposed that these concepts are the ones central to the cross-cultural 
analysis making up the second part of this thesis.   
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Process – Elias’s Historical Understanding of Sociology and Social Development 
Arnason further confirms Elias’s position in pointing out that “Elias’s objections to 
classical and contemporary paradigms are closely linked to his interest in the analysis of 
long-term processes” (Arnason 1987: 442). It is worthwhile briefly looking at Elias’s 
understanding of the historical nature of social reality. Given that his ideas on the 
civilizing process represented a rejection of most of what was accepted theory at the 
time of its formulation, it is not difficult to see just how integral historical process was 
for him. As noted above, one of Elias’s early intuitions about psychic development was 
of its deeply historical nature. In other words, in The Civilizing Process he proposed that 
the human psyche changed over time in response to changing social circumstances. 
These changes, both the social and the psychic, are processes that occur slowly over 
extended periods. 
 
Elias’s basic point is that habitus and culture are very slow to change, 
making it impossible to understand social life except over long spans of 
time. A temporal dimension, in other words, is crucial to understanding 
the workings of human social life (van Krieken 1998: 49).  
 
To do other than to view society from a very long-term perspective is to run the risk of 
committing the unpardonable sin of what Elias called ‘process-reduction’, which is to 
take both the temporal and the constantly changing nature of social reality out of the 
equation. The field of sociology at the time when Elias was developing his ideas was, in 
Elias’s opinion, rather more focussed on social reality as consisting of static elements  
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fitting together in static fashion and, therefore, in Elias’s view, hopelessly caught in this 
trap. He describes this problem nicely with the following: 
 
We say ‘The wind is blowing’ as if the wind were actually a thing at 
rest which, at a given point in time, begins to move and blow. We speak 
as if the wind were separate from its blowing, as if a wind could exist 
which did not blow (Elias 1978: 112). 
 
We tend to see a thing naturally at rest which takes on the added characteristic of motion 
and change. The wind, at rest, subsequently blows. This is a misperception.  
 
He discusses this as a linguistic problem which translates into a conceptual problem, 
something he believes has created enormous difficulties in the sociological endeavor. 
Elias points to an interesting example that might help in understanding the background 
of this issue.  
 
Studying the long-term development of the words ‘culture’ and 
‘civilization’ leads to a number of relatively unexpected discoveries. 
One is that in the eighteenth century both terms to a large extent 
referred to processes, while in the twentieth century they represent 
something almost entirely static. This declining sense of the dynamics 
of social processes is by no means confined to the changing meanings 
[of] the concepts ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’. The increasing tendency to 
conceptualise processes as if they were unchanging objects represents a 
more widespread pattern of conceptual development running conversely  
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to that of society at large, the development and dynamics of which have 
noticeably quickened from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries 
(Elias 1989: 225). 
 
He goes on to point out that in the eighteenth century the rising middle class’s 
understanding of these terms “reflected this deeply development-oriented and dynamic 
character of their attitudes and basic beliefs” (Elias 1989: 227). By the twentieth century 
this had clearly changed with the vision of what is actually an ever-changing social 
reality being seen in a much more static fashion. But again, it is important to remember 
that these changes in perception are attributed by Elias to historic transitions in social 
relations; in this case the rise of the middle class and all that entails in the civilizing 
process. 
 
Referring to his civilizing process, Elias discusses this basic misapprehension of then 
contemporary sociology. He starts by saying that when looking into social processes the 
focus  must be on “society itself” (Elias 1994a: 288).   
 
This applies to the process of feudalization as to the process of 
increasing division of labour; it applies to countless other processes 
represented in our conceptual apparatus by words without process-
character, which stress particular institutions formed by the process in 
question, for example, the concepts of “absolutism”, “capitalism”, 
“barter economy”, “money economy” and so on. All these point beyond 
themselves to changes in the structure of human relationships which are 
clearly not planned by individuals and to which individuals are  
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subjected whether willingly or not. And this applies finally to the make-
up of people themselves, to the civilizing process (Elias 1994a: 288).  
 
With the word ‘process’ appearing six times in the above passage, the point should be 
clear. The concept of process under-girds essentially all of what Elias is talking about. 
This word, of course, entails both time and change. 
 
At the time when Elias was developing his ideas, and for a significant period thereafter, 
the social sciences were not very accommodating to this sort of thinking. Van Krieken 
suggests one possible contributing factor in saying that sociologists were uncomfortable 
with the determinism of evolutionary theory. In other words, evolution, which 
necessarily (at that time at least) occurs by  gradual accumulation of minor changes over 
extended periods, simply did not fit into their understanding of social reality as 
consisting of structures and functions and other such relatively fixed entities. 
Unfortunately, “in the process sociologists also forget about history altogether” (van 
Krieken 1998: 49). This quote is helpful in understanding the macro side of Elias’s 
social theory. The difference lies in the understanding of how these processes work. 
Where their focus was on, for example, structures and functions, Elias was looking in a 
very different direction. For Elias, their static starting points and units of analysis were a 
significant error in method and resulted in a number of difficulties which had to be 
resolved for the discipline to get back on the right track.  
 
Looking at long-term processes or what is often termed historical sociology, helps in 
gaining a clearer picture of Eliasian thought, for it directly impacts his entire oeuvre. As  
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we saw, his career started with an eye to this understanding of social reality, and he 
never really deviated from it. He was not treading entirely new ground here.  
 
The long-term socio-cultural differentiation of human groups in varying 
degrees of competitive interdependence has been familiar to 
sociologists since the days of Victorian social evolutionists. So have 
processes of integration into larger co-ordinated units, processes which 
are the other side of the coin from differentiation, the two running 
together in the long term, though with many complicated leads and lags 
over the shorter term (Mennell 1990: 360).  
 
The sociological community seemed to have been aware of long term development of 
sorts, yet in Elias’s eyes they still viewed social reality through hopelessly short-sighted 
lenses; in terms of reified units of analysis. 
 
His magnum opus, The Civilizing Process, would of course be the outstanding example 
of his own perspective. His examination was of a civilizing process which itself 
(continues to) occurred over, in effect, millennia, and which he was dogged in pointing 
out, had neither a start nor a finish.  
 
There is no zero point in the historicity of human development, just as 
there is none in the sociality, the social interdependence among men. In 
both ‘primitive’ and ‘civilized’ peoples, there are socially induced 
prohibitions and restrictions, together with their psychic counterparts, 
socially induced anxieties, pleasure and displeasure, distaste and  
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delight. At the very least, therefore, it is not very clear what is meant 
when the so called primitive standard is opposed as ‘natural’  to the 
‘civilized’ as social and historical (Elias 1994a: 131).   
 
Elias’s study looks first at the Roman period, extends through early feudalism and then 
the state court society, proceeds further to ‘bourgeois’ dominated society, and extends 
into the future to a ‘world society’. With no beginning or end to the process, there is 
only constant change and transition. In addition, each and every one of the processes 
with which we are concerned that are part of Elias’s overall civilizing process; state 
formation, integration, differentiation, extending chains of interdependence, and 
internalization of constraint, exemplify and analytically flow out of this historical 
‘process nature’ of social reality. What this whole civilizing process, along with all its 
key elements, is ultimately all about, of course, is changing interdependencies – 
relations between people – and the impact of those changes on the human psyche. It is 
all about sociogenetic change effecting psychogenetic change over extended periods of 
time. It is ultimately about how ‘traditional man’ became ‘modern man’. “Rather, what 
Elias wants us to contemplate is the entire restructuring of the personality and psychic 
economy in the process of historical change” (Burkitt 1991: 174).  
 
The civilizing process viewed from a distance is really the process whereby people’s 
characters, their self-control, and the controls themselves become ‘more even’, ‘more 
automatic’, and ‘more all-round’ over extended periods (Mennell 1998: 20). There is no 
single universal process, with specific characteristics that fit all cultures and societies. 
The civilizing process is involuntary and with no beginning or end. “Only the direction 
is clear” (Elias 1995: 8). One can not look at any one individual or any society and say  
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that they are civilized - they are only becoming more civilized, often in fits and starts, 
and always over extended periods of time.  
 
The process of civilization is related to the acquired self-regulation that 
is imperative for the survival of a human being… Without learnt self-
regulation a person is not in the position, without great discomfort, to 
defer - in accordance to realistic circumstances - the fulfilment of urges 
he or she pursues, nor to change the direction in which they are 
pursued… The pattern of self-regulation, the way it integrates to one’s 
own urges and those of other people, changes in a definite direction in 
the course of the development of humankind. The concept of 
civilization quite properly relates to the direction of this process (Elias 
1995: 9). 
 
Different societies will go through different civilizing processes, but, according to Elias, 
all these processes have a singular direction toward the internalization of constraints 
leading to the more self-controlled individual described above.
5  
 
It is also worth noting at this point that the process nature of social reality for Elias will 
be an important point of comparison in looking at the Chinese situation; specifically 
how, and over what time frame, the process played out in each context. Elias does 
acknowledge that different societies go through different processes, and that all 
processes entail constant change, but the important point is that the long term direction 
of the change is always the same. In the Chinese case it will be obvious that the 
                                                 
5 Duerr makes the argument that people from traditional societies often exhibit considerable – and 
possibly greater – control than people in more modern societies (van Kreiken 1998). This objection may 
apply in the case of the Chinese and will be discussed in somewhat more detail in a later section.  
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civilizing process being proposed contrasts with that of Europe in important ways. 
Having said that, it is held that there are interesting and worthwhile parallels to be 
discussed. It will also be made clear that while there is consistent change through time, 
there are also what Schwartz refers to as dominant orientations weaving their way 
through the social fabric of time (Schwartz 1985: 3). Because the Chinese civilizing 
process occurred over more extended periods, it is posited that these orientations, to be 
described loosely as Confucian in nature (hierarchy, respect for elders, filial piety, 
among others), are more obvious and important to the analysis. The point of this brief 
digression is to prepare the ground for seeing both difference and change as inherent, 
and to stress that these dominant orientations, when they are described in more detail, 
should not be misconstrued as being static social structures.  
 
In looking at Elias’s historical perspective the focus is on how changes in social 
structure actually effected changes in psychic structure, or personal habitus, over time. 
Primarily, Elias looked at the transition from feudalism to the state in European society, 
with the idea that this change was largely responsible for increasing differentiation, 
integration, and extending chains of interdependence. These social changes ultimately 
resulted in greater affect control and eventually the internalization of social constraint as 
self-restraint at the individual level. This is what Elias referred to as the second nature. 
 
So, as part of the individual civilizing process, learning self-control is a 
human universal. It follows that the conversion of external constraints 
into self-constraints takes place in all societies. But the degree, strength 
and pattern of this process vary between societies, as does the balance  
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between external constraints and self-constraints adopted as a social 
standard in each society” (Mennell 1989: 207).  
 
While there are undoubtedly other similarities and differences Mennell here points to 
the one most fundamental to Elias’s work. The process of the internalization of 
constraint, the bedrock of Elias’s civilizing process, differs from one society to the next. 
That it happens in all societies, however, is equally true in Elias’s eyes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
31
Chapter One – Social Processes 
 
In this chapter, a number of Elias’s central concepts will be examined in greater detail, 
sometimes within his overall theory, sometimes not. It should be reiterated that the 
intent is not to isolate and therefore reify these ideas. It is only to gain a greater 
understanding of them in order to enable their application to Chinese culture. The way 
in which they are arranged is not meant to imply a temporal or hierarchical ordering. It 
is simply thought to be the best way to introduce the main points to be put forward in 
Part Two of this thesis, and hence, those points central to the whole project. 
 
For Elias, the central ideas in sociological analysis are process and interdependence. 
Having already dealt at some length in the Introduction with the importance of historical 
process, the focus over the next several pages will turn to interdependence. It might be 
said of Elias that “his subject matter is always people in dynamic interdependence” 
(Mennell 1992: 94).  “Elias sees patterns of relations to be of greater significance.  ‘The 
individual’ is not the point of departure or epistemological foundation for sociology. 
Social relationships should, according to Elias, be the analytical starting point for 
sociology as a study of how societies work” (Olofsson 2000: 371). It is only here, within 
social relations (or interdependencies), that one can begin to gain an understanding of 
the social whole.  
 
Focussing on interdependence in formulating his civilizing process, Elias assembled a 
formidable social theory that has effectively proven its worth in terms of explanatory 
power. Ilse Seglow comments: “Already then Elias had put into the centre of his 
sociology the problem of interdependence which was then - and it still is - greatly in  
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advance of prevailing “interaction” theories” (Seglow 1977a: 21). In this sense Elias 
was and remains ahead of his time. 
 
Elias had a profound sense that the historical development of humankind could only be 
understood in relational terms. To say that he was the pioneer in this aspect of his 
thinking would be misleading. Taken individually the relational planks from which his 
platform was built were not particularly original, but viewed as a whole; the platform 
they constructed was. As will be explored in more detail below, he was able to 
overcome some of the more problematic lingering issues through his unique view of the 
bigger picture.  
 
Determining how social constraints turned into self-restraints is the primary issue both 
for Elias and for sociology at a more general level according to Stephen Mennell. 
 
How these constraints through other people from a variety of angles are 
converted into self-constraints is the question that links the mainly 
‘microscopic’ concerns of volume I of The Civilizing Process to the 
mainly more ‘macroscopic’ concerns of volume II. In constructing this 
link, in showing how the regulation of the whole instinctual and 
affectual life by steady self-control becomes more and more all-
embracing in step with the developing structure of society as a whole, 
Elias sketches their psychogenesis and sociogenesis (Mennell 1989: 95). 
 
This is clearly true of Elias’s civilizing process. Quilley and Loyal suggest that the 
civilizing process that Elias describes entails   
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the internalization of progressively more restrained codes of conduct, 
greater and more or less automatic patterns of self control, the 
increasing mediation of affective drives and short-term impulses - by 
processes of calculation and foresight - and in short the formation of a 
more complex ‘super-ego’ agency in the psychical structure (Quilley 
2004: 49).  
 
The Civilizing Process then, forming the backbone of Elias’s life work, might be 
accurately described as his answer to the question of the hegemony of either the macro 
or the micro approaches to sociology. For it is within this transition from external 
constraint (the constraints of the social environment or social other) to internal restraint 
(psychic restraint) that the macro is tied to the micro, that socio-genesis is tied to 
psycho-genesis. Elias would say neither the macro nor the micro approaches to the 
fundamental questions of sociology are correct in and of themselves. He instead aims at 
a target somewhere in between, and in so doing, has found a way to effectively access 
both. His target for the bulk of his analysis is, as has already been emphasized, 
interdependence. 
 
The central idea of Elias’s civilizing process is that changes in social relations, or 
interdependencies, result in changes in personal habitus, or psychic structure. As already 
shown in Chapter One, he looked at the transition from feudalism to the state in 
European society. In the process of this transition social interdependencies were 
transformed in fundamental ways. His idea was that this rather lengthy transition was to 
a very large degree responsible, through the civilizing process starting first within  
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limited circles and expanding from there, for increasing affect control and eventually the 
internalization of social constraint as self-restraint. Over time this internalized constraint 
became part of the habitus of the wider public that would later result in what Elias 
referred to as “second nature… as an automatic self-restraint, a  habit that, within certain 
limits, also functions when a person is alone” (Elias 1994a: 113). In different words, the 
individual’s way of understanding and responding to the world is a product of the 
processes of social change. 
 
If Stephen Mennell is correct in his assertion that the main issue of sociology is the 
development of self-restraint, and if it is accurate to say that this shift is fundamental to 
the transition from traditional to modern culture, then a logical extension of this thought 
would be that Elias has provided another way of discussing the mechanisms of the 
transition from traditional to modern culture. Elias himself took pains to point out that 
he was applying the detail of his ideas on the civilizing process only to the European 
context but also seemed to imply at several points that all societies go through civilizing 
processes, even if the details differ. To quote Mennell again;  
 
So, as part of the individual civilizing process, learning self-control is a 
human universal. It follows that the conversion of external constraints 
into self-constraints takes place in all societies. But the degree, strength 
and pattern of this process vary between societies, as does the balance 
between external constraints and self-constraints adopted as a social 
standard in each society (Mennell 1989: 207).  
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The process itself, the balances involved, may differ from society to society but the 
overall trend of external to internal constraint is always the same. Referring to his 
monopoly mechanism, Elias says that if 
 
in a major social unit, - so the mechanism may be roughly summarized - 
a large number of smaller social units which, through their 
interdependence, constitute the larger one, are of roughly equal social 
power and are thus able to compete freely – unhampered by pre-existing 
monopolies – for the means to social power, i.e. primarily the means of 
subsistence and production, the probability is high that some will be 
victorious and others vanquished, and that gradually, as a result, fewer 
and fewer will control more and more opportunities, and more and more 
units will be eliminated from the competition, becoming directly or 
indirectly dependent on an ever-decreasing number (Elias 1994a: 347). 
 
Again, in this case he is talking about his monopoly mechanism in the European 
context, though referring to different timeframes and in language such that the process 
should be applicable beyond European boundaries. If that is the case then it should be 
possible to apply his processual concepts to other societies in an effort to elucidate their 
developmental path; not that they will provide a complete and definite explanation but 
that they may shed some light on a situation that would remain murkier otherwise. This 
would situate Eliasian thought as a good starting point for analysing the Chinese cultural 
context, one that is in many ways still highly traditional, and one that is also currently in 
a period of rapid transition. Part Two of this thesis will be an effort to do just this, for it 
is held that Chinese society is experiencing an analogous process to that at the time  
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when the ‘bourgeois’ class began to assert itself in Europe. The question that has to be 
addressed is why this society remained so traditional for so long. 
 
Monopoly Mechanism 
In talking about Elias’s state formation process as it applies to America, and as he points 
out similarities between America and Europe, Stephen Mennell starts with a basic 
premise. “State formation was a violent competitive process through which there 
emerged successively larger territorial units with more effective monopoly apparatuses” 
(Mennell 2004: 160). This was central to Elias’s state formation and therefore, civilizing 
processes. Elias proposed that there was what he referred to as a monopoly mechanism 
operating on the transition from a feudal social structure to one dominated by the state in 
the European context. 
 
Elias’s theory of state formation implicitly begins from Max Weber’s 
definition of the state as an organization which successfully upholds a 
claim to binding rule making over a territory by virtue of commanding a 
monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, but he by-passes the 
problematic term ‘legitimacy’  by linking a rising level of internal 
security and calculability in everyday life directly to the formation of 
habitus (Mennell 1998: 16). 
 
This mechanism is central to his civilizing process as a whole in that it essentially sums 
up the process leading to the advent of the state, and for Elias, the state is ultimately 
integral to the internalization of constraint. Where states formed in Europe, they 
followed a pattern easily identifiable with Elias’s monopoly mechanism. He provides a  
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nice description of the functioning of the monopoly mechanism with the following 
observations of the social situation of the time (occurring initially in France but 
eventually all over Europe, though again, the process was different in different places): 
 
that a monopoly will sooner or later be formed has a high degree of 
probability, at least in the social structures that have existed so far. In 
the language of exact science, this observation would perhaps be called 
a ‘law’. Strictly speaking, what we have is a relatively precise 
formulation of a quite simple social mechanism which, once set in 
motion, proceeds like clockwork. A human figuration in which a 
relatively large number of units, by virtue of the power at their disposal, 
are in competition, tends to deviate from this state of equilibrium (many 
balanced by many, relatively free competition) and to approach a 
different state in which fewer and fewer units are able to compete, in 
other words it approaches a situation in which one social unit attains 
through accumulation a monopoly of the contended power chances 
(Elias 1982: 99-100). 
 
This transformation begins with numerous feudal territories, all relatively equal in 
strength, vying for greater control. Finally, over the course of an extended period, 
“through marriage, purchase or conquest” one becomes clearly the strongest assuming 
command of all the other territories (Elias 1982: 94). Early, it is the individual knights 
fighting for more territory and hence, more power. Then it is the larger territories 
fighting each other for more space and greater control, first within the territories, and 
then between them. It will be important to remember that, as per Elias’s final sentence in  
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his description above, when they contend for territory they are really competing for 
more power. More territory means control of more resources and more people. In this 
sense, territory equals power. They are fighting for control of a greater proportion of the 
available power chances. If they do not expand, they will be taken by their neighbours. 
All are competing for survival, and if they do not compete successfully, they do not 
survive. This is true at the very least in terms of their position and prestige, their power, 
and was often true in a literal sense as well. If they do not become more, they become 
less. The process of elimination continues until there are only two, or a few, left. At that 
point those that remain are approaching a monopoly position. The winner ultimately 
secures a monopoly of physical violence.
6 “The mechanism leading to hegemony” 
according to Elias, “is always the same” (Elias 1982: 95). In looking at China’s 
civilizing process it will be evident that a very similar progression occurred over the 
centuries leading up to the eventual unification under the Qin dynasty over two 
millennia ago. In this sense Elias is corroborated in his belief that the civilizing process 
in terms of the monopoly mechanism operates in the same ‘law-like’ fashion in different 
places and times. 
 
Comparing the ‘free feudal nobility’ with the ‘courtly nobility’ Elias says that, “In the 
former, the social power of the individual house, a function of both its economic and 
military capacity and of the physical strength and skill of the individual, determines the 
allocation of resources; and in this free competition the direct use of force is 
                                                 
6 At this point there are actually two monopolies that are vital to the maintenance of the monopoly 
position. The first, as already stated, is the monopoly of violence where “Free use of military weapons is 
denied the individual and reserved to a central authority” (Elias 1982: 104). The second, described by 
Elias as the other side of the same coin, is that of taxation, whereby the right to tax the property and 
income of individuals is reserved by a central authority. Each both supports, and cannot survive without, 
the other. The monopoly of the means of violence enables the central authority to collect taxes, and the 
money secured through taxation enables the centrally controlled military, and hence, the monopoly of 
violence. As one goes, so goes the other. For the purposes of this effort, in speaking of the monopoly of 
violence, both are assumed unless otherwise stated. 
  
 
39
indispensable” (Elias 1994a: 352). In this earlier situation, the use of violence is basic, 
and the distribution of resources is determined by the head of the house (on a very local 
basis), the person most adept at the skilful use of violence. Social functions are 
relatively independent. 
 
Elias compares the eventual monopoly situation with the above more competitive 
environment in saying, “As against this phase of free competition, monopoly formation 
means on one hand the closure of direct access to certain resources for increasing 
numbers of people, and on the other a progressive centralization of the control of these 
resources” (Elias 1994a: 352). This transition is vital both in terms of the civilizing 
process and, as will be evidenced, the overall analysis of this thesis, for the situation in 
China developed far differently. As the resources, or more precisely, their distribution, 
became more centrally controlled in the European context the formerly independent 
social functions became dependent social functions. With unification and the formation 
of the state in China, centralized control of the distribution of resources was never 
achieved in a lasting way. In Europe the formerly traditional social relations/functions 
had been fundamentally altered. The old figuration was changed forever. This was not 
the case in China. It was at this point that the Chinese civilizing process took a different 
route. The traditional social relations and functions remained largely as they had been 
despite the formation of a state with a monopoly of violence. More and more people in 
Elias’s European context became dependent upon the central authority for access to 
needed resources and hence had to look progressively farther down chains of 
interdependence to meet daily needs. They had to interact in a different way with many 
more, different people. Initially, it was the monopoly of violence by the central authority 
that facilitated this change.   
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In historical terms Elias’s discussion of the European situation begins with Louis VI 
consolidating his power in the region of Francia. He was apparently preoccupied with 
this effort throughout his reign from 1108 to 1137 (Elias 1982: 92). At that time there 
were a number of feudal lords fighting it out for control of this region of what would 
later become France. Elias makes very clear that the difference in strength between the 
eventual victor, the Capetians, and the surrounding houses was at first not all that great. 
He adds to this the “low degree of economic integration, undeveloped transportation and 
communications, and the limitations of feudal military organization” as further 
contributing factors to the difficulty in acquiring the monopoly that would ultimately 
come to the victor (Elias 1982: 93). “Louis VI was… essentially a great landowner who 
had to contend with lords with somewhat smaller possessions and military power; and 
only the victor of these battles could attain a kind of monopoly position within the 
territory, beyond the competition of other houses” (Elias 1982: 92). Giving a specific 
example, Elias refers to the house of Montlhery occupying a very important strategic 
location and as having become largely independent in a typically feudal fashion. This 
represents what Elias refers to as “a typical example of the centrifugal movements that 
are taking place everywhere in this period” (Elias 1982: 93). Louis apparently struggled 
for control of this fortress for many years. When the final victory came he added a tidy 
sum of 200 pounds to his own income (“a handsome sum for those times” (Elias 1982: 
94)) and over thirty fiefs providing significant military strength. There were other battles 
as well, and with each victory the dominance of the Capetian position grew, while that 
of its competitors diminished.  
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As an important corollary to this, it is worth considering briefly how the lives of the 
people formerly under Montlhery rule changed. With this new situation, they had 
become part of a significantly larger, more centralized domain. Spierenburg, in his 
discussion of the unique nature of the development of the Dutch Republic, says that 
“Integration and state formation on a higher level imply a loss of functions, prestige and 
power of people on a lower level” (Spierenburg 1977: 366). He also points out that this 
process was common. Control over the resources the Montlherians produced was no 
longer their own, or even local, but was in the hands of someone with whom they may 
have had no contact whatsoever. In fundamental ways this changed the entire web of 
social relations in which the people, all the people, of the Montlhery estate formerly 
existed. As the overall argument develops in Part 2 of this thesis, this point will become 
more important. For the Chinese, the emperor controlled all under heaven in name only, 
ruling instead from afar by moral example. Control over the distribution of resources, in 
fact, remained in local hands, much as it always had. 
 
The battle for Montlhery was merely the first step leading to the huge monopoly of 
military and economic strength that the French state would become “four or five 
centuries later” (Elias 1982: 94). It is very unlikely that Louis, or any of the other feudal 
lords, had any vision toward this ultimate outcome. Again drawing on  Spierenburg and 
his study of the Dutch Republic, explanations based on singular causes and effects fail 
in that they miss the unintended character of the social processes involved (Spierenburg 
1977: 362). “He acts under the direct compulsion of his actual situation” (Elias 1982: 
95). If Louis does not control the house of Montlhery, he loses control of a significant 
portion of his domain. Again, if he does not become more, he becomes less, and 
possibly disappears altogether. It was roughly half a millennium later that the true  
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monopolist emerged from the fray. It is hardly conceivable anyone involved in the 
process planned for what would be the eventual outcome. 
 
Social Constraint/Internal Restraint 
In talking about this overall civilizing process Elias points to a steady historical trend of 
increasing division of social functions, or differentiation, binding people from all classes 
together in relationships of interdependence (Mennell 1989: 109). What this represents 
is greater specialization of essentially economic (subsistence) tasks necessarily resulting 
in decreasing self-sufficiency. This is what is occurring as the monopoly mechanism 
works itself out and as authority becomes increasingly centralized in any given society. 
The traditional figurations, and the people within those figurations, whether one is 
looking at the courts or elsewhere, became increasingly integrated into the larger society 
and thus dependent upon a more centralized authority. As a result, they also became 
dependent on a significantly larger number of other people who had formerly been 
beyond their figurational boundaries. In addition, the social distance between people in 
terms of hierarchy gradually decreased as well.  
 
The persisting division of social functions has continued to bind all 
social classes and strata to each other in more equal – not equal but 
more equal – interdependence… Elias uses the term functional 
democratization to denote the process by which every individual is 
enmeshed in longer and denser webs of interdependence with more and 
more others, leading to a greater reciprocal dependency and more multi-
polar control within and among groups... In the circulation of models,  
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functional democratization is expressed in an overall trend toward both 
diminishing contrasts and increasing varieties (Mennell 1989:109). 
 
As the more traditionally hierarchical figurations were forcibly changed through the 
relentless centralization of the monopoly mechanism, social relations were progressively 
levelled as well. Within the traditional figuration resources were controlled by the head 
of the house (or village) and social relations were relatively fixed in a strict hierarchical 
order. Both integration into the wider society and differentiation of social functions were 
fairly low. In China, contrary to the situation in Europe, this remained the case until 
fairly recently. 
 
Fletcher points out that for Elias differentiation usually corresponds to economic events 
while integration usually corresponds to political events. Both economic and political 
development was at an early stage at the time when these traditional figurations were the 
norm. Fletcher draws on Elias in talking about the role of the monopoly of violence in 
the formation of the state as “one aspect of an overall social process which was 
inextricably bound up with fiscal and commercial activities” (Fletcher 1997: 64 ). This 
became increasingly true as the emerging monopolist gained control of progressively 
more territory and resources, and hence, the distribution of those resources. The chains 
of interdependence between people extended and grew more complex, and the average 
individual necessarily relied on an ever greater number of others to meet their daily 
needs. What had been traditionally far more independent social functions within more 
traditional and hierarchical figurations broke down (or at the very least, became less 
important) in favour of new, more dependent, level social functions.  
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This, of course, occurred first at court with the courtly nobility where they became 
reliant on the king and their fellow courtiers. One should not underestimate the size and 
impact of these court phenomena as they progressed toward the absolutist state courts. 
Elias has received some criticism (briefly outlined in Kuzmics, 1987) for his 
(over)emphasis on the courts as a social formation. He responded to this in saying that 
that the courts were for a long time the models for the rest of society. “National 
bourgeois society is pre-dated by a pan-European courtly aristocratic society which 
created those models of peaceful interaction responsible for civilizing the warriors of 
medieval society, through manners which become ‘refined’ and ‘polished’” (Kuzmics 
1987: 517-518). Elias clearly never said the courts were the sole force influencing the 
civilizing process, that there were not other interweaving factors, but he did hold to the 
idea that they were a quite significant force in themselves. Once again, it was at the 
courts where the model for the civilised habitus was initially set. 
 
Van Krieken  confirms that for Elias court society on the whole was a very important 
period in the social development of Europe calling it “a significant form of social 
organization” (van Krieken 1998: 86).  
 
In the seventeenth century the absolutist ruler had a great influence on 
the development of self-constraint among courtiers, in that he forced the 
nobility to transform themselves from warriors into courtiers; and court 
life demanded a high degree of self-restraint (Elias 1994b: 60).  
 
For Elias this transition to self-constraint is the civilizing process and the courts were 
where it all began. With the model having been set at the courts, it gradually spread to  
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the wider population (van Krieken 1998: 97). It was the courts that set the standard for 
the rest of society, making the courtiers the primary contributors to this process for an 
extended period. Through the civilizing process the behaviours and constraints of the 
court gradually filtered down to become those of the ‘bourgeois’ and eventually the 
peasant classes of society. Chartier points out that for Elias it was not a simple matter of 
characteristics flowing down from the elite to the masses and being accepted there, 
however. Rather, for him, it was the competitive struggle of the ‘bourgeois’ which then 
led the court to further their own demands for ‘civilité’ in order to further their own 
distinction. This competition led to ever “raising even higher the threshold of censorship 
of behaviour” (Chartier 1988: 89). It was always a two way process for Elias. 
 
In the situation at court the former heads of feudal territories became isolated, 
essentially waiting on the king. The constraints on behaviour of the people at court 
became intensified as they attempted to pursue every possible avenue of advantage over 
their ‘peers,’ all the while forming and playing by a new set of rules. These rules were 
initially enforced by the social other, or what Elias came to call Fremdzwänge. Fremd 
“literally means ‘alien,’ ‘stranger,’ and ‘external,’” and Cavalletto goes on to say Elias 
uses it here to mean “socially interdependent other people” (Cavalletto 2007: 211). 
“‘Zwang’ brings to the compound a meaning not only of ‘constraint’ and ‘control’ but 
also of ‘compulsion,’ ‘pressure,’ and ‘coercion’” (Cavalletto 2007: 211). Using this 
word Elias sets out the extent of the impact of the social other on ego. It is the social 
other, the fremd, who essentially forces certain standards of behaviour on ego. This 
word is rendered in many forms in the English translation, indicating the many ways it 
can be understood, and furthering the previous point.  
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Cavaletto points out that this also shows the many ways the sociogenetic and the 
psychogenetic can be related.  
 
Thus, Femdszwang signifies both ‘social structure’ and ‘psychic 
structure’; more specifically, Fremdzwäng signifies particular 
configurations of the interface between these two structures… In The 
Civilizing Process, Fremdzwäng often functions simultaneously as both 
a sociological and psychological concept, thereby exhibiting a key 
quality of Elias’s method of ‘historical social psychology’ (Cavalletto 
2007: 258).  
 
He goes on to point to Elias’s claim that his method is at the same time sociogenetic and 
psychogenetic.  
 
This, in turn, is related to the historical variability of the idea. The reader must 
understand this to understand Elias’s rendering of the term ‘social structure’. Social 
structure for Elias is “a pattern of pressures exerted upon people by their relationship 
with others upon whom they are functionally dependent either directly or indirectly; it is 
a historically specific ‘system of pressure exerted on living people by living people’” 
(Cavalletto 2007: 212 citing Elias). Cavalletto is quoting Elias’s Society of Individuals 
here in order to emphasize his idea that it is the matrix of forces resulting from people in 
relation that forms the connection between the sociogenetic and the psychogenetic. 
Regardless of the specific social situation, as people are in relation and are therefore 
functionally dependent on one another, they also represent a constraining influence on 
each other. “While a fundamental premise of the entire Eliasian project is the  
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universality of the constitutive role played by Fremdzwäng in the formation of the 
human personality, the character of this constitution varies radically  from one historical 
period to another” (Cavalletto 2007: 212).  
 
This is equally true from one society and/or culture to another. At the point of the feudal 
courts that are Elias’s primary subject matter, the Fremdzwäng are a given lord’s fellow 
courtiers, those at court with whom he must interact, those with whom he must contend 
for social position. As the social situation, or the interdependencies, change, so too do 
one’s Fremdzwäng.
7 
 
This new situation was entirely different from that of the feudal lords who were much 
more independent in their self-sufficiency, and were allowed almost free reign of 
emotion and action. Elias vividly describes the court situation: 
 
These are the consequences of the new, increased dependence in which 
the noble is now placed. He is no longer the relatively free man, the 
master of his own castle, whose castle is his homeland. He now lives at 
court. He serves the prince. He waits on him at table. And at court he 
lives surrounded by people. He must behave toward each of them in 
exact accordance with their rank and his own. He must learn to adjust 
his gestures exactly to the different ranks and standing of the people at 
court, to measure his language exactly, and even to control his eyes 
exactly. It is a new self-discipline, an incomparably stronger reserve 
                                                 
7 There is a potentially very interesting parallel here to Chinese guanxi as it developed in the revolutionary 
period. This will not be explored specifically in depth in this thesis, but the implied connection will be 
clear, and it merits further research.   
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that is imposed on people by this new social space and the new ties of 
interdependence (Elias 1994a: 177).  
 
The former feudal lords now ensconced at the victorious monopolist’s court remain in a 
struggle for power chances, albeit on a far more limited basis. The battle they now wage 
is not an independent conflict with swords, one where they are in command, but a 
dependent one of wit that requires a greatly heightened sense of awareness and control 
of all aspects of interaction. They are now fighting a battle in which weapons are denied 
them, for social position within a new figuration in which they are but another member. 
In this case independent social functions have been taken over by dependent ones as 
these formerly highly autonomous lords now must look to the king and all the other 
courtiers in living out their daily lives. They are now far more integrated into and 
dependent upon the more centralized authority that the monopolist represents. 
8 
 
With the growing intensity of these dependencies and constraints, far different from 
their former social reality, the courtiers were gradually and increasingly forced to 
monitor themselves.  
 
When life at court located distinction in proximity,  reality in 
appearance and superiority in dependence, it required of those who 
participated in it specific psychological gifts that are not common to all, 
such as the art of observing others and oneself, the censorship of 
                                                 
8 This transition from independent to dependent social functions is quite significant in the analysis of the 
Chinese context, for it is posited that this is where the fundamental difference between the civilizing 
processes of the two cultural blocks lies. As was pointed out above, different societies proceed through 
their own civilizing processes at different rates and in different ways. The Chinese shift from independent 
to dependent social functions took far longer than that in the West. 
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sentiments and the mastery of passions and the internalization of the 
disciplines that govern civilité. A transformation of this sort modified 
not only ways of thinking but the entire structure of personality and the 
psychic economy of the individual to which Elias gives an old name: 
Habitus (Chartier 1988: 88).  
 
With the continuing growth in differentiation in society, the ‘bourgeois’ gained in 
influence and began to compete professionally in wider circles, as well as competing to 
enter the elite courtly society. In the process, they took on aspects of courtly behaviour 
in an effort to emulate those of higher rank. This was done primarily to facilitate their 
own rise in stature, and thus their own access to more power chances. With this process, 
“the waves of expansion of the standards of civilized conduct to a new class go hand in 
hand with an increase in social power of that class, a raising of its standard of living to 
that of the class above it, or at least in that direction” (Elias 1994a: 506). This change 
had occurred by about the eighteenth century according to Elias. 
 
Here it is important to make the Eliasian connection between the civilizing process at 
court and that among the ‘bourgeois’, for they can appear to be two distinct processes 
with little theoretical connection. To facilitate this Elias will be quoted at some length: 
  
In every social stratum that area of conduct which is functionally of 
most vital importance to its members is the most carefully and 
intensively moulded. The exactitude with which, in courtly society, 
each movement of the hands while eating, each piece of etiquette and 
even the manner of speech is fashioned, corresponds to the importance  
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which all these functions have for courtly people both as means of 
distinction from below, and as instruments in the competition for royal 
favour… They are pre-conditions for the respect of others, for the social 
success which here plays the same role as professional success in 
bourgeois society (Elias 1994a: 502-503). 
 
Elias makes the point here that those skills deemed most important in the competition 
for power chances are naturally those skills most carefully monitored and therefore most 
highly developed. It is these skills, whatever they may be, that will set one apart from 
others, and facilitate successful competition. The mode and means may differ from class 
to class, but the goal does not; greater control of power chances. And neither does the 
result according to Elias; the internalization of constraint. Continuing with the same 
source we see that where the ‘bourgeois’ may have started by imitating the skills used 
by the courtier as a means of ascendancy, with continuing competition, differentiation 
and the associated changes in social structure, the skills deemed necessary for success in 
their quest changed as well: 
 
Other skills take their place as primary skills on which success or failure 
in life depends – skills such as occupational proficiency, adeptness in 
the competitive struggle for economic chances, in the acquisition or 
control of capital wealth, or the highly specialized skill needed for 
political advancement in the fierce though regulated party struggles 
characteristic in an age of increasing functional democratization. While 
the aristocratic courtiers’ personality structure is to a large extent 
determined by the need to compete for status and power chances within  
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one of the ruling establishments of their age, the social personality 
structure of the rising bourgeois strata is determined by the competition 
for a greater share of the growing capital wealth, or else for jobs or for 
positions which endow their occupants with greater political or 
administrative chances of power. These and related competitive 
struggles now become the main factor of constraint which leave their 
imprint upon the personality of individuals (Elias 1994a: 503). 
 
The social milieu in which the ‘bourgeois’ operated clearly differed significantly from 
that of the courtier. For this reason their short term goals, which were really a means to 
an end, differed as well – wealth as opposed to the courtier’s pursuit of social position. 
9 
 
With regard to movement toward self-restraint in court in France, as opposed to that of 
the ‘bourgeois’, Mennell stipulates that Elias was 
 
not arguing that self-restraint was uniquely severe in these circles, nor 
that it is exclusively from the cultural legacy of these circles that the 
pattern of restraint in modern society is derived. In fact, in many asides 
comparing the constraint of life at court with those found in what is 
badly translated as ‘professional- bourgeois’ society, Elias depicts the 
latter as more compelling. For one thing it was only towards their peers 
                                                 
9 In clarifying this transition, Elias distinguishes two different bourgeois groups; the robins and the lower 
bourgeois. Mennell points out that the interests of the robins were not identical with those of the lower 
bourgeois but that they all depended on the crown in maintaining their privileges. They were tied into the 
old status quo. “Only with the emergence of bourgeois forms not dependent on privileges derived from 
the crown did this cease to be true - and then the old middle class was swept away along with the monarch 
and the nobility” (Mennell 1989: 79). It is held that only then could wider social dependencies with longer 
chains of interdependence form among the bourgeois.  
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that court people need subject themselves to great constraint, and far 
less toward their social inferiors inside and outside the court. In 
bourgeois society, the occupational functions - competition for capital 
and wealth, the acquisition of professional skills, success in business - 
are far more central to social existence and esteem, and through the 
occupational sphere people of all classes are far more closely bonded to 
each other. Bourgeois people of the nineteenth century were shaped 
above all by the necessities of careers demanding regulated work and 
the subjection of affects to routine; overall, the pressures upon them 
were more demanding than those upon courtiers. (Mennell 1989: 93). 
 
The social side of court life that had been so vital to the courtiers was for the most part 
relegated to private life for the ‘bourgeois’ (Mennell 1989: 93). But for Elias, constraint 
on the ‘bourgeois’ was still more demanding than that on the courtier. This point is quite 
important in that, as alluded to earlier, it has been suggested that Elias is advocating the 
idea of a much more stringent social environment at court than in other social milieus 
and/or at other times. This is not the case. What the ‘bourgeois’ and the courtiers have in 
common in their respective civilizing processes is a great deal of social constraint as 
well as the ever-present differentiation, integration, and competition for the goal of 
access to power chances. No matter the social class, people compete for this goal 
resulting in increasing differentiation and finally the internalization of constraint – the 
civilizing process. And in the historical situations of both the courtiers and the 
‘bourgeois’, the social constraint is internalized as self-restraint. 
 
Van Krieken sums up this process, as seen by Elias:   
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The development of habitus ‘always veers towards a more or less 
automatic self-control, a subordination of short-term impulses to the 
commands of an imagined longer-term view, and to the formation of a 
more complex and secure “superego” agency’. The dynamics of this 
development, Elias felt, was also always the same in Western societies, 
beginning with ‘small leading groups’ and then affecting ‘broader and 
broader strata’, not through some process of ‘diffusion’, but resulting 
from the dynamics of social competition (van Krieken 1998: 105-106). 
 
The specifics of the civilizing processes for both groups may have been different but 
they are in a sense tied together through competition for power chances. The so called 
diffusion of the model set at court to the lower social classes did not occur through a 
passive process of assimilation but more one of aggressive competition. The details of 
the courtiers’ environment and struggle certainly differed from that of the ‘bourgeois’, 
but the fact of the struggle, and the general goal for which it was waged, were the same. 
This is presumably true for all civilizing processes. The notion of competition as it plays 
out in different social environments is a very important point of analysis for comparing 
the civilizing processes of Europe and China. 
 
From the ‘bourgeois’, the civilized habitus finally trickled down to the masses. The ever 
increasing social differentiation continued and was accompanied by a greater need for 
affect control as one was forced to interact with and give consideration to an ever-
growing number of people. Here again we see independent social functions being 
replaced by dependent ones except now on a much broader scale. People even down to  
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the local level were integrated into and became dependent upon the centralized state for 
their needs. Also, over time and as the chains of interdependence became more 
extended, Elias says that the external social constraint once manifested at court and 
filtering down to the broader society, became internalised as self-restraint here at the 
broader, lower social levels. Differentiation continued, there was more specialization 
and interdependence, and relations between people and classes became more equal 
facilitating greater interaction. The chains of interdependence one had to deal with in 
living out each day became so long, involving so many people, that they could no longer 
actively consider and engage them all. They had to account for the constraint imposed 
by these myriad unseen, often unknown, others by restraining themselves. Van Krieken 
summarizes Elias’s ideas thus: “Elias argued that the restraint imposed by increasingly 
differentiated and complex networks of social relations became increasingly 
internalized, and less dependent on its maintenance by external social institutions, 
developing what Freud was to recognize as superego” (van Krieken 1998: 98).  
 
Over time anti-social impulses that had been consistently suppressed externally in the 
past no longer needed external monitoring, as they were restrained internally; and this, 
at last, by the whole population. 
 
Taking a step back and looking at Elias’s civilizing process as a whole, the most 
important individual aspect would seem to be differentiation, or the division of social 
functions. “Elias specifies the increasing division of social functions and state formation 
processes to be crucial for the sociogenesis of European civilizing processes” (Fletcher 
1997: 53). State formation and the monopoly of violence broke down the traditional 
figurations and social relations through assuming control of resources and their 
distribution, turning what had been independent social functions into dependent ones.  
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The traditional self-sufficiency of the local community gave way to a more integrated, 
dependent situation. With the old, more restrictive social relations breaking down and 
new ones emerging, people found themselves in competition for a greater share of the 
power chances available, spurring greater differentiation. It is the social process of 
differentiation that is the characteristic common to all the societies of Elias’s analysis. 
Within given societies, regardless whether one is looking at the courtier, the robin or 
lower ‘bourgeois’, or the peasant, again it is differentiation that remains the common 
thread. Fletcher confirms this with the following remarks when talking about drive and 
impulse controls (civilizing processes): “in the European case this was related to the 
competitive pressures increasing the division of social functions and the number of 
people dependent upon one another”(Fletcher 1997: 53). Clearly, this process of 
differentiation occurs at all levels as a result of competitive pressures; competition in 
pursuit of power chances. Competition spurring differentiation is what drives the 
civilizing process of the social theory of Norbert Elias. This will also be an important 
point of focus for Part Two of this thesis as Eliasian theory is taken to the Chinese 
world. 
 
Manners 
Early in his discussion of changing social behaviour, and manners in particular, Elias 
makes an important point for the analysis of the Chinese situation when he suggests that 
the traditional social order had been, 
 
if not broken, extensively loosened and in a process of transformation. 
Individuals of different social origins are thrown together. The social  
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circulation of ascending and descending groups and individuals speeds 
up (Elias 1994a: 64). 
 
As the traditional social ties binding people into their figurations were altered by the 
social processes then occurring (state formation, integration, differentiation, extending 
chains of interdependence), different people from different classes and origins were 
interacting together in ways that they never had before. New figurations with more 
extended chains of interdependence were forming. He refers to new hierarchies forming 
after a time, and along with it a new upper class. As will be evidenced, the process Elias 
describes here is mirrored in the situation as it developed in China during the Post-
Opening period after 1978.  In this new situation in Europe, Elias talks of the 
unprecedented exposure of people from the new upper class to the pressures of others 
and to social control. This breaking down of the old social order was a more or less 
necessary step in (or possibly ‘precondition to’) the continuing civilizing process. As 
different relationships, and sets of relationships, were formed and became a regular part 
of people’s lives, different rules for interacting became necessary. These rules of 
conduct, of course, exist in all societies and go through periods of change, contributing 
to civilizing processes.  
 
For Elias it was a matter of representing them in some fashion. In attempting to do so, 
he found an interesting, and quite powerful, starting point for putting forward his 
position on the historical nature of social development: For it was in the above 
mentioned social context that “the writings on manners of Erasmus, Castiglione, Della 
Casa, and others are produced. People, forced to live with one another in a new way, 
become more sensitive to the impulses of others” (Elias 1994a: 64). Elias points out that  
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these men were not the first to concern themselves with such issues. The important point 
is that there is always movement. There is no beginning or ending point, no start or 
point at which one can say the process is complete. Elias is simply choosing the 
medieval period as his point of analysis. Stephen Mennell refers to how in the manners 
books we see greater observation of conduct. Elias’s point was that “preservation of 
one’s social position under severe competitive pressure necessitated a more 
psychological view of people” (Mennell 1994: 186). At the time the manners books 
were produced, people’s behaviour was more tightly prescribed. It was these restrictions 
that were put down in books for a wider audience.  
 
Beginning with medieval manners books, Elias deals initially with manners at table. He 
is able to show an unmistakable trend over time as the manners books were first directed 
at the court aristocracy. They then became very popular with the rising ‘bourgeois’ as 
they at first attempted to imitate the court, and later came to interact on a relatively more 
level playing field. De Courtin’s book, for example, was meant for a more ‘well-bred’ 
audience, but enjoyed “not inconsiderable success from the interest of the leading 
bourgeois strata” (Elias 1994a: 82). This diffusion to the ‘bourgeois’ occurred mainly in 
the eighteenth century. After that, “The church proves, as so often, one of the most 
important organs of the downward diffusion of behavioral models” (Elias 1994a: 83). 
Regardless of mode and method, the important point remains the diffusion from the 
model-setting class to the rest of society. Increasingly restrictive table manners were set 
at court and diffused through the population over time. The individuals at court continue 
to alter their own manners in order to stay ahead and apart from the lower classes, while 
the lower classes continued to try to keep up. Proper manners represent power chances 
and as mentioned above, all are competing for access to those chances.   
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From table manners, Elias moves on to examining the bodily functions with which all 
people necessarily have to contend in one fashion or another, and in so doing very 
effectively positions himself to further his argument. In his choice of subject matter, he 
examines  
 
things that humans cannot biologically avoid doing, no matter what 
society, culture or age they live in. Moreover, infants are born in the 
same emotional condition everywhere, so the lifetime point of departure 
is always the same. Therefore, if change occurs in the way these 
functions are handled, it can be seen rather clearly. In so doing Elias 
was choosing strong ground from which to fight a battle with those who 
see the relationship between social personality and the structure of 
societies as merely random (Mennell 1989: 37). 
 
He is able to show how, over time, people’s response to bodily functions changed. In the 
parts of his study representing earlier time frames, “Neither the functions themselves, 
nor speaking about them or associations with them, are so intimate and private, so 
invested with feelings of shame and embarrassment, as they later become” (Elias 1994a: 
110). With time, and due to changing social relations, Elias shows these bodily 
functions to have  taken on a whole new range of meaning and significance. Only 
people ‘in the know’ and ‘in touch’ with power knew the proper ways of responding to 
such things. They set the precedents for the rest of society. 
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He starts with the blowing of one’s nose. Here he shows how starting in the European 
Middle Ages when people used their hands/fingers whenever need arose, the behaviour 
gradually changed to being restricted at table as well as in terms of which hand could be 
used, to the use of a handkerchief first by the upper class, and finally to its use by the 
public at large – “at least among people who lay claim to ‘good behavior’” (Elias 1994a: 
122). Over the course of the two centuries involved the blowing of one’s nose became 
progressively more restricted and ‘hidden’ (though he does make the point that the use 
of the hands is not eliminated completely). Obviously, in most contexts in today’s 
Western world, the idea of blowing one’s nose into one’s hand is not a very pleasant 
thought. 
 
He also deals with both the bedroom and relations between the sexes. In both cases he is 
able to show the same general ‘civilizing’ process occurring in similar sequence and 
over similar timeframes. As greater shame is associated with the acts of sleeping and 
sex, they are gradually removed behind the scenes of daily life. This remains largely 
true today.
10 
 
At this point the discussion of bodily functions ends with the act of spitting. As part of 
simply being alive all people accumulate saliva in their mouths on an ongoing basis. 
That is a human universal. What a given person does in response to that biological 
situation is another matter. Elias points out that “since the [European] middle ages, 
behavior has changed in a particular direction. In the case of spitting, the movement was 
unmistakably of the kind  we call ‘progress’” (Elias 1994a: 128). During the Middle 
Ages, spitting was thought both a normal and necessary part of everyday life. There 
                                                 
10 Elias does point to a relaxation of restrictions on such functions in modern times but claims this fits in 
with his ideas, in that this implies even greater self-control. This argument will not be dealt with in this 
thesis.  
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were few restrictions even at court. Beginning in the sixteenth century this started to 
change as more restrictions were placed on the act and spitting too, was gradually 
moved ‘behind the scenes.’ 
11 
 
Spitting is an interesting case study with regard to the European and Chinese civilizing 
processes. Mennell makes a telling point when he says, “For instance, when spitting was 
accepted and frequent, it was said to be unhealthy to retain sputum; only after spitting 
became socially unacceptable was it declared unhygienic” (Mennell 1992: 46). The 
same initial attitude seems to hold true for at least some parts of China today.
12 
 
By choosing biological functions as the focus of his discussion on manners, Elias was 
able to empirically show how, over extended periods, what had been considered normal 
and acceptable social behaviour was gradually constrained through manners, how this 
constraint became accepted as normal for ever widening circles, and how these norms 
were eventually internalized, representing essentially a demonstrated shift in the human 
psyche.  
 
                                                 
11 Things that are considered bad manners are removed behind the scenes, so to speak. By this he means 
simply that such behavior is taken out of the public view. Elias makes an interesting allusion to China 
here with regard to the use of the knife. The Chinese apparently thought of Western people as ‘barbaric’ 
because they used the knife in their eating. Whereas it had at least been “behind the scenes of social life” 
(Elias 1994: 99) in the West (carving still had to be done), in China it had been removed much earlier and 
more radically. It had been removed completely. He points out that “One may assume that this custom is 
connected with the fact that for a long time in China the model-making middle class has not been a 
warrior class but a class pacified to a particularly high degree, a society of scholar officials” (Elias 1994: 
103). This observation has interesting implications that will not be explored in detail in this thesis but 
which will be included tangentially. 
12 In dealing with the issue of why different people from different people groups respond to the same 
stimulus so differently, Elias looks at their history and their social context. Interestingly enough, in 
today’s China we see a similar response with regard to spitting as that of the average person in the 
Western Middle Ages. Whether or not there is a direct correspondence between the civilizing processes of 
the two cultures in areas as specific as this is a question that will not be delved into in this project (except 
indirectly).  
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What is important is that in this change, in the inventions and fashions 
of courtly behavior, which are at first sight perhaps chaotic and 
accidental, over extended time spans certain directions or lines of 
development emerge. These include, for example, what may be 
described as an advance of the threshold of embarrassment and shame, 
as ‘refinement’ or as ‘civilization.’ A particular social dynamism 
triggers a particular psychological one, which has its own regularities 
(Elias 1994a: 82).  
 
Social changes had effected psychic changes and these changes had occurred over 
significant spans of time. As such, choosing manners as they relate to bodily functions 
was a very effective focus for establishing his ideas on civilizing processes.  
 
In the European Middle Ages manners had apparently been talked about a lot but they 
had not changed much or become lasting habits. With the new and/or changing social 
context, the new pattern of social relationships, people started to examine or reflect on 
their own behaviour more than in the past. This is not to say that the self suddenly 
became an object of intense and prolonged scrutiny, but that one’s own behaviour was 
given more careful consideration than in the past, simply because it was now far more 
important. As a result, the standards of behaviour were set in motion. 
 
The degree to which human life and behavior can be molded by 
historical processes remains to be determined in detail… all this shows 
how natural and historical processes interact almost inseparably. The 
formation of feelings of shame and revulsion and advances in the  
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threshold of delicacy are both at once natural and historical processes. 
These forms of feelings are manifestations of human nature under 
specific social conditions, and they react in their turn on the 
sociohistorical process as one of its elements (Elias 1994a: 131).  
 
Elias mentions that the behaviour standards he talks about were first made by the court 
for the court. Speaking of eating behaviour, he says that up to about the fifteenth 
century, though there was some small movement in a civilizing direction, manners 
remained fairly consistent. There was not yet very great restraint in medieval society. As 
the civilizing process progresses, this begins to change. Wider and wider circles of 
society adopt the models set out at court. During roughly the sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
eighteenth centuries, manners at table “press constantly in one direction, toward a new 
standard of table manners” (Elias 1994a: 86). From this point on, something important 
began to happen that, while not removing daily conduct from view, pushed it into the 
background; the rise of the ‘bourgeois’ and the accompanying focus on achievement as 
opposed to manners (Elias 1994a: 86-87). While the importance of manners does not 
immediately disappear from view, their central defining authority diminishes from that 
of earlier times. This represents another significant change in the social context as the 
balances of power continue to shift with changing interdependencies.  
 
Sociogenetic - Psychogenetic Change  
Roland Robertson summarizes Elias’s understanding of the civilizing process in very 
simple terms; “For Elias, the civilizing process consisted in the way in which what had 
been, historically, constraints on human behaviour became internalized” (Robertson 
2006: 421). Here he confirms for Elias what Mennell stated was the case for sociology  
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in general. Elias’s view of sociology in terms of history and long-term social processes 
is tightly tied to his understanding of psychic change. He feels that we could not 
understand the connection between the psychic and the social unless we understood the 
psychic as ‘in motion’ in the same fashion as the social. In other words, while society 
was undergoing long term change, so too was the psyche.  And Elias goes further in not 
only saying that these changes were related, but in providing fairly substantial empirical 
evidence to support his case (both The Civilizing Process and The Germans being good, 
but certainly not the only, examples). 
 
Elias’s feeling was that in order to understand changes in the human psyche one had to 
look at changes in human society. It was here, in the ongoing change in human society 
and social relations, that one could get to the roots of shifts in the human psyche.  
 
Specifically, Elias shows how the process of internalization of restraints 
and the resulting transformation in behavioural codes (psychogenesis) 
was intimately connected with transformations in the division of labour, 
demographic shifts, processes of societal pacification, urbanization and 
the growth of trade and the money economy (sociogenesis) (Quilley 
2005: 818).  
 
Quilley and Loyal also argue that, 
 
there are processual connections between the scale, internal 
organization and interdependence of those groupings around which 
people have ‘we-images’ and ‘we-feelings’ (which might be variously  
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families, clans, villages, tribes, empires, nation-states), the control and 
management of violence within and between such groupings, and 
individual processes of socialization and psychological formation 
(Quilley 2005: 819). 
 
This, of course, goes to the very heart of all of Elias’s work. That is not to say that the 
process is completely one way with social change dictating psychic change, but only 
that the one can not be understood without the other. There is clearly a link connecting 
the interdependencies between individuals to the psychic development of said 
individuals. Over the course of this process “the moulding of affects, the structure of 
drives and consciousness, in short the whole social personality structure and the social 
attitude of people are changed at the same time” (Mennell 1998: 141). In short, the 
social and the psychic are inseparable, moving not necessarily in tandem, but always in 
response to each other.  
 
Internalization Process - The Formation of the Individual 
According to Szakolczai, both Elias and Borkenau agreed with each other (and 
apparently also with Weber, Freud, and Simmel) that individualism “represents a 
precarious balance” in need of explanation and that it was “rooted in the collapse of the 
medieval order” (Szakolczai 2000: 59). While individualism is most often taken as a 
given in today’s West, this position is not at all justified. The collapse of the earlier 
social order led men to search for a new order “guided by a new elite” (Szakolczai 2000: 
60).  
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The centrality of the individual knowing subject in traditional 
epistemology can be shown to have arisen from the  individual self-
experience of people, particularly aristocratic and bourgeois 
intellectuals, during specific phases of the development of Western 
societies...This self-experience has produced the homo clausus 
individual analysed by Elias (Kilminster 1998: 17 Citing Elias).  
 
Elias suggests they found the new elite in the courtly aristocracy. This development is 
fundamental to the civilizing process. For Elias the source of individualism was to be 
found in “the taming of violence by the courtization of warriors” (Szakolczai 2000: 60). 
It is held in this thesis that this relationship between individualism and its causes – the 
civilizing process – is a key element in understanding some of the major differences 
between European and Chinese culture. This is true in that it relates directly to their 
respective civilizing processes, which are quite different, and in that their levels of 
individualism are so radically different. 
 
In attempting to come to an understanding of this process it is valuable to look at 
another closely related process – that of rationalization. Rationality is not an attribute of 
individuals.  
 
The term ‘rationalization’ refers to changes in the way people habitually 
orient themselves in the world in which they live, and these changes are 
directly related to the way they are bonded with each other. In other 
words, the forms of behaviour we call rationality are produced within a  
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social figuration in which short-term impulses are subordinated to 
longer-term projects (Mennell 1998: 19).  
 
Rationalization is part of the civilizing process and not the “principle propellent of long-
term social development” (Mennell 1998: 19). Rationalization, the development of 
reason, is an integral aspect of the civilizing process. It is also true that Elias does not 
opt for an explanation of his civilizing process solely in terms of reason. Rational 
understanding is not the driving force behind the civilizing process. In fact, it is the 
civilizing process that explains rationalization. Exemplifying this point, Elias shows, 
according to Mennell, that the standards arose first and the justification later. The 
spitting reference from Mennell again serves as an informative example: the rationale 
for not spitting only surfaced after the act itself had become socially unacceptable 
(Mennell 1992: 46). Instead, an increase in rationality goes with the civilizing process in 
that greater control over affect and impulse is both rational and naturally occurs as part 
of the civilizing process. It is also worth noting that different social contexts undergoing 
different civilizing processes may have different forms of rationality. “Norbert Elias in 
his study of courtly society in France compared the ongoing evaluation of the courtiers 
social position to a stock exchange... such a configuration as the French court carried 
with it a specific type of rationality” (de Swaan 1977: 392). The implication is that the 
rationality of the German aristocracy, or, for that matter, the French ‘bourgeois’, may be 
significantly different from that of the French court. But they all remain examples of 
rationality nonetheless, developing out of the particular civilizing processes of the 
societies under consideration. 
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In talking about humanity’s increasingly effective response to nature, Elias says that 
“their outlook as well as their actions, changed” (Elias 1987: 8). He goes on to relate 
this to the development of the sciences. “Throughout these developments the mastery of 
people over themselves, as expressed in their mental attitudes towards nature, and their 
mastery over natural forces by handling them, have grown together” (Elias 1987: 8). He 
reinforces the point by going on to say that the level of detachment with regard to nature 
is directly related to the human ability to control natural forces.  
 
For a long time humans have been in a vicious circle with regard to nature where they 
were too emotionally involved largely because they had so little control, and because 
they were so insecure in this regard they could not develop the level of detachment 
necessary to gain control. People cannot become more detached without gaining more 
control over nature, and they cannot gain more control over nature without becoming 
more detached. Elias discusses the growth of understanding and control of natural forces 
as being “associated with specific changes in human relationships; it goes hand in hand 
with the growing interdependence of growing numbers of people” (Elias 1987: 10). 
Subsequently more detached dealings with nature, in turn, helped to spur on the changes 
in human relationships in a circular and mutually reinforcing process. “More and more 
groups, and with them more and more individuals, tend to become dependent on each 
other for their security and the satisfaction of their needs in ways which, for the greater 
part, surpass the comprehension of those involved” (Elias 1987: 10).  
 
As relationships are stretched, people become more dependent on others for their safety 
and wellbeing. This dependency, in turn, fosters more self-reflective thought through the 
civilizing processes already discussed. “The same process which has made people less  
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dependent on the vagaries of nature has made them more dependent on each other” 
(Elias 1987: 10). The process itself clearly lies beyond just reason. At the same time 
people become less aware of their interdependence and the resulting forces upon them 
because the relations involved are increasingly dispersed and, in a sense, ‘invisible’. The 
relationship between rationalization and detachment for Elias is obvious. 
 
When the ideas of process and interdependence are mentioned as central to the civilizing 
process, it is important to see this as going beyond simple interaction. People are often 
interdependent with others whom they have never met. This is, of course, what happens 
when the chains of interdependence get extended beyond the face to face. As 
interdependencies become more extended involving more people, each person must take 
account of how their own and other’s actions affect others in the chain, whether they 
have personal contact with them or not. They become more constrained, and more 
foresight is required.  
 
Mennell talks about three aspects of increasing foresight: 
 
1. Psychologization - “The habit of foresight over longer chains grows. And with this 
change also comes a change in the way of considering others” (Mennell 1989: 101). 
With regard to life at court, “Preservation of one’s social position under severe 
competitive pressure necessitated a more ‘psychological’ view of people, involving a 
more precise observation of oneself and others in terms of longer series of motives and 
causal connections” (Mennell 1989: 102). He goes on to say this was not psychology in 
the modern sense in that it was “not concerned with the individual in isolation, but 
always with individual people in relation to others in a social context” (Mennell 1989:  
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102). Mennell then notes that the boundaries within which this happened were quite 
narrow at court, leaving significant room for growth with the continuation of the 
civilizing process. 
 
2. Rationalization - According to Mennell, there was apparently also strong movement 
towards rationality in the sixteenth century, as noted by Weber, among others (Weber 
1958). Of course Elias puts this in the “broader context of the transformation of 
personality structure and pressure towards habitual foresight” (Mennell 1989: 102). 
Elias argues that rationality takes place only when external compulsions become internal 
compulsions. Interestingly enough, court rationality and ‘bourgeois’ rationality were 
quite different, and may even have been very irrational from each other’s point of view. 
Yet both remain products of rationalization and hence, for Elias, of the civilizing 
process. They both take a longer term view of reality over the shorter term, as dictated 
by the social interdependencies in which they are involved. “Both forms of rationality 
involve the control of behaviour directed towards competing for the means of power 
prestige and capital being the dominant means of power in the respective societies” 
(Mennell 1989: 103-104). They are all basically struggling for the same goals, it is the 
environment that dictates how the war is waged.  Rationality varies with the structure of 
social reality but whatever the social situation, there must be foresight. 
 
3. Advance in thresholds of shame and embarrassment - This too becomes more obvious 
after the sixteenth century. Shame occurs when there is a loss in social standing in the 
eyes of a social other with whom one has or has had a relationship. Embarrassment is 
similar except in that it is caused by another person when they violate social standards.  
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The fear of transgressions of social prohibitions takes on the character 
of shame and embarrassment, by definition, the more fully Fremdzwäng 
has been converted into Selbstzwang. This fear is obviously related to 
vigilance and foresight in anticipating social dangers. That is why 
shame and embarrassment on the one hand and rationalization on the 
other represent two sides of the same coin (Mennell 1989: 105).  
 
Elias held that prior to the emergence of the feudal courts, the habitus of the average 
person was quite different from that which would develop subsequently. Rational 
conduct presupposes the people involved to be adults capable of detaching themselves 
from immediate and pressing personal problems. He further suggests that people had no 
chance to become detached as long as they had no control over nature. The lack of 
control engendered fears that resulted in emotional response. According to Kilminster it 
is also difficult for people in an insecure position to be detached about “social relations” 
over which they have little control (Kilminster 2004: 33). An extension of this same 
problem is that “it is difficult for them to extend their understanding and control social 
processes as long as they cannot approach them with greater detachment, which entails 
greater control over themselves” (Kilminster 2004: 33). 
 
In a situation that was both naturally and socially unpredictable and uncontrollable, 
people had little chance to develop the reason and detachment now considered the norm 
in modern society. The development of these psychic characteristics was an integral part 
of the civilizing process but in order to achieve it people had to have “a particularly 
well-developed and all-round capacity to regulate their drives and emotions internally” 
and the social environment in which they lived had to be “relatively pacified”  
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(Kilminster 2004: 31). This self-control was not an a priori characteristic but only forms 
“at a comparatively late stage of social development in people for whom, internally, a 
longer gap exists between impulse to act and the act itself, than existed in people in the 
[European] middle ages” (Kilminster 2004: 32). From this increasing gap comes “the 
characteristic feature of thinking-about-thinking so typical of learned and cultured 
people in western societies in particular” (Kilminster 2004: 32). Elias describes this as a 
circular sort of feedback mechanism with each aspect feeding into and spurring on the 
other.  
 
In the competition between feudal lords and territories there were winners and losers. As 
ever more territory was consolidated in fewer hands (Elias is always careful to point out 
that this was not a smooth one-way process) more and more feudal warriors became 
ensconced at court where the social order was significantly different, thus changing the 
shape of the figurations of which one was likely to be a part. They were no longer 
independent masters of their own domain but had to attend to many significant others in 
their daily decisions. Consequently, they were forced to play a very different game by 
very different rules.  
 
As the centralization process continued and the courts grew, violent outbursts were 
much more tightly regulated and ‘social prowess’ became the weapon of choice. Losing 
control meant losing status among one’s peers. The means of violence having been 
taken out of the hands of the former lords turned courtiers, they had to find another 
means of ‘doing battle’ within newly dependent social relations. Effective modes of 
behaviour in general had to change. Wouters points out that at about this time “Social 
constraints pressed towards stronger and more automatic self-supervision, the  
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subordination of short term impulses to the commandment of a habitual longer-term 
perspective, and the cultivation of a more stable, constant and differentiated self-
regulation” (Wouters 2004: 199).  
 
As with everything in Eliasian thought, this was an extended process spanning a 
significant period of time. The  important point here is that as these interdependencies at 
court grew and became more intensely scrutinized by all the players in the game, the 
manipulation of the relationships themselves became the means for social advancement, 
or gaining control over whatever power chances were accessible to those involved.
13 
Kuzmics alludes both to the nature of the environment and the level of competence of 
the participants at court with the following contrast to the later ‘bourgeois’ environment. 
“The courtier, in contrast, was, day and night, tied into a social formation approximating 
a totalitarian system. He frequently achieved a level of skill in dealing with people that 
is staggering in contrast with late ‘bourgeois’ performances” (Kuzmics 1991: 27). Their 
lives depended on the sophistication of their interaction with the other courtiers. This 
required of them intense monitoring of every aspect of social intercourse, their own and 
that of all others with whom they interacted, naturally resulting in the honing of those 
social skills upon which they depended. 
14 
 
There came to be clear rules, the breaking of which would cause embarrassment and/or 
shame. This, according to Elias, started off in the earlier courts as external coercion,  
 
                                                 
13 This is very much analogous to the traditional social situation in Imperial China which has been 
described in similar terms (Pye 1992: 173). 
14 It will be shown in Part Two that Chinese society very early on reached a level of development roughly 
analogous to this point in European history. The descriptions of court society, with ‘social prowess’ being 
the key weapon, sounds in many ways very similar to the situation in much of China even today.  Though 
not a focus in this thesis, the similarity between social life at court as described by Elias, and that in the 
traditional Chinese village is an area that strongly merits further research.  
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but with the actions of more and more persons becoming increasingly 
entangled in a wider figuration, they turned into forms of self-restraint. 
Eventually, self-restraint is not merely exercised in front of the high and 
mighty, or strangers or almost anyone, but in front of oneself (Kuzmics 
1987: 521).
15 
 
As the courts grew and more people were drawn into dependency within the court 
figuration, the constraints became more intense, leading in the direction of the 
internalization of social constraint as self-restraint. 
 
Duerr raises some important objections to Elias’s analysis regarding the internalization 
process which merit discussion at this point as they play into this and later analysis. 
According to van Krieken, Duerr is arguing that Elias is combining two different 
arguments in the civilizing process, that restraints were internalized, and that they 
became more effective. Duerr thinks that while the first may be valid, the second is not 
borne out by the evidence. He stresses that the further back in time one goes one does 
not see societies less controlled or restrained. In fact, the opposite is often the case (van 
Krieken 1998: 121-122).  
 
This observation certainly applies to the Chinese social context where restraint has long 
been a vital concern for all social interaction and the controls involved, primarily face, 
are very rigid and demanding. In fact, many of the descriptions of the constraints in 
court society could fairly accurately be applied to most Chinese social contexts.  
                                                 
15 If one wished to situate China of the twentieth century, with face as its external constraint, into Elias’s 
description of the European civilizing process, it would be at about the transition point of the earlier 
courts with shame as their external constraint. It is only in the Post-Opening period after 1978 that there is 
evidenced a more bourgeois-like transitional environment.  
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Duerr argues that since ‘the people in small, easy to survey ‘traditional’ 
societies were far more closely interwoven with the members of their 
own group than is the case with us today’ this means that ‘the direct 
social control to which people were subjected was more unavoidable 
and air- tight’. Whereas for Elias the lengthening chains of 
interdependence characterizing industrializing and urbanizing societies 
can result in only the demand for greater foresight and self-restraint, 
Duerr suggests that ‘associating with many other people also means, a 
lack of ‘bindedness’ and thus a relational freedom’. Being bound to a 
larger number of people thus means that breaches of norms and social 
deviance are ‘less consequential, the person concerned does not lose the 
face but one of their faces’ (van Krieken 1998: 122).  
 
As far as it goes, this would seem to be a fairly accurate description of the contrast 
between, for example, the more traditional Chinese society and modern industrialised 
societies. The question remains whether or not this is an effective criticism of Elias? 
 
Duerr agrees that urbanization and the decline of feudal economic 
relations had made traditional forms of social control far less effective, 
and that the forms of social control which emerged from around the 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation were more effective than the 
older ones in some respects. However, in other senses, ‘a certain degree 
of porosity arose, which was unknown to the forms of social control in  
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‘archaic’ times and which gave people opportunities for freedom which 
they had never had before’ (van Krieken 1998: 122). 
 
So the emergent forms of social control were more effective, but only in some areas. In 
other presumably important areas they allowed for freedoms which had never existed 
before. At this point it is unclear whether Elias would disagree with Duerr. 
 
Medieval villages and members of tribal societies are, for Duerr, 
subjected to considerably more restraint than inhabitants of a modern 
industrial city (van Krieken 1998: 123).  
 
These villages consisted of much more tightly knit webs of relations and groups than 
modern society, according to Duerr, and therefore logically imposed far greater 
constraint on the individual.  
 
This is the most telling objection to Elias’s account of the civilizing process. It also 
represents a fairly accurate description of the Chinese social situation. Yet, despite its 
force as an objection, van Krieken finds a way to overcome it, providing a pathway for 
this thesis. He states the problem thus: 
 
Duerr argues that individuals were ‘subjected to an essentially more 
effective and inexorable social control than today’. This does not mean 
that in specific historical contexts there may not appear situations of 
relative behavioural freedom, but Duerr attributes this to the transition  
between one type of social regulation and another, from the ‘village  
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eye’ to the self-constraint of urban industrial societies. For Duerr, the 
intensification of self-control is less a product of any increased 
demands on individuals of more socially differentiated societies, and 
more the form of social regulation suited to social relations where one 
encounters a larger variety of ‘interaction partners’ from diverse social 
and cultural backgrounds (van Krieken 1998: 123-124). 
 
And then provides a way out: 
 
most social historians would accept the rough outline of what Elias has 
argued: a gradual intensification of self-discipline, a shift from social 
control based on public humiliation, neighbourhood surveillance, 
priestly condemnation, fear and violence, to internalised norms and 
values, a quite demanding socialization process, what many would call 
‘ideology’ (van Krieken 1989: 208).  
 
Goudsblom points out that  Weber too sensed a “profound historical change in mentality 
or habitus - a shift towards more regular and all-round self-restraint” (Goudsblom 2004: 
267). Van Krieken takes this a step further in declaring that Elias was far from alone. In 
fact he has “the majority of historical social scientists on his side; if he was wrong about 
a development in personality structure, then so were Weber, Simmel, Horkheimer, 
Mannheim, Foucault, and just about every scholar who has turned their attention to the 
question” (van Krieken 1998: 124-125). The author of this thesis is satisfied that Elias is 
correct in his argument that there was a historical, psychological change in European 
man, and that his explanation for that change, whether right in all the details or not, is  
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worthy of application to another culture in attempting to further understand its 
development. 
 
In summary, this thesis might be said to agree with some aspects of Duerr’s objections 
to Eliasian theory and the internalization of constraint, but not to the extent that they 
could be said to refute Elias’s account of the civilizing process. As will be argued in Part 
Two of this thesis, it is the very nature of the social relations and their effectiveness 
within traditional societies that, somewhat ironically, results in a lack of internalization 
in some, particularly the Chinese, social situations. It is held (generally in agreement 
with Duerr) that it is the ever-present nature of these constraints, based on face-to-face 
interactions within very tightly knit webs of social relations, that causes them to remain 
external. This is not to say that there is no internalization whatsoever, but that constraint 
in such contexts remains primarily external because of its very ubiquity. “If parents beat 
their children with a stick for every transgression, children will avoid transgressions as 
long as they cannot be conceiled [sic] from their parents, but they will not by themselves 
learn to control the impulses leading to transgressions”  (Wouters 1977: 446). Ever-
present external constraint does not allow for internalization on the same level. For 
constraint to be internalized, the traditional social relations, the tight web of relations 
holding people firmly in place, needs to be broken down allowing face-to-face 
interdependencies and constraints to become more distant.  
 
The strength of these external constraints relative to that of the internalised constraints 
in more modern industrialised societies is not the question being addressed in this thesis. 
Rather, the question is, can Elias’s ideas on the process of internalization itself be 
applied to other societies where this did not happen in anywhere near the same degree or  
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in the same spans of time as it did in Europe; societies that remain, for whatever reason, 
more traditional in their social organization? The answer is yes, provided the focus is on 
the details of the traditional figuration in Chinese society. 
 
Absent the civilizing forces initiated by the monopoly of violence in combination with  
the central control over the distribution of resources breaking down the traditional 
figuration, social constraints in more traditional societies remain largely face to face 
(and indeed highly effective) and the chains of interdependence never extend to the 
degree necessary for the internalization of social constraint. There is certainly change, 
but the details and pace will be different than it was in Europe, and possibly radically so. 
This is a central contention of Part Two of this thesis dealing with Chinese society. 
 
There are a few other issues that should be elaborated upon before moving on to discuss 
Eliasian concepts. First, and probably most important, there are those who read Elias as 
advocating an a priori view of human nature. Maso is one who indicates as much in 
holding that the civilizing process is, for Elias, in effect the taming of innate untamed 
drives. While crediting Elias with furthering Cassirer’s thinking on relationist principles 
by showing that they “could encompass all aspects of society” (Maso 1995a: 132), Maso 
argues that “the notion that ‘drives’ are to a large extent innate was one of the 
foundations of his civilizing theory” (Maso 1995b: 72).  
 
Van Krieken refers to this general position in his study of Elias as a fairly common and 
a potentially effective criticism of Elias’s work, if it were true. 
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Finally, many of the criticisms appear to arise in response to Elias’s 
persistent use of the concepts ‘restraint’ and ‘constraint’. Elias’s own 
theoretical position is that human habitus is socially constituted, but the 
notion of restraint, emanating from either outside or within an 
individual, implies the existence of some presocial ‘nature’ which 
requires restraining (van Krieken 1998: 133).  
 
The point is clearly and simply that the existence of innate drives (the idea of restraint 
implying pre-existing drives that need restraining) would seem to hint at the existence of 
a more or less Kantian a priori aspect of the human condition. But Elias is not left on the 
hook for long. The charge is rebutted.  
 
Goudsblom says that this “allegation is as absurd as it is ponderous”, pointing out that 
Elias’s work, especially The Civilizing Process, belies this idea (Goudsblom 1995: 124). 
Contrary to Maso’s observations, this was a very important element of Elias’s whole 
theoretical stance. George Cavelletto sums up Elias’s answer to this objection in The 
Civilizing Process, arguing that the aggressiveness of the knights is said by Elias to be 
compelled by Fremdszwang, and not socially released. He goes on to point out that in 
the synopsis Elias says “Drives... are ‘always already socially processed.’ ‘In other 
words,’ he adds, drives are ‘sociogenetically transformed in their function and 
structure’”  (Cavalletto 2007: 217 citing Elias). Elias clearly dismisses the idea of the 
innateness, or “pre-sociality of drives” (Cavalletto 2007: 217). “drives, while containing 
natural (i.e. physiological) ‘raw materials’ and ‘elementary energies,’ are from an 
individual’s birth onward ‘sociogenetically transformed’ by social relations into what 
we, as social beings, experience as ‘drives’” (Cavalletto 2007: 217).  
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One might still press for an answer here as to what exactly the ‘raw materials’ and 
‘elementary energies’ referred to by Elias are. Cavalletto points out that Elias does 
indicate an answer to these questions, though it is often overlooked. “Drives… are 
constituted by processes identified with three separate but related fields, each of which 
contributes its own regularities ‘to a certain extent’ to this constitution: the processual 
fields of the soma, the psyche, and society” (Cavalletto 2007: 219).
16 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 For a more detailed discussion of this topic look to Cavelletto, Crossing the Psycho-Social Divide: 
Freud, Weber, Adorno and Elias starting on p. 215, or Elias’s introduction to the chapter on the changes 
in medieval aggressiveness in his The Civilizing Process. Also see Maso; ‘Elias and the Neo-Kantians’ as 
well as ‘The Different Theoretical Layers of The Civilizing Process’, and Kilminster and Wouters, ‘From 
Philosophy to Sociology’. This thesis is satisfied with Elias’s response to this criticism, and in that it is 
not central to this effort, it will not be delved into any further. 
17 Kilminster suggests that the other recent criticisms of Elias are reducible to four categories: cultural 
relativism highlighted by Blok and Duerr, ‘stateless civilizations’ (van Velzen, Rasing, Jagers), the 
permissive society (Brinkgreve, Korzec), and the barbarism of the 20th century (Leach) (Kilminster 1991: 
166). He goes on to point out that Elias established criteria for measuring progress and regress and it was 
these issues that these procedures were designed to deal with. As a crowning blow (in this author’s 
opinion) to these criticisms Kilminster further points out that Elias “would have had to have been 
monumentally naive or obtuse to have made such obvious blunders” (Kilminster 1991: 168). There is no 
reason to think that he was and in this author’s opinion the above objections do not represent a serious 
problem for Eliasian thought. 
A final objection that this author feels is worthy of attention has been voiced by Bryan Turner. This is 
Elias’s lack of consideration of religion as a shaping influence in social life. “Religion has played a major 
part in shaping the restraints on social behavior that make social life orderly and predictable” (Turner 
2004: 261). This is an important criticism of Elias’s work, one which Elias did respond to (in this author’s 
opinion not adequately), but one which also lies outside the scope of this thesis.  
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Chapter Two - Eliasian Concepts  
 
A summary of Elias’s account of the civilizing process has been presented as a 
background to prepare the reader for the analysis of the Chinese social situation in Part 
Two, but some concepts need further treatment before delving into an entirely different 
culture. Those concepts are: homo clauses, habitus, figurations, power, and finally 
competition. 
 
Homo clausus  
“Elias proposes a paradigm shift from ‘homo clausus’ to ‘homines aperti’, i.e. men 
situated in contexts, subject to constraints, and seeking to maximize control” (Arnason 
1989: 51). For Elias, beginning with the individual in the sociological endeavour was 
methodologically pointless. Kilminster makes the point that homo clausus was a very 
important concept for Elias in that he seemed to see its influence everywhere 
(Kilminster 2007: 15).
18 Mennell agrees with Kilminster in holding that sociology is of 
the opinion that humans bring a sort of self-identity to the collective. He goes on to say 
that this is more or less obviously incorrect. “We all know how misleading that is” 
(Mennell 1994: 176). For Mennell, and for Elias as well, humans have always been 
social and form their identities in interdependence. 
 
Kilminster continues: 
 
                                                 
18 Kilminster points out that by not always acknowledging his intellectual debts Elias may have been 
inconsistent with the position he so strenuously held. The implication is that he may indeed have seen 
himself as an isolated individual in the sociological endeavour (Kilminster 2007: 15).  
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As a counterweight, Elias repeatedly stressed that because people lived 
in interdependence with each other they were inconceivable in isolation. 
Hence, starting sociological enquiries from the ‘individual’ and then 
trying to deduce ‘society’ was both misleading and futile. One had to 
start with interdependent people in the first place (Kilminster 2007: 15). 
 
At the same time that Elias decried the idea of the isolated individual as an unsuitable 
starting point, he also pointed out that the whole notion of the individual was in itself a 
result of the civilizing process. As alluded to earlier, this notion of the isolated 
individual being a product of the civilizing process fits well with the tenor of this whole 
project with respect to the Chinese. 
 
Insisting on the historicity of social and psychic development as Elias does, carries with 
it certain assumptions. One important consideration is that humans do not exist in a 
vacuum, separated from their social surroundings by an impenetrable ontological wall. 
In this sense, Elias is arguing against the very notions subsequently described as having 
been inscribed in the Western human self-perception since roughly the time of 
Descartes. Elias suggests that since that time man started to view himself as an 
individual, a rather new perspective in social history. In The Society of Individuals, Elias 
describes this changing/changed self-image of man in the following terms: 
 
The self-perception of the person as observer and thinker was reified in 
speech and thought, giving rise to a notion of an entity within the 
human being which was cut off from everything going on outside itself 
by the walls of its bodily container, and which could gain information  
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about outside events only through the windows of the body, the sense 
organs (Elias 1991a: 107). 
 
In other words, individuals existing somehow within the bodily container viewed the 
outside world, perceived it in the only way they could, through their senses, and reacted 
accordingly. This is the great dualism with which Elias (and many others) had so much 
difficulty and which he struggled so fervently against; what he termed homo clausus. A 
seemingly unbridgeable barrier had been erected between individuals and their 
surroundings.
19  
 
Blok makes an insightful contribution to this conversation in referring to the concept of 
freedom. He says that the modern idea of freedom is ‘freedom to.’ In medieval times it 
was ‘freedoms from.’
20 He adds that the plural is rarely seen now. Blok feels this 
represents a problem for “sociological insight, as the plural usage brings out more 
clearly the interdependence, that is, the alliances and oppositions between people, 
whereas the singular conjures up the metaphysical image of human beings as 
windowless monads, as homines clausi” (Blok 1977: 184). This is a good example of a 
perception having changed due to a historical change from an understanding of people 
as interdependent to their being understood as isolated individuals; a perception that is 
itself a result of the civilizing process (It might also be worth noting here that the 
                                                 
19 In rejecting the idea of homo clausus Elias was not advocating a thorough social determinism as he is 
sometimes accused of doing, but only that society and the individual are so interconnected as to be 
incomprehensible in isolation. Each impacts the other to a degree that to look at either in isolation is 
ludicrous.  
 
20 Isaiah Berlin made the distinction between the positive ‘freedom from’ and the negative ‘freedom 
to’, though it originally can be traced to Kant.  
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distinction between the positive freedom to and the negative freedom from can be 
attributed to Isaiah Berlin, and possibly even traced back to Kant). 
 
Elias argues that humans are personally impacted by their immediate social environment 
and therefore by historical development as well, in that their personal environment is 
considered necessarily a product of historical social development. Society and the 
individual are integrally related, as are, in an extension of that point, socio- and psycho-
genetic changes. For Elias, the whole notion of the classic dualism, of an entity existing 
somehow separately within the human head, cut off from the outside world, was one of 
the primary sources of misunderstanding within the fields of philosophy and the social 
sciences (Elias 1994a). This notion had to be re-thought in order to develop a more 
accurate model of humanity and society.  
 
Social development continued in more or less the same direction (the already 
acknowledged short-term changes in direction not affecting the longer term trend) 
through the absolutist state courts and into ‘bourgeois’ society. Throughout, with the 
changing social order’s growing differentiation and extending chains of interdependence 
first in the court and later in wider society, people were forced to view life with both 
greater reflection and more effective foresight and anticipation (Elias 1994a). If they 
wanted not only to thrive, but even to survive in this changing social environment, they 
had no choice.  
 
As individuals come to experience more overlapping and possible 
contradictory sets of interests and allegiances, their actions become 
correspondingly constrained. That is to say, the increasing likelihood of  
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unforeseen ‘boomerang’ effects, constrains individuals to reflect upon, 
preconsider or otherwise exercise restraint in the conduct of daily life 
(Loyal 2004: 134). 
 
Simply put, as people became interdependent with more other people there were more, 
and increasingly varied, demands upon their own behaviour. The old order of social 
relations was breaking down in favour of a new one that was making different demands 
and requiring different responses. In order to interact effectively within their growing 
figurations, they had to be able to see the ‘bigger picture’ with all the different players, 
and all their different agendas. What this really represented was greater detachment of 
the individual from his environment in the sense of being able to view it ‘from afar’ and 
respond more objectively. This was something new. A person’s social 
interdependencies, which had previously been for the most part restricted to those that 
were personal and face to face, were now being stretched well beyond ‘visual’ limits. 
According to Elias, this increasingly detached perspective was ultimately to be the 
precursor of modern individualism, or what became his ‘homo clausus.’  
 
If specific balances between involvement and detachment are part of 
what is learned by every child in each particular society, the question is 
how the public standards available for learning are themselves formed 
and changed over time. It is here that Elias forges the link between the 
theory of involvement and detachment and the sociogenetic and 
psychogenetic theory expounded in The Civilising Process: rising 
standards of detachment of knowledge require a similar rise over many 
generations in the standards of self-control that have to be learned in the  
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course of growing up, the same transformation of personality structure 
(Mennell 1992: 163). 
 
In a very real sense the civilizing process itself was therefore responsible for 
constructing the wall that emerged between individuals and their social surroundings 
(van Krieken 1998: 55).
21 But as Burkitt explains with the following comments, and as 
was touched upon earlier, Elias effectively showed through his Civilizing Process that 
the individual cannot be separated from the surrounding society, or the history of that 
society, and in this sense, while homo clausus is itself a product of the civilizing 
process, it is nothing more than a myth. 
 
All aspects of the self, then are socially formed. They are not regions 
within separate and self-contained personalities, but are moments in the 
network of social relations and activities … There is no division 
between the individual and the social. We cannot say that the boundary 
of the personality is the skin, or any other membrane – physical or 
psychological – which acts as a barrier within which to contain 
individuality. Indeed, the whole concept of ‘individuality’ as a self-
contained and pregiven entity is now undermined. We must begin to see 
                                                 
21 As a brief aside, it is this very perspective of a radical separation between the individual and society 
which Elias claims has made sociology fall woefully short of its potential. Elias seems to be saying that 
sociologists, who have grown up and been nurtured in this social environment and assume a more or less 
clear idea of homo clausus, are unable to see that same environment in any other way but from an 
individualistic perspective. The individual/society issue has already been discussed in greater detail at the 
beginning of this thesis.  
 
87
personality as social in all its aspects and understand individuals as 
social selves (Burkitt 1991: 212-213).
22 
 
With these words, Burkitt brings down the curtain on the concept of homo clausus 
within the social sciences (as opposed to its use with regard to the self-experience of 
people in general) and, though its demise is probably not yet certain, there does seem to 
be a shift away from homo clausus and toward homines aperti. 
 
Therefore the psychogenesis of the adult personality make-up in our 
‘civilized’  society cannot be understood in isolation from the 
sociogenesis of our ‘civilization’ (Mennell 1989: 50). 
 
To conclude this brief discussion of the internalization process and the formation of the 
individual, while the notion of the individual has become a fundamental Western 
assumption, the idea itself, according to Elias, is ironically merely a product of long 
term social processes; of the civilizing process. In societies where the civilizing process 
has followed a different course, it is reasonable to expect a different understanding of 
the individual.  
 
Moving a little further in the direction of person formation, and in establishing the 
foundation for the forthcoming examination of the Chinese context, the obvious next 
place to look is at Elias’s concept of habitus. 
 
                                                 
22 As will become clear later, this is an argument that would be intuitively obvious to the Chinese. Their 
culture never developed the conception of such a membrane around the individual. Again, the derivation 
of the Chinese word ren mentioned earlier provides valuable insight on this point.   
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Habitus 
That which was developing/changing in the individual(s) as they reacted to a changing 
social environment (the civilizing process) was what Elias came to refer to as the 
habitus, and here he means the individual habitus.  
 
Habitus is a useful word in referring to the modes of conduct, taste, and 
feeling which predominate among members of particular groups. It can 
refer to shared traits of which the people who share them may be largely 
unconscious; for the meaning of the technical term ‘habitus’ is, as 
Norbert Elias used to remark, captured exactly in the everyday English 
expression second nature - an expression defined in the Oxford English 
Dictionary as ‘an acquired tendency that has become instinctive.’ … 
Habitus is closely related to the notion of identity. (Mennell 1994: 177).   
 
Mennell further says that identity differs in that it may be more ‘conscious’ than habitus. 
He also points to the ‘taken for grantedness’ of the ‘habitus’ as being good for Elias’s 
purposes because it helps in explaining the rightness of the self and members of one’s 
group and the wrongness of others, further establishing the strength of the ‘we image’ 
phenomenon (Mennell 1994: 177). This, in turn, is obviously important because it is the 
‘we image’ of the traditional figuration that must be broken down in some measure to 
allow for greater competition leading to further differentiation, extending chains of 
interdependence, and ultimately the internalization of constraint. These ‘we images’ that 
are so integral to the make-up of the habitus of a group or its constituent individuals are 
very difficult and slow to change. It therefore takes a powerful influence to cause this 
kind of change.  
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It is worthwhile here digging a little deeper into the use and meaning of the term. To 
quote Burkitt again in talking about what Elias is actually after: 
 
Rather, what Elias wants us to contemplate is the entire restructuring of 
the personality and psychic economy in the process of historical change. 
To designate this level of the psychic economy and personality 
structure, Elias uses the term which is common to that used by Bourdieu 
- the social ‘habitus’. That is, the characteristics and psychological 
dispositions shared by groups of people in a particular historical 
configuration, and in a particular position within their own social 
hierarchy (Burkitt 1991: 174). 
 
Elias, in fact, used the term habitus “before its popularization by Bourdieu (1979)” 
(Dunning and Mennell 1998: 340-341). Bourdieu, in turn, makes the point that “the idea 
of habitus has a long tradition behind it. The Scholastics used it to translate Aristotle’s 
hexis. You can find it in Durkheim... It’s also in Marcel Mauss” (Bourdieu 1993: 86). 
For Bourdieu the habitus is something acquired through time and is not merely 
reproductive, but also generative. It reproduces what it has learned, but often changes it 
in the process (Bourdieu 1993: 87). Fowler, in discussing a similar aspect of the habitus, 
says, “Thus people (agents), collectively or individually, transform or reproduce their 
social structures, but they do so within specific social conditions, including those that 
are internalized as part of their habitus” (Fowler 1997: 23). The habitus works within the 
environment and is both reproductive and transformative. It operates within and 
according to the rules of the social environment in which it finds itself, but also acts  
 
90
upon that environment. This is much in agreement with Elias’s understanding and use of 
the term habitus. As such it is understandable why it was so important in his civilizing 
process, as well as his ideas on sociology in general. It is a very real entity, but one that 
is in a constant state of change, acting and being acted upon. And it is interacting with 
the civilizing process itself.  
 
Having established the habitus as that which changes in the civilizing process, Elias’s 
definition of the term might require further elaboration. Van Krieken refers to Elias’s 
idea of habitus in the following terms: 
 
The concept of habit or habitus refers to ‘the durable and generalized 
disposition that suffuses a person’s action throughout an entire domain 
of life, or in the extreme instance, throughout all of life - in which case 
the term comes to mean the whole manner, turn, mould, or cast of 
personality’. Elias called it ‘second nature’ (van Krieken 1998: 47 citing 
Elias). 
 
He later notes that “The dynamics of figurations are also dependent on the formation of 
a shared social habitus or personality make-up which constitutes the collective basis of 
individual human conduct” (van Krieken 1998: 59). Van Krieken elaborates by quoting 
Elias:  
 
This make-up, the social habitus of individuals, forms, as it were, the 
soil from which grow the personal characteristics through which an 
individual differs from other members of his society. In this way  
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something grows out of the common language which the individual 
shares with others and which is certainly a component of his social 
habitus – a more or less individual style, what might be called an 
unmistakable individual handwriting that grows out of the social script 
(van Krieken 1998: 59 citing Elias).  
 
It is also appropriate to point out the difference between individual and social habitus 
here as Fletcher does with reference to this same passage: 
 
One can distinguish between individual habitus, which refers to the 
learned emotional and behavioural dispositions which are specific to a 
particular person, and social habitus, which denotes the learned social 
dispositions shared by most members of a group or society (Fletcher 
1997: 11).  
 
Fletcher suggests that habitus is a way of understanding change at an individual level 
within the civilizing process. Again, the changing individual habitus is the changing 
psyche of the civilizing process. The social habitus is the social seedbed out of which 
the individual habitus grows. What the word provides, according to Fletcher, is a more 
or less value free way of dealing with the subject matter of the civilizing process. With 
this idea of habitus, Elias has gone beyond the notion of homo clausus to a notion of the 
‘individual’ integrally tied to his social surroundings. 
 
This whole notion of habitus is tightly bound up with, as the above implies, the habits of 
a person or social group. Several writers, including van Kreiken, point out that both  
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Durkheim and Weber saw a need to get at the habits of man in order to understand 
human conduct. In this sense Elias was following a similar path. Cavalletto sums up 
Durkheim thus: 
 
As Durkheim wrote, anticipating Freud, ‘it is not enough to direct our 
attention to the superficial portion of our consciousness; for the 
sentiments, the ideas which come to the surface are not, by far, those 
which have the most influence in our conduct. What must be reached 
are the habits... these are the real forces which govern us’ (van Krieken 
1998: 47 citing Durkheim).  
 
Van Krieken goes on to talk about how Weber saw the same thing in The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber 1958). Our actions are fundamentally based 
on habit. The identity a person develops over time, from childhood moving forward, is 
their habitus which emerges from the habits of the figurations of which they are a part. 
“These social habits or dispositions are likely to be common to the social class or 
religious or ethnic group in which we are reared, as part of the social habitus of that 
group. Our tastes and distastes, the things we find acceptable and unacceptable, 
attractive or repulsive, are formed within this social habitus” (Burkitt 1991: 206-207).  
 
For Elias people form their identity over the course of their lives, beginning in the 
earliest childhood. One learns it from their social environment, from birth to the point 
where they forget it was even learned, to the point where the learned habits are so 
ingrained that they are no longer a part of one’s consciousness. They are internalized as  
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one’s individual identity, formed through the figuration of which one is a part, which is 
itself historically specific and always changing. 
 
Once again in explaining this Elias directs our attention to the medieval social 
transitions as his starting point for a changing habitus/psyche and ultimately an 
individualist perspective (Elias 1994a). 
 
Figurations 
Peter Seglow stresses the importance of Elias’s use of the word “‘configuration’. The 
word symbolises Elias’s view of the world as a constantly shifting nexus of inter-
dependent forces.” (Seglow 1977b: 349). This avoids the problems that emerge when 
the model of the natural sciences is used for the social sciences. 
 
According to Seglow, there are three reasons why emulating the natural sciences is a 
problem: 
 
1. Nothing in the social world is constant. 
2. Thinking in terms of constants causes us to “think in terms where the process of 
change is conceptually distinct from the supposedly static entity which is merely subject 
to it” (Seglow 1977b: 350). This causes us to think in a way such that we might think 
the institution exists independently of the process of change. “All social structures are 
composed of a configuration of characteristics whose precise composition exists only 
for an instant in time” (Seglow 1977b: 350).  
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3. Using the scientific model has led sociologists “into an almost irresistible temptation 
to count things” (Seglow 1977b: 350). For Seglow statistics are only a tool, and need to 
be understood as such and nothing more.  
 
The idea of figurations effectively deals with all of the above potential problems. It is a 
concept so closely tied to interdependence that its importance in Elias’s overall program 
is unmistakable. As an introduction to the idea, a figuration might be thought of as that 
web of relations containing those individuals with whom one is interdependent. 
Olaffson provides a more sophisticated, yet very concise definition of the concept: 
“Networks of interdependent, i.e. reciprocally dependent individuals and groups, with 
shifting and asymmetrical power balances between them” (Olofsson 2000: 362). It is 
only here, for Elias, in these ‘webs of relationships’, that an accurate understanding of 
society can be gleaned. Where other sociologists talk about structure, Elias talks about 
figurations. “For Elias structures are figurations, they can only be understood as being 
constituted by acting human beings, and the concept of figuration is intended to dissolve 
the distinction between system and social integration, not take its place within it” (van 
Krieken 1998: 59). Cavalletto elaborates on the correspondence between structure and 
figuration in suggesting that Elias’s use of the term figuration shows the many ways the 
sociogenetic and psychogenetic can be related. Social structure for Elias is “a pattern of 
pressures exerted upon people by their relationship with others upon whom they are 
functionally dependent either directly or indirectly” (Cavalletto 2007: 212). This, of 
course, is making essentially the same point, that for Elias structures are figurations, and 
that really, the idea of ‘structure’ as it is commonly understood is a misrepresentation of  
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social reality.
23 This is a significant and very important shift in point of view within the 
discipline. For Elias it is also fundamental to understanding society; this is where the 
study of sociology must begin in order to be successful. 
 
Given the importance of the idea Elias will again be quoted at some length here. In What 
is Sociology, Elias extends his understanding of figuration using his game (in this case, 
cards) analogy in the following way: 
 
despite all the expressions which tend to objectify it, in this case the 
course taken by the game will obviously be the outcome of the actions 
of a group of interdependent individuals. It has been shown that the 
course of the game is relatively autonomous from every single player, 
given that all the players are approximately equal in strength. But it 
does not have substance; it has no being, no existence independently of 
the players, as the word ‘game’ might suggest. Nor is the game an idea 
or ‘ideal type’, constructed by a sociological observer through 
considering the separate behaviour of each individual player, abstracting 
the particular characteristics which several players have in common, 
                                                 
23 Jackson makes a helpful point about the word ‘structure’ along the same lines as that made by Elias 
regarding culture and civilization. “Comparison with a building suggests something hard, permanent, and 
complete, as if it were built from solid materials and to a predetermined plan. Social structure would then 
enter economics as a rigid constraint that restricted human behavior. The static analogy is misleading and 
offers at best a partial view of structure. In its earliest English language uses, structure was a noun of 
process which referred to the act of building, not the end product; only later has structure become static... 
Even when seen as a state rather than a process, structure still has a capacity for change” (Jackson 2003: 
728).  
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and deducing from them a regular pattern of individual behaviour (Elias 
1978: 130). 
 
The game is something other than any of the players themselves, but it has no existence 
apart from the players. No individual player determines the figuration. The figuration is 
in some sense a result of the combined interactions of the players in relation to each 
other. 
 
The ‘game’ is no more an abstraction than the ‘players’. The same 
applies to the four players sitting around the table. If the term ‘concrete’ 
means anything at all, we can say that the figuration formed by the 
players is as concrete as the players themselves. By figuration we mean 
the changing pattern created by the players as a whole - not only by 
their intellects but by their whole selves, the totality of their dealings in 
their relationships with each other. It can be seen that this figuration 
forms a flexible lattice-work of tensions. The interdependence of the 
players, which is a prerequisite of their forming a figuration, may be an 
interdependence of allies or of opponents (Elias 1978: 130).   
 
The above provides valuable insight into Elias’s meaning of the concept figuration. It 
was his intent in using the concept to move toward eliminating the opposition between 
the ‘individual’ and ‘society.’ For him, as has already been seen, this was a hurdle that 
sociology had to clear in order to provide an accurate and successful reflection of that 
which it purported to observe. The above quotation should make clearer how his 
thinking about figurations moves in that direction. The figuration (game) exists both  
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because of the actions of the players, tying the players and the game inextricably 
together, and as a ‘changing pattern’, in a sense beyond them.  
 
When we look at social formations of whatever type, what we are actually seeing are 
figurations, or webs of human relationships consisting of any number of people who 
make up a given group for whatever reason. These figurations overlap extensively and 
pulsate with change and activity – hence Elias’s oft cited dance metaphor to exemplify 
the term. They both influence and are influenced by the individuals that form them.  
 
Individuals are not members, so to speak, of one and only one figuration to which they 
have somehow sworn an oath of allegiance. Instead, people act out their lives within any 
number of figurations, all of which are integral in their make-up. From moment to 
moment one might be reacting to or acting within the figurations of their family, their 
baseball team, their home town, their graduating class at university, or even their nation 
of origin. And within each of these different figurations, the individual has differing 
roles and, therefore, in a sense, differing identities. Van Krieken points out that the idea 
of figuration, for Elias, represents all types of relationships whether good, bad, or 
indifferent (van Krieken 1998: 57). A man can be loving father in the morning, vicious 
combatant in the afternoon, and peacemaking neighbour in the evening, all the while 
being entirely consistent within his set of roles dictated by the figurations of which he is 
a part. Importantly, in all of these roles he is acting out his position in relation to 
interdependent others, albeit different sometimes overlapping sets of others. 
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Composition of Figurations 
For most of human existence “human beings have lived in small bands, based on 
kinship” (de Swaan 1995: 27). Only within the past 10,000 years with the emergence of 
sedentary agriculture has this changed. At that point people had identification by 
proximity, not based on kin, but on the village (de Swaan 1995: 27). With this change 
came the emergence of what are thought of as more traditional societies. Within most 
traditional contexts, the average person’s figurations will normally be limited first to 
their family, whether immediate or extended, and then to their village. The two may 
well be, and in fact often are, the same in that the village is nothing more than an 
extended family. The Chinese social context fitted this general description until quite 
recently, and in many locations still does. In these less complex societies, figurations 
tend to be relatively smaller, and for that reason interaction between the members 
thereof are more often than not, face-to-face. The chains of interdependence are, of 
course, short with people not normally venturing too far beyond village boundaries. 
Differentiation is relatively low with the community being largely self-sufficient. Over 
time (Elias thinks in terms of centuries), with the always and ever-present increasing 
differentiation and resultant extending chains of interdependence, the number and 
complexity of the figurations in which any one person is involved increases 
significantly. This is a lengthy process and, for reasons to be stipulated, can in some 
cases extend for millennia.  
 
Examining societies considered more modern, one sees figurations that are far more 
extended where interaction is, more often than not, no longer face to face. These 
societies are far more complex. Individuals, instead of being part of one or, at most, a 
few figurations, may be interacting within a considerable number on an ongoing basis  
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and have different roles and response sets for each. And, very importantly in Eliasian 
theory, most of the people with whom one is interdependent are largely unknown to 
them. In Eliasian theory, this fact is integral in the internalization process, in that one is 
forced to look much farther down the chains of interdependence in considering the 
ramifications of their actions, whereas in simpler societies the constraint was much more 
‘local’ and immediate, and therefore, external. In this changing situation, greater care in 
social interaction was forced on the individual in their own self-interest. 
 
This clearly brings the argument back around to the issue of change. The shift from 
traditional to more modern societies can be reduced to the changing shape of the 
figurations in society over time. It was the nature of the interdependencies in the 
figuration that was changing. The chains between the individuals involved in the 
interdependencies were extending. More people were tied to the figuration in some 
fashion. The relations were becoming far less intimate.
24 The balances of power were 
becoming less graded. The act of relating socially within one’s changing figuration was 
itself changing considerably. Elias argued that this type of change was ongoing, without 
a beginning or an end. For reasons to be explored, the above mentioned changes did not 
occur in the Chinese context in the imperial period. 
 
Formation/Identification 
“The dynamics of figurations also depend on the formation of a shared social habitus or 
personality makeup which constitutes the collective basis of individual human conduct” 
(van Krieken 2001: 356).  Identification is the key to why people come together in 
groups, or figurations, around which they form ‘we images’. Within these figurations 
                                                 
24 The Chinese notion of guanxi will be used in Part Two of this thesis to explore similar developments in 
that context.  
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they feel, or come to feel, that they are more like each other than they are like the social 
‘other’. According to de Swaan,  
 
Social identification is a process in which people come to feel that some 
other human beings are much ‘the same’ as they are and still others are 
more ‘unlike’ them. It occurs in the course of group formation, as part 
of the dialectics of inclusion and exclusion from which groups emerge 
in a dynamics of competition (de Swaan 1995: 25). 
 
In Elias’s study with John L. Scotson of the ‘Winston Parva’ social context, a 
community is observed in which there appear to be three relatively distinct groups of 
people; one that has lived in the community for an extended period, another that is 
relatively newer but made up of individuals and families who are considered 
professional, and a third that is newer to the area and of working class background 
(Elias 1994c). The people making up the group living in the community for a longer 
period are referred to as the established and as a result apparently only of their term of 
residence are in some sense considered to be of a higher class.  
 
In Dunning’s paper on race relations and figurations he describes four features of Elias’s 
established – outsider relationships. 
 
1. A tendency for the established group to perceive the outsiders as  
‘law-breakers’ and ‘standard-violators’ 
2. A tendency for the former to judge the latter in terms of a ‘minority of the  
worst’  
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3. A tendency for the outsiders to accept the established group’s stigmatization of them 
4. A tendency for the established to perceive the ‘outsiders’ as in some way ‘unclean’ 
(Dunning 2004: 82). 
 
Though in the Winston Parva case it is decidedly not an issue of race relations, the 
above four features still apply. What are evidenced are figurations of people who, 
otherwise generally quite similar, have formed ‘we images’ based on their longevity of 
residence within the community. These ‘we images’ can be very powerful and enduring.  
 
A member of the ‘Established’ figuration of Winston Parva is also a member of the 
‘Winston Parva’ figuration which includes both the professionals and the ‘Outsiders’. 
As societies constantly change and grow more complex, with far longer chains of 
interdependence, ‘we images’ as they relate to figurations and the individuals that make 
them up grow progressively more ambiguous. The ties are less intense and / or intimate. 
For that reason too the ties to the older, more traditional figuration(s) lose their intensity 
and constraining influence. 
 
Change as Inherent 
Van Bentham van den Berg captures both the constant motion and the variety of 
figurations in saying that we see “human history and society as moving interconnected 
figurations of interdependent states, ruling and ruled groups, social classes, established 
and outsider groups, and in the last instance, of interdependent human beings, both in 
the plural and in the singular” (van Bentham van den Bergh 1977: 173). As figurations 
oscillate both within themselves and in responsive interaction with other figurations,  
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they themselves are constantly changing. Again, it is change that is the one constant for 
Elias. 
 
In the concept of figuration he brings together the concepts of change, time and 
figuration in a way such that all three are fundamental to the sociological endeavour. 
“Figurations of interdependent individuals and groups can only be properly understood 
as existing over time, in a constant process of dynamic flux and greater or lesser 
transformation” (van Krieken 2001: 357). Elias regarded the natural state to be that of 
change, with stability as the aberration, much in contradistinction to his contemporaries. 
The figuration, the set of relationships existing above and in some sense beyond the 
individuals embodying it, remains contiguous, while still undergoing continual change, 
through time. In addition it is only through these changing figurations that one can 
understand one of the more basic questions in sociology – the internalization of 
constraint and the transition from traditional to modern society. For it is actually the 
figuration that is changing, the shape of the figuration and the social relations within the 
society as a whole. 
 
Van Krieken quotes Elias in The Court Society to emphasize that figurations “‘continue 
to exist even when all the individuals who formed them at a certain time have died and 
been replaced by others’” (van Krieken 2001: 356 citing Elias). While any given 
figuration is made up of individuals, and individuals certainly impact the figurations of 
which they are a part, figurations are not reducible to their constituent individuals. 
Figurations are in a sense independent of those individuals. In other words, a 
figuration’s existence is not dependent on a particular set of individuals, but it also 
cannot exist without the individuals forming it at any moment. The village continues to  
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exist notwithstanding the passing over the course of time of any or all the individuals in 
it at any given time. It may well continue for centuries in an ever-changing (in the sense 
that the individuals making it up change), but still recognizable (in terms of the 
figuration itself) form. This is certainly often exemplified in the Chinese social context 
where some villages have existed for millennia. Van Krieken goes on to point out that 
when the activity of a figuration stops, the figuration will indeed cease to exist. In this 
sense, the figuration exists independently of the specific individuals of whom it is 
composed, but not of individuals per se, for it is they who carry out the activity on 
which it is based. Van Krieken puts it simply: “they [figurations] only exist in and 
through the activity of their participants”(van Krieken 2001: 356). It is this activity that 
changes, along with the shape of the figuration, hence changing ‘the game.’ 
 
Elias would further say that it is this change in the figurations making up society that 
ultimately causes the psychic change that is the civilizing process. For Elias, nothing can 
accurately be seen as static. Nothing is motionless. Everything is in a state of change at 
all times. To think of social reality as otherwise is to misunderstand it. And it is these 
changing relationships that are the figuration, that, over time, effects change in the 
individual human psyche. Differing social relations (or balances of power) within the 
figuration in which one is integrated present a changing social reality to which one has 
to respond and with which one must come to terms. Changing figurations represent the 
sociogenetic aspect of his formulation. In order to better understand this process one 
needs to know why there is a constantly changing universe of figurations making up 
society. 
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Social Relations as Shifting Balances of Power   
Both power and change are central to Elias’s thinking.  Both are also intimately 
connected to social relations in Elias’s bigger picture. In getting a clear picture of how 
this works for Elias it is worthwhile first looking at how power was understood by Max 
Weber, and then relating Elias’s ideas to this understanding. 
 
Weber related power and authority in his writings. He defined power in the following 
way. “In general, we understand by ‘power’ the chance of a man or of a number of men 
to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who 
are participating in the action” (Weber 1948: 180). Dunning, through Henderson and 
Parsons’ translation, stresses that ‘chance’ exists within a social relationship (Dunning 
1977: 229). Weber’s understanding of authority, on the other hand is the expectation 
that a specific order will be obeyed by certain people. Dahrendorf says that the 
difference lies,  
 
in the fact that whereas power is essentially tied to the personality of 
individuals, authority is always associated with social positions or 
roles… It is only another way of putting this difference if we say – as 
does Max Weber – that while power is merely a factual relation, 
authority is a legitimate relation of domination and subjection. In this 
sense authority can be described as legitimate power (Dahrendorf 1959: 
166). 
 
Dunning suggests that the important difference lies elsewhere. He sees the difference as 
being between resistance with regard to power and obedience with regard to authority  
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(Dunning 1977: 229). More important, with regard to Elias, however, is Weber’s view 
of the nature of power. “Despite the reference to a social relationship, power is not 
conceived in this [Weber’s] definition as a relational phenomenon, that is as a product 
of relationships per se which can only be understood in a relational context” (Dunning 
1977: 230). Dunning goes on to reference Emerson as saying that the flaw with the 
discipline’s treatment of power in general is that it seems to see power as being more or 
less a characteristic of individuals or groups when instead it should be seen as lying in 
people’s dependency (Dunning 1977: 231).  
 
By logical extension Emerson (and Dunning) would seem to be saying that power is an 
aspect of social relations. As such, the Eliasian connection is coming to the fore, for 
relation and dependency, as already discussed, are central ideas to the civilizing process. 
Dunning refers to Elias’s chains of interdependence as an appropriate means of research 
beyond the laboratory. The important point for this effort is that as one seeks to control 
relations of dependency one is seeking to control power chances.  
 
Despite their differences, Weber and Elias would seem, by implication at least, to be in 
agreement on one issue regarding power. Weber at one point in his writings claims that, 
“Power, including economic power, may be valued ‘for its own sake’” (Weber 1948: 
180). People desire either power itself, in Weber’s terms, or what power represents 
(control of relational balances) in Elias’s terms. Turning again to the word ‘chance’ in 
the passage from Weber, for him this is the chance for people to realize their own will in 
a given action even overcoming the resistance of others who are involved. In this, 
power, the chance for one to realize one’s own will, would equate to having the 
relational balance tilted in one’s own favour, or being in control of a dependency  
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situation, or having control of a power chance. This would seem to be the object of the 
competition that was so central to Elias, as will be discussed in the coming section. So, 
whether or not they are in agreement on the exact nature of power, Weber and Elias both 
seem to see power as it relates to, or is manifested in, interpersonal relations. Power is 
central to social development as well as to sociological research. 
 
Emirbayer argues that both Foucault and Bourdieu also talk about power in terms of 
relational balance. He first draws on Foucault’s point that power balances are an integral 
part of all relationships, that they are an effect of and internal to the unequal nature of all 
relations (Emirbayer 1997: 292). He quotes Bourdieu to show how much of a ‘relational 
balance’ thinker he is:  
 
‘By field of power I mean the relations of force that obtain between the 
social positions which guarantee their occupants a quantum of social 
force, or of capital, such that they are able to enter into the struggles  
over the monopoly of power’ (Emirbayer 1997: 292 citing Bourdieu and 
Waquant).
25 
 
Emerbayer says of this passage:  
 
Far from being an attribute or property of actors, then, power is 
unthinkable outside matrices of force relations; it emerges out of the 
very way in which figurations of relationships – as we shall see, of a 
                                                 
25 An interesting area of further research would be the way in which the rise of the Communist Party has 
affected Emirbayer’s fields of power at the local level of Chinese society.  
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cultural, social structural, and social psychological nature – are 
patterned and operate (Emirbayer 1997: 292).  
 
In other words power is simply an inherent characteristic of relationships, and so of 
figurations as well as society. Where relationships exist there are balances of power and 
where there are such balances, there is also this element of force, or constraint, for no 
relationship is truly equal. 
 
 
Elias’s Triad of Controls  
Power for Elias “refers to mutual but asymmetric networks of control and constraint, 
based on varying combinations of multiple resources” (Arnason 1987: 433). 
Interdependencies in terms of power relations are situated at the root of Elias’s entire 
social theory. For Elias it is within these interdependencies, in the form of balances of 
power, that the social constraints on humans are to be found. It is therefore also within 
these power balances as they change, that is to be found the impetus to social constraint 
transitioning to internalized constraint (restraint) and hence a changing psyche – the 
civilizing process. 
 
An understanding of Elias’s theoretical ideas of controls and constraints will assist in 
leading into the next section on competition. Elias writes the following in The Germans: 
 
If one wanted to try to reduce the key problem of any civilizing process 
to its simplest formula, then it could be said to be the problem of how 
people can manage to satisfy  their elementary animalic needs in their  
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life together, without reciprocally destroying, frustrating, demeaning or 
in other ways harming each other time and time again in their search for 
this satisfaction – in other words, without fulfilment of the needs of one 
person or group of people being achieved at the cost of those of another 
person or group (Elias 1996: 31).  
 
Arnason further elaborates on the relational nature of power for Elias: 
 
For Elias, the concept of power can denote a relationship between men 
and natural objects, as well as between men; by implication, it is also 
applicable to the relationship between social individuals and their own 
malleable, but neither amorphous nor self-regulating nature. The 
manifestations of power in this general sense are synonymous with the 
exercise of control. Elias refers to a ‘triad of basic controls’: a society 
can be analyzed and its level of development defined in terms of its 
capacity to control natural processes and social relations, and to make 
its individual members capable of controlling their own behaviour 
(Arnason 1989: 48).  
 
In What Is Sociology Elias describes the triad of basic controls by which a society’s 
social development can be judged. 
 
First, by control over the physical environment, he means both  “control over what are 
normally called ‘natural events’” (Elias 1978: 156), as well as “technological 
development” (Elias 1978: 157).   
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Second, Elias talks about the level of control over the power chances within one’s 
figurations. He refers to this as “control-chances over interpersonal relationships… over 
what are usually called ‘social relationships’” (Elias 1978: 156) and “development of 
social organization… increasing differentiation and increasing integration of social 
bonds” (Elias 1978: 156-157). These control chances are relational power chances, such 
that the feudal lord or, later, the monopolist at court, would score well, while the peasant 
would score poorly. 
 
Third is “the extent to which each of its members has control over himself as an 
individual” (Elias 1978: 156), or “the ‘civilizing process’” itself (Elias 1978: 157). This 
refers to self-control (self-restraint) and is what develops over the course of time 
through the civilizing process. Whereas early on constraint was external to the 
individual and therefore social, with time it was internalized, resulting in self-restraint. 
 
The three are described as closely interrelated but not ‘parallel’ in terms of developing 
in tandem and/or at equal rates. Elias warns the reader not to make the mistake of 
thinking that they will develop in such a fashion, a caution that is very pertinent to this 
thesis in that the civilizing process in China has taken a very different course from that 
in Europe. Speaking of the first two, Elias says that “they do not increase at the same 
rate. For example, it is highly characteristic of modern societies that their control-
chances over non-human natural nexuses are greater and increase faster than their 
control-chances over interpersonal social nexuses.” (Elias 1978: 156) 
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Elias posits the triad of basic controls as a means of ascertaining “The stage of 
development attained by a society” (Elias 1978: 156). What these controls represent is a 
people’s ability to control those four constraints to which Elias says they are naturally 
subjected: 
 
1. Constraints imposed on people by the characteristics of their animal nature… hunger 
or the sexual drive” (Elias 1996: 32). 
2. Constraints due to “dependence on non-human natural circumstances” (Elias 1996: 
32); shelter, need for food, etc. 
3. “Constraints which people exercise over each other in the course of their social lives” 
(Elias 1996: 32); external constraints 
4. Self-constraints or ‘self-control’ [selbstzwange].” This arises from reason, or     
conscience. This is only potential, and the type that emerges in an individual depends 
mainly on where they are born and grow up (Elias 1996: 32). 
 
Within the social realm these constraints and their controls are embodied in the balances 
of power which are intrinsically a part of every social situation.  
 
If social constraint (number 3 above), or ‘Fremdzwäng’, is about constraint by other 
people then it is really about the ability of others to cause or to force one to, or not to, do 
something or react in some way.
26 One acts as a constraint by virtue of their being in 
relation, entailing a balance of power between themselves and others. As one constrains 
the actions of another they can be said to ‘have’ power over them, though have is not the 
word Elias would use. It is this for which people compete within their social relations or 
                                                 
26 It is also this external social constraint that remains by far the most important constraint in Chinese 
society, manifested primarily in the form of face.  
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figurations. And ultimately, it is this which forces both differentiation and the extension 
of the chains of interdependence. In other words, it is the competition for power chances 
that drives the civilizing process. It will be seen that the Chinese situation developed 
very differently in this regard, but that in the long run its development can readily be 
described in Eliasian terms. 
 
Many have described power, or possibly more accurately, shifting balances of power, as 
the central moving ‘force’ of Elias’s thought. For example, Sampson argues that, 
 
The central idea that animates this and all of Elias’s subsequent works is 
that changes in the matrix of social relationships of power and 
interdependency among people (and groups) alter first the behaviour 
and then the consciousness and ‘emotional economy’ of all those caught 
up in the transformation (Sampson 1984: 26).  
 
For all intents and purposes Sampson is here summarizing the civilizing process. 
Changes in social relationships (interdependencies, figurations, social structure, or even 
society) effect changes in behaviour and then, over time, the consciousness of everyone 
involved. At the centre of these social relationships are balances of power. Social 
relations effectively are nothing other than balances of power. It is therefore the 
changing balances of power that result in the changes that Elias labels the civilizing 
process
27. Burkitt ties together the notions of figurations, interdependence and balances 
of power quite effectively. In Social Selves he says that as a result of being a part of a 
                                                 
27 In referring to informalizing processes, Wouters says it is ‘very obvious’ that informalization is 
connected with changing power balances whether of the different classes or different generations. 
Regardless of where the civilizing process is heading at a given time, or whether the “long term process of 
informalization is part of the civilizing process”, power balances are the key (Wouters 1977: 443).  
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figuration our personalities and behaviour “are dependent on the processes within those 
figurations. Furthermore, these processes are formed by the changing historical network 
of interdependencies between individuals, which, in turn, is influenced by the 
fluctuating balances of power within the figuration over time” (Burkitt 1991: 163). 
These processual effects are essentially axiomatic. In that we exist necessarily as part of 
a figuration(s), we are impacted by the changing balances of power therein. In 
describing it thus Burkitt effectively positions the importance of power within Elias’s 
constellation of concepts. In terms of social change it is clearly basic.  
 
An important characteristic of power within this matrix is its nature as a balance. 
According to Burkitt, “power is a relation between individuals or groups, and this 
always comes in the form of a balance” (Burkitt 1991: 164), a balance in which 
individuals are always and unavoidably involved. Burkitt continues, quoting Elias,  
 
‘the concept of power has been transformed from a concept of substance 
to a concept of relationship. At the core of changing figurations - indeed 
the very hub of the figuration process - is a fluctuating, tensile 
equilibrium, a balance of power moving to and fro, inclining first to one 
side and then to the other. This kind of fluctuating balance of power is a 
structural characteristic of the flow of every figuration’ (Burkitt 1991: 
165 citing Elias). 
 
Power as Elias understands it, is not something that one person possesses and another 
does not. It is part of the relationship itself, part of all relationships. In every relationship 
where the players ‘have’ an amount of power, they ‘have’ it only relative to the others in  
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that relationship, or in that figuration. “For Elias, humans can never be considered as 
separate from the figuration of social relations they form between themselves, a 
figuration that is bounded and changed by varying balances of power between the 
different groups and individuals within it” (Burkitt 1991: 163). Whether enemies, 
friends or otherwise, the players in any given figuration are (must be) interdependent as 
they face each other across the fulcrum of their particular relational balance(s). People 
can not be separated, and cannot escape, from their relations with others, and these 
relations are necessarily in the form of a balance.  With this conceptualization the 
importance of power in the overall figurational picture is clear. These balances of power 
making up every figuration are as well in a constant state of motion and change. 
 
The point has been made several times that for Elias, nothing can accurately be seen as 
static. Nothing is motionless. Everything is in a state of change at all times. To 
understand anything about social reality as otherwise is to misunderstand it. As 
balances, teetering insecurely one way, then another, it is these changing relations of 
power, the changing relationships that make up the figuration, that, over time, effect 
change in the individual human psyche. Differing social relations, within the figuration 
in which one is integrated, present a changing social reality to which one must respond 
and with which one must come to terms.  This, in a nutshell, is the account of the 
civilizing process of Norbert Elias. Changing balances of power over time force 
accommodation by individuals to a continually new social reality. These 
accommodations, as they are passed from generation to generation over extended 
periods of time, though in a continual state of change, become habit to the point that one  
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is no longer aware of them, and in this way they are eventually internalized as self-
restraint, or superego in Freudian terms.
28  
 
This is not to say that people are ever fully accommodated to their social reality, or their 
figuration - in so far as change is the only constant, that would be theoretically 
impossible - but only that the “patterns of… feeling and thinking” are always in motion 
as well (Burkitt 1991: 167).  
 
For individuals, relations within the figuration are historically variable, 
changing as the balance of power and the nature of interdependencies 
alter. This necessitates the changing of individual strategies of action 
within the figuration, which also creates a different structure of 
personality formation: a change not only in the patterns of activity, but 
also in feeling and thinking (Burkitt 1991: 167).  
 
It will be remembered that all these changes take place over relatively extended periods 
of time. They are not in any sense abrupt, forcing quick and dramatic shifts in one’s 
modus operandi. In fact the individual’s habitus always lags the changing figuration. 
One might think of it in terms of a professional sport where minor rule changes force the 
                                                 
28 It is important to keep in mind that this only seems to occur in societies where the chains of 
interdependence have become fairly extended. It is only here where the social other has become unseen, 
where the social constraint is no longer ‘face to face’, that Elias’s internalization takes place. This is the 
change event that must take place within the figurations of a society for internalization of external (social) 
constraint to occur. For this to occur, the traditional social ties within the traditional figuration must be 
broken down, or at the very least weakened considerably.  This relates specifically to the Chinese context, 
as will be seen in Part Two of this thesis. For this we have to look to state formation and the attending 
monopoly of violence that Elias posits. 
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players to adapt to a slowly changing game, and often ultimately change the type of 
player that will be successful as time goes on. 
 
Early in the European civilizing process, in less complex pre feudal and feudal societies, 
differentiation was low, and the chains of interdependence were short. As society was 
significantly less complex, the members of a given figuration were far fewer. The 
average person was part of a limited number of figurations, and possibly only one, with 
far less in the way of opportunity for improving their own situation.
29 Social relations 
were, of course, in the form of balances of power but the balances tended to favour one 
side or the other rather heavily, leaving little point and far greater risk in attempting to 
shift that balance. And as these early figurations were mostly self-sufficient, with 
resources being controlled within the figuration and the figuration providing for its own 
needs, there was little need or reason to compete for power chances beyond their 
relatively tight borders. The ‘we images’ of these smaller figurations were secure and 
dealings with outsiders were minimal. As society began to centralize, by extension the 
control of resources was taken out of the hands of the more localised figuration and 
centralised as well. Simple sustenance dictated that greater numbers of people came into 
contact and grew interdependent with each other in growing and increasingly complex 
figurations. As this process continued, differentiation continued to increase, as did the 
length of the chains of interdependence. Dependencies were changing, growing far more 
numerous and levelling out. Elias describes this latter idea as functional 
democratization. As the number of balances of power increased and became more multi-
polar, and as power differentials subsequently decreased, the chance of improving one’s 
own situation (control over power chances), without necessarily incurring the loss of 
                                                 
29 This also represents a fairly accurate description of the Chinese social context up through the revolution 
of 1911, and even today for much of the population, though this is changing significantly.  
 
116
one’s own, or someone else’s, head, grew more realistic. With greater numbers of 
people in relatively more equitable, more secure positions, competition for control over 
balances of power (power chances – usually entailing in some fashion or other, the 
control of resources) naturally grew, further increasing differentiation, lengthening the 
chains of interdependence, and driving on the civilizing process. 
 
From the start, Elias’s civilizing process seems ultimately to be about, or at least to be 
driven by, competition – competition ultimately in the interest of securing power 
chances entailing the control over the distribution resources.  
 
Competition 
Stephen Mennell sums up the importance of competition:  
 
Elias makes clear that the most fundamental and general structural 
process underlying the civilizing process is the progressive division of 
labour or, more broadly, division of social functions. From very early in 
the history of European society, social functions have become more and 
more differentiated under the pressure of competition… As we have 
seen, competition takes many forms; the monopoly mechanism is one 
manifestation, competition between firms another, competitive 
refinement in court society a third. The more differentiated social 
functions become, the larger the number of people on whom one 
depends in all his actions. More, and longer, and more intertwining 
chains of interdependence intersect, so to speak, within every 
individual. To fulfil his own functions at his node in the web, every  
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individual is constrained to take account of the effects of his own and 
other people’s actions through a whole series of links in the social 
chains. And the denser becomes the web, the greater the division of 
social functions, and the brisker the competitive forces generated within 
the figuration, the more does this pressure increase (Mennell 1989: 95-
96, italics his). 
 
Where differentiation is the most basic process of the overall civilizing process, 
competition is the most basic driving force. In feudal warrior society it was competition 
for land and control over soldiers that were the main forms of competition. During the 
period of the absolutist state court society, competition for prestige and social rank in a 
constant struggle for social dominance became more important. In ‘bourgeois’ society it 
was, and is, competition for wealth and advantage in the struggle for economic 
dominance that has always been central. Winning the struggle in any and all of these 
competitions enables one to control power chances in the social relations in which they 
are involved, in their figurations. 
 
Even the cases of frightful violence sometimes described by Elias are only examples of 
the competition common to all living organisms. Referring to The Civilizing Process, 
Cavalletto suggests that “all historical formations” are determined by the same 
competition that drives the changes in interdependencies. Cavalletto goes on to put the 
overarching nature of competition in appropriately stronger terms by quoting Elias: “As 
the synopsis adds, ‘competitive pressure... permeates... [these social] networks, affecting 
directly or indirectly every single individual act’” (Cavalletto 2007: 237 citing Elias, 
italics and brackets his).   
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The whole of the civilizing process is about “historically specific structures of social 
competition” (Cavalletto 2007: 237). He elaborates on this by saying that: 
 
In each case the social dynamics under study embody historically 
specific structures of social competition… the social dynamics 
examined in these studies are all, at root, manifestations of attempts by 
groups and individuals to secure and maintain an advantage over the 
other groups and individuals. Competition, thus, is the other side of 
social fear; at base, it is the social source of the fears that shape the 
behavior of the members of society (Cavalletto 2007: 237). 
 
Focussing on competition is also helpful in understanding how the concept of power fits 
into the civilizing process. As figurations shift and change over time, relationships, and 
people’s responses to those relationships, change as well. As smaller groups compete for 
advantage and are either victorious or not, larger, or at least different, groups ultimately 
form, and in the process the individuals making up those groups must adapt to new 
social situations. As they do so they are in competition to shift the prevailing balances of 
power in their own favour. They are seeking to control a greater number of power 
chances. 
 
While Elias talks about state formation, differentiation, and interdependence as the keys 
to civilizing processes, and indeed they are, all of those transformations are also all 
driven by the underlying spur of competition. And as the civilizing process progresses, 
competition increases. Fletcher notes that “the trajectory of a lifetime within competitive  
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relations or balances of power with others is Elias’s unit of analysis” (Fletcher 1997: 
26). Here Fletcher describes balances of power as competitive relations, thus implying 
that the shifting balance is dependent upon more or less successful competition for 
power/control. Based on the above observations the place of competition for Elias seems 
clear. Ultimately it is competition that is at the root of both social change and individual 
identity. As people compete for survival, they are ultimately embroiled in a competition 
over power chances, and the ‘right’, or chance, to control power chances. They are 
actually competing for a favourable balance of power. The more the balances in which 
they are involved are in their favour the more they control. 
 
Ultimately, humans are most actively involved in this competition for power chances, 
for the ability to control the power balances within their figurations, to control the 
figurations themselves. As individuals compete for the ability to control power chances, 
and either succeed or fail, the balances of power themselves are changed. The relations 
that make up society, constantly change. Because they are in a state of constant flux, so 
too is each person’s psychic makeup, in that they are in constant need of making 
adjustment to ever changing power balances that effect them on every level of their 
make-up. 
 
De Swaan’s observations about the formation of ‘we images’ based on apparent 
similarity and how this initially translated in Europe through competition into 
figurations based primarily on kinship and proximity have already been noted (de 
Swaan 1995: 25-27). At that point there existed both “familial ties or the bonds of clan, 
referring to a shared and known ancestry, and neighbourly ties referring to adjacent or 
shared lands and to collective efforts for defence, policing, irrigation, building and so  
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forth” (de Swann 1995: 27). Society before, and even throughout, the imperial period in 
China ran very much parallel to this description of early European society. Continuing 
with the European context, there were new identifications between people uniting 
against outsiders who were in competition with them. Clan relations were still very 
important, but they were no longer the only relations that were important. De Swann 
makes the point that in the dialectics of identification, as some are included, others are 
necessarily excluded (de Swann 1995: 26), but the criteria for deciding who was to fit 
into which category were always on the move. At this point, with these typically small 
figurations, the ties of identification were still very strong. The strength of the ‘we 
image’ tightly bound the individual to the group. Competition for the most part served to 
reinforce this. It was at this point in their own civilizing process that the Chinese can 
most accurately be described as remaining for over two millennia. 
 
These were the social groupings represented early in Elias’s account of the civilizing 
process in Europe by the relatively undifferentiated, self-sufficient figurations of people 
with very short chains of interdependence. Their figurations were relatively small and 
most interaction was ‘face to face’. They existed prior to and at the onset of the process 
of centralization. For the most part, they produced and distributed what they needed for 
subsistence among themselves. Together, these figurations form a more or less cellular 
mosaic on a broader social canvas. In time elimination contests, competitions for 
physical survival and hence for control, commenced between different figurations, 
different groups of interrelated individuals. The process of centralization was underway. 
Some groups would win and more others would lose. As part of this process the 
‘monopoly of violence’ started to take effect. This part of the civilizing process took  
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place much earlier in the Chinese context and led to the dynastic system of rule, as we 
shall see shortly. 
 
In Europe, larger groupings eventually formed into what became the medieval courts. 
Over time these courts continued to compete for more, larger territory, some eventually 
winning and assuming command of the vanquished, absorbing them and all their 
members into new figurations. The losers were those for whom the balance of power 
within their new figuration had shifted decidedly against them. The winners now 
controlled the power chances of their social inferiors, formerly their relative equals, as 
they in turn competed with each other for the favour of the rulers of the given 
figurations and to shift the balance with their ‘peers’ to whatever degree possible back 
in their favour. Within these new larger figurations the effective behaviours (those 
actions maintaining the figurations, and on which they were based) determining success 
or failure had changed from those of earlier feudal society, but the fact of competition 
had not. Now it was a competition with a metaphorical dagger of social prowess, 
between rivals of a relatively lower rank currying the favour of their conquerors. The 
prize in these cases was prestige and social position, or social survival, as opposed to 
physical survival. Ultimately, it remained as it had always been, about control of power 
chances. At each ‘step’ along the way, the ‘we images’ of the individuals involved 
necessarily changed as well. 
 
These courts continued to grow in a similar fashion, into what would become the 
absolutist state courts, at which point the number of people both within and existing in 
dependence upon the courts had expanded dramatically.  
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As this process continued the centralizing authority had both taken ownership of 
resources, and control of their distribution. This was important in its effect on life at the 
more localized level. In taking over the control of the distribution of resources, the 
monopolist had taken over functions formerly carried out by the feudal lords in their 
smaller, more localized figurations. In doing so he had broken down or at least 
considerably weakened much of the basis for the more traditional social relations, in that 
self-sufficiency of the local community had been reduced and dependence on the central 
authority increased. The people at the local level were now able, and in fact, had to form 
new ‘we images’ with different sets of social others as the old ‘we images’ were 
significantly weakened. With this changing social situation, people were necessarily 
interacting with others in very different social relation to themselves. The traditional ‘we 
images’ were changing. Along with these changes, competition among individuals was 
no longer restricted to the clan or village, but was fostered well beyond these formerly 
restrictive boundaries. It was this process leading to the assumption of the central 
control of the distribution of resources that did not occur in China. This is where the 
vital difference between the two civilizing processes lies. It is this final shift in 
competitive pressure that never occurred in China. For the Chinese what competition 
there was stayed almost exclusively within the boundaries of the local figuration. 
 
Another important and obviously related consequence of competition and the 
breakdown of traditional social relations in Europe was its facilitation of the onset of 
functional democratization. According to Mennell,  
 
Elias uses the term functional democratization to denote the process by 
which every individual is enmeshed in longer and denser webs of  
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interdependence with more and more others, leading to greater 
reciprocal dependency and more multi-polar control within and among 
groups… In the circulation of models, functional democratization is 
expressed in an overall trend towards both diminishing contrasts and 
increasing varieties (Mennell 1989: 109). 
 
In other words, society was becoming flatter and more differentiated. Mennell 
elaborates on this when he relates the process as a whole to the democratization being 
discussed. 
 
The hypothesis is that with the increasing scale and complexity of 
society - specifically, ‘longer chains of interdependence’ - people are 
subject to increasing pressure to exercise foresight and curb their 
impulses... What is more, it is suggested that longer chains of 
interdependence - and especially more even power ratios between the 
links - are associated with a ‘widening circle of mutual identification’. 
In other words, people come to be able to ‘feel the pain’ of more and 
more other human beings (Mennell 2006: 430, italics mine).  
 
The old social hierarchies within the formerly smaller, tighter figurations were largely 
broken down and as people continued to compete they were doing so in a different way, 
on a much broader basis and with different others (of course, without the use of 
weapons). In addition to this and as mentioned above, they were forming ‘we images’ 
with different, broader sets of social others. With this, there was the accompanying  
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increasing differentiation and lengthening chains of interdependence at the local level as 
well as at court.  
 
In a sense, all of this facilitated the ensuing rise of the ‘bourgeois’
30, as they, too, 
competed for power, forcing further change in social figurations. The courtiers above 
them found themselves in competition both with themselves and with the ‘bourgeois’, 
while the ‘bourgeois’ below competed amongst themselves in a battle for economic 
power and survival, as well as with the workers below in the interest of maintaining 
their own position. In this way the models set at the court were gradually passed down 
the line to the rest of society.
31 Van Krieken sums it up thus: “Competition also drove 
the spread of many aspects of courtly rationality first to the higher bourgeois strata, in 
their attempts to enter court society, and then in turn to the strata below them” (van 
Krieken 1998: 92). 
 
Conclusion to Part One 
As Elias describes the civilizing process, it is always ultimately headed toward the 
internalization of constraint. Through the state formation process (which was itself a 
competition for greater power chances) the emerging state, with its accompanying 
monopolization of the means of violence and through its assumption of control of the 
distribution of resources, affected a breakdown in the traditional figuration. This, in 
turn, spurred increasing competition for power chances on a broader scale, further 
driving the civilizing process, engendering increased differentiation and extended chains 
of interdependence. With them came further change in figurations (entailing changing 
social relations) and ultimately a changing psyche.  
                                                 
30 Formerly the lower class finding the opportunity to compete for power through economic activity. 
31 This represents Elias’s diffusion of the courtly model of etiquette.  
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The psychic transition of the civilizing process, according to Elias, begins with the 
relatively free range of emotion and response in the feudal period transitioning into the 
much more constrained environment of the courts where social prowess became the all-
important skill. In this later context, external constraint in the form of shame (at least in 
its earlier manifestations) was a primary guiding social force. As the civilizing process 
progressed and with the rise of the ‘bourgeois’, interpersonal relations became greatly 
extended and one often no longer interacted directly with those with whom they were 
interdependent. This, according to Elias, resulted in the internalization of constraint.  
 
In Part Two the focus is shifted to the Chinese social context which, until at least the 
second half of the nineteenth century, had remained highly resistant to social change for 
over two millennia. For reasons that should become clear, the Chinese social 
environment was strongly reminiscent of the court society that Elias describes as 
existing prior to the rise of the ‘bourgeois’ in Europe. In the Chinese context face has for 
long been the primary guiding social constraint and in this sense is analogous to shame 
as an external constraint in Elias’s Europe.  
 
It is argued that in the twentieth century the traditional order was finally impacted 
enough through the state’s radical incursion into local society and assumption of control 
of the distribution of resources that civilizing trends could emerge. The highly localized 
and self-sufficient Chinese figurations began to change shape. Where in the past one’s 
social position was fixed in a rigid hierarchy within a local environment, with loosened 
cultural and political constraints people began to move, both physically and socially, 
and interact with others with whom they never would, or even could have interacted in  
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the past. Figurations began to expand and the chains of interdependence began to extend 
in a fashion certainly more rapid, but also reminiscent of Elias’s Europe at the time of 
the rise of the ‘bourgeois’. In this new context different rules for interacting became a 
necessity, with the growth of guanxi being a manifestation of this fact.  
Part Two will focus mainly on the process of the breaking down of the traditional social 
order over the course of about 150 years, to the point where the civilizing process could 
re-commence in the fashion to be described. 
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Part Two – An Eliasian Understanding of the Chinese Social Context 
 
Chapter Three – Introduction to Part Two 
Part Two of this thesis is a study of the Chinese cultural context using the Eliasian 
concepts examined in the Part One as a basic framework, showing how the use of 
Elias’s understanding of power and competition can fruitfully assist in understanding a 
path of social development quite different from, yet in many ways analogous to, the 
European case. Ken Young, in his State Formation in Southeast Asia talks about the 
usefulness of Elias’s monopoly mechanisms when applied to that region, in that they 
allow for “a dynamic of state formation prior to and not dependent on the growth of 
nationalism, and having its own momentum quite apart from the rise of the bourgeoisie” 
(Young 1997: 74). In this sense Elias’s argument is quite valuable for the Chinese 
context, for China had neither a nationalist sentiment nor a ‘bourgeois’ class at the time 
when its state formed. It will be shown that the Chinese state developed very early on 
but the civilizing process did not progress beyond this initial stage for an extended 
period, a point that requires some explanation. 
 
The question ultimately being addressed is whether the links Elias posited between state 
formation, the traditional social structure, the extent of differentiation, the length of the 
chains of interdependence, and the Chinese habitus in terms of external and internal 
constraint can reasonably be posited for the Chinese social context. The question is 
answered in the affirmative as it is posited that Elias’s understanding of state formation 
and civilizing processes does, indeed fit the Chinese context.  
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As Elias describes it, the most basic source of the civilizing process at the interpersonal 
level is competition, both between groups (figurations) and between the individuals of a 
given society. It is competition first and foremost that engenders the process, ultimately 
forcing the internalization of constraint. In order to approach a conclusion to the initial 
question the broad focus of the thesis in Part Two will be on the changing nature of 
interpersonal relations; in Eliasian terms, the figurations and chains of interdependence 
at the local level. This approach is meant to parallel Elias’s focus on the same things in 
his work in the European context.  
 
Pre-1949, post-1949, and post-1978 China are the three periods examined. The pre-1949 
period effectively covers China going back to its roots, but realistically looks at the early 
state formation period in showing first that through dominant orientations, the Chinese 
state system and social structure down to the local figurational level formed a 
remarkably stable symbiosis that lasted throughout imperial times. The examination is 
taken up again in the late Qing dynasty where the state-local society symbiosis remained 
in place but began to crumble, finally falling in the revolution of 1911. From there the 
Republican period is examined as it leads up to the Communist assumption of control in 
1949. The Communist period will then be examined, followed by the Post-Opening 
period beginning in 1978.
32 In the interest of making a case for Elias’s civilizing process 
in China, those social concepts basic to Elias’s model will be discussed as they existed 
and changed in each of the aforementioned periods.  
 
Evidence will show that the traditional nature of Chinese society was continually 
reflected in the social environments of all the periods mentioned, mainly through the 
                                                 
32 ‘Post-reform’ is sometimes used for what here will be referred to as the Post-Opening period beginning 
after 1978.  
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ongoing existence of small, self-sufficient, and tightly knit figurations with relatively 
low levels of differentiation.
33 Though radical social change was imposed after the 
revolution of 1911, this observation continued to hold true. It was only after 1978 during 
the Post-Opening period that this began to change in a direction indicative of a civilizing 
process. In this final period there is a new, changed state–local society relationship that 
resulted in several Eliasian social trends, primarily increasing differentiation, extending 
chains of interdependence and changing local figurations, analogous to those of Elias’s 
Europe. The concepts of mobility and ‘guanxi’ will be used as barometers for these 
trends for the post revolutionary period. If the theories of Norbert Elias are applicable in 
the Chinese context, it is expected that there will be some significant change in each, in 
correspondence with any changes in the level of differentiation and interdependence. 
 
It is also worth noting that through all the reform movements starting with the late Qing 
and through the Republic and Communist periods, there was a very conscious effort on 
the part of the central government to destroy the traditional social order in an effort to 
modernize China. This, of course brings to mind Elias’s theoretical position on 
unintended consequences. “Elias does not give much weight to the success of intentions 
and plans in this framework. Nor does he check to see when the planning of associations 
of action has been successful” (Haferkamp 1987: 556). This is an issue worthy of further 
research in the Chinese context but one which is beyond the scope of this project. 
 
The Population 
The Chinese people - called the ‘Han,’ to distinguish them from the 
numerous minority nationalities living in China - had emerged from the 
                                                 
33 The ongoing importance of face as external constraint is inherent to the traditional Chinese social order 
and will be discussed in a manner meant to cover all three periods.  
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mists of prehistory in the loess plains of north China, close to present 
day Sian, near the great bend of the Yellow river. As late as about 1000 
B. C., these Han, these early Chinese, inhabited an area that is only 
about 10% of what is today China proper (Eastman 1988: 8-9).  
 
Surrounded by many culturally and ethnically distinct groups (Yue, Shu, Li, Zhuang, 
among others) the Han expanded dramatically over the next 3000 years, and continue to 
do so today in places like Tibet and Sinkiang (Eastman 1988: 8-9). These same Han 
with their agrarian, Confucian culture came to dominate what is today China proper. 
When talking about the ‘Chinese’ it is they who are usually being discussed.  
 
In pursuing the above mentioned research goals, the rural Chinese population will be the 
centre of focus for the simple reason that it is within the rural communities of China that 
the overwhelming majority of Chinese are to be found. Hsu says that historically the 
farmers “constituted some 80 % of the population” (Hsu 1970: 97).  While these 
statistics have changed over the past few decades (largely due to ‘accounting’ changes), 
and the exact numbers vary depending on source, through the mid-eighties 82% (Xiaolin 
1998: 83) of the Chinese population lived in rural areas and 71% worked in agriculture 
(Kaichen 1991: 56). Feurwerker  notes similar statistics (as do Fei Hsiao-tung (Fei 
1962), Zuo Xuejin (Xuejin 2000), and others) and suggests that “To find figures even 
remotely close to those of China in 1933, one would need to look at America in 1820 or 
1830 when 70% of the labor force worked in agriculture” (Feuerwerker 1977: 9).While 
these numbers have undoubtedly varied over time
34, the rural population has never 
comprised a much lower percentage of the overall population. This reflects the 
                                                 
34 China has witnessed a significant increase in urban population beginning in the mid eighties, but some 
studies (Xuejin 2000) still show roughly the same percentage for rural population as when the reforms 
started in 1978.   
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traditional agrarian social structure that has dominated Chinese culture until quite 
recently. 
 
Even those who do reside in cities often do not consider their urban residence to be 
‘home’. It is more common for Chinese people to refer to their village of origin as their 
‘native place.’ Stockman  says “The traditional village was a cultural entity of which 
one was either a member or not, an insider or an outsider” (Stockman 2000: 60). He is 
implying here the intense nature of the social ties and relations incumbent on one in 
their village. The importance of this point will become apparent later.  At this point it is 
sufficient to say that people had relationships with their fellow villagers, but generally 
not with those outside their village. Generally, the boundaries of their world were the 
same as those of their village. Until recently, and often still, people living in cities did 
not identify with them as such. Their village, as their ‘native place’ was simply far more 
important mainly because of the relationships involved. One’s village was where their 
figuration was to be found, whether considered in terms of their nuclear family, or the 
entire clan. Rarely did their figuration, at any level, extend beyond village boundaries.   
 
This Chinese figuration has until quite recently, been considerably smaller and more 
tightly woven than the Europen figuration. It has more closely resembled that of Elias’s 
medieval Europe. Much like the Europe of the Middle Ages that formed the backbone of 
Elias’s research, China, until recently has been an agrarian society, changing little in 
that regard for millennia. China has always been a culture/society/nation of villages; 
more or less cellular units loosely integrated into the larger framework of the state. 
When in cities people have tended to group along village lines anyway, and do business 
accordingly, so it seems, even when in the city, people have remained in their village.  
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Even if forcibly relocated, as so many were under the Communist regime, they would 
often send most of the resources they acquired back to their native village (this might 
serve as evidence that even after they no longer lived in the village, control over 
whatever resources they managed to acquire remained within their native village). Their 
village, the locus of their network of relationships – their figuration – has always had 
primacy. The urban situation will be examined primarily as it has impacted and been 
impacted by rural change. It is among the rural population that the important change is 
to be found. If one wants to look at China from an Eliasian perspective, it is held that it 
is to the village that one must look. This is exactly where an interesting proving ground 
for Elias’s ideas is to be found. 
 
Two premises are set forward here in order to lay the foundation for the following 
argument. First, it is held that there are a number of cultural threads woven into the 
historical fabric of traditional Chinese culture that have allowed it to remain so 
relatively stable over such a long period, and it is these threads that have come, and are 
continuing to come, under the greatest stress in the post-revolutionary period. This is not 
by any means to suggest that Chinese society remained in some kind of stasis for an 
extended period, that it remained in a sort of undisturbed time capsule, but only that 
there have been some important elements of the culture that have remained intact over 
the entire period. As Dirk Bodde said regarding the Qin unifiers of China, “The social, 
political and economic movements which were inaugurated under this dynasty were so 
profound and far-reaching that their study should destroy forever, I hope, the mistaken 
but persistent belief that in the East nothing changes” (Bodde 1967: v). The Han carried 
on with these changes.  
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The four and a half centuries that separated the proclamation of the 
Ch’in Empire in 221 B.C. and the abdication of the last Han emperors in 
A.D. 220 witnessed major evolutionary changes in almost every aspect 
of China’s history. At the beginning of the period there could be no 
certainty that a centralized empire would be recognized as the ideal 
norm for governing mankind; by the end of Han its preservation had 
become the natural and accepted aim of every ambitious statesman, and 
educated officials could be expected to offer it their loyalty and services 
(Twitchett 1986: 14). 
 
While the Qin and Han may have been the most radical, they were certainly not the only 
significant innovators in Chinese history. Despite these periodic movements, however, 
there have also been the aforementioned consistent threads, or orientations, which are 
deemed basic to understanding the process that China has undergone, and is undergoing. 
For this reason, it is necessary to first briefly examine pre-revolutionary China, where 
evidence of differentiation and the relative length of chains of interdependence will be 
sought, in order, ultimately, to contrast this period with the society emerging out of the 
modernizing efforts after 1911 and, more specifically, after 1978. It is argued that this 
latter period marks the ‘restart’ of China’s civilizing process.  
 
Second, it is held that statehood in the Eliasian sense of a government acquiring a 
monopoly of violence and taxation was achieved in China at a very early date. The 
crucial difference with the Europe Elias describes lies in the Chinese state’s lack of 
intrusiveness into the lives of the people. It will be argued that the state had the 
capability to intervene in and control the lives of the people to a far greater degree than  
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it did, but this significant intrusion only occurred with the original unifiers, the Qin 
dynasty (sometimes written as Ch’in, which is as it is pronounced) which was quickly 
toppled from its position of power, and subsequently only with the advent of the 
Communist regime. Prior to 1911, and more especially 1949, the central government 
was not generally something the people, the masses for lack of a better word, needed to 
be overly concerned about. The timing of the shift in the level of state intrusiveness (and 
the reasons for it) is a crucial difference in terms of statehood and the civilizing process 
between Elias’s Europe and Imperial China. 
 
The Traditional Chinese Social Structure - Social Stagnation 
The Chinese culture is, obviously, a target of immense proportions for any broad 
sociological analysis. It could almost be said to have for an extended period 
encompassed a whole civilization - Confucian - within its borders. “A civilization 
constitutes a kind of moral milieu encompassing a certain number of nations, each 
national culture being only a particular form of the whole.” (Durkheim and Mauss 1998: 
153). In the Chinese case this description is turned very nearly on its head. China can be 
described as both a state and a civilization. “M. Granet has rightly spoken of ‘Chinese 
civilization’ within the boundaries of China; he is equally right to describe as Chinese 
certain traits outside those boundaries” (Mauss 1998: 156). This provides some insight 
into the problems that the size of the Chinese culture represents for a researcher. 
 
Until recently, Chinese culture has been approached with a view to its static nature over 
time. It has often been seen as a monolithic cultural block that has continued through 
time largely unaffected by either external or internal influences. Amaury de Reincourt 
made the case in the late 1950s that China, after the Tang and Sung dynasties, had  
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become socially petrified. The Confucian patterning of social relations dated to well 
before the time of Confucius but it was really with Han rule that Confucian orthodoxy 
became enshrined as the organising system for the people of this newly formed entity, 
the empire. As this Chinese state went through some considerable growing pains,  
 
below the apparent instability of Chinese politics, a civilization kept 
expanding and growing to full maturity during the four hundred years of 
Han rule, to achieve the maximum of its potentialities under the 
following T’ang and Sung dynasties. Thereafter, the growth slowed 
down and stopped, Civilization became petrified, China went on living 
on its carefully transmitted stock forms but created no more. (de 
Reincourt 1965: 63). 
 
For de Reincourt, the Confucian system was to be both the source of Han, and Chinese, 
success, as well as of its eventual stagnation. Others have agreed with him on this point. 
In fact, Bergere says that historians have “worked in the shadow of Weber’s thesis that 
Confucianism posed an obstacle to creativity, competition and development” implying 
that this was a commonly held position (Bergere 1984: 327). She believes this argument 
is not adequate, however (Bergere 1984: 327). Adequate or not, the point remains that, 
while Confucianism may have been generative in some areas, it was a stumbling block 
in many others. 
 
De Reincourt continues in saying that through the course of the Han dynasty the realm 
prospered and wealth multiplied quickly. The gentry grew in wealth and influence and 
effectively became their own class.   
 
136
 
They began to identify themselves mentally with the noble lords 
depicted by Confucius, imitated their polite manners and acquired their 
discriminating tastes. As the gentry provided most of the government 
officials, Confucianism crept back into the administration and the 
political world, becoming gradually the sole moral code of China’s 
ruling elite (de Reincourt 1965: 65).  
  
This is in ways reminiscent of the Europe Elias describes, where the rising ‘bourgeois’ 
imitated the manners of the courtly nobility in an effort to enhance their own status. De 
Reincourt later describes a situation where a new way of recruiting the ruling class was 
needed. As society was stagnating, and with all else falling by the wayside, the social 
situation left 
 
government service as the only prestige-bestowing, face-giving 
occupation… With the crystallization of Chinese civilization, this 
learning was progressively codified by laws and regulations and became 
indispensable to all who aspired to government service. The 
examination system grew out of this typically Chinese yearning and 
admiration for scholarly knowledge (de Reincourt 1965: 67).  
 
He goes on to say something especially important here. “All those who did, finally, rise 
to the top by scaling the examination ladder lost whatever originality and personality 
they might have had in their youth” (de Reincourt 1965: 68). According to de Reincourt,  
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in order to pass one had to become completely moulded to the system, and through this 
process, creative thought was eliminated (de Reincourt 1965: 70). 
 
While there is undoubtedly some truth to the conclusions presented above, recent 
research has indicated that stagnation and petrification overstate the case. In fact, 
change, as always (and especially in Eliasian terms), is the one constant. It is also true 
however that even from an Eliasian perspective Chinese culture has, in many ways, 
remained remarkably stable over time. Despite feudalism having ended and the state 
having formed, the traditional figurational complex for individuals within Chinese 
society has remained in tact for millennia. It has not been integrated into the larger state 
apparatus. Nor has the state tried to subsume the social functions of the local figurations 
under its own auspices. Competition has remained restricted to within the traditional 
figuration, and differentiation has remained relatively low; the chains of 
interdependence have not extended appreciably. Possibly most significantly in Eliasian 
terms, it is still a culture guided by external constraint. DeSwann summarizes Elias as 
saying of Europe that pacification occurred through “state monopolization of violence 
and the attendant growth of interdependence between human beings… As these forms 
spread across the continent  people were able to see each other as more similar - they 
were becoming more alike.” (de Swaan 1995: 35). For some reason this is exactly what 
did not happen in China. The state formed but the ‘growth of interdependence between 
human beings’ did not. De Swann describes the European society of some distant past in 
the following way: “Beyond the circle of the family and village, identifications as a rule 
were much weaker, since they applied to strangers, who were different and with whom 
one was much less concerned” (de Swaan 1995: 29).This is a description that could 
appropriately be applied to much of China even today. Given that there has been change  
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in China, but also significant stagnation, what is it about this traditional culture that has 
presumably remained so stable and, in a sense so contrary to Eliasian thought, relatively 
unchanging?  
 
Dominant Orientations - Schwartz 
The explanation, for the purposes of this thesis, lies in what Schwartz  calls “dominant 
orientations” (Schwartz 1985: 3). He introduces his thoughts on the subject by 
acknowledging that there are a lot of reservations about “a static cultural approach” but 
asks the question of whether there is anything to be said for “the notion of dominant 
orientations... within a given culture that persist over time” (Schwartz 1985: 3). He says 
that ancient cultures share certain characteristics yet “they remain different from each 
other in very significant ways” (Schwartz 1985: 3). These shared characteristics may be 
what he is referring to as dominant orientations, having resulted from similar responses 
to similar circumstances, but the cultures differ as a result of the differing ways they 
have dealt with changing environments and social circumstances over time. The shared 
characteristics, however, often remain common threads within and between cultures 
through time. Schwartz’s final point on dominant orientations is that they are “by no 
means incompatible with… historic change” (Schwartz 1985: 4).  
 
In dealing with the dominant orientations spanning the ages of Chinese culture, 
allowance has also to be made for the significant change which did occur. China is not 
the monolithic and unchanging colossus it has so often been seen to be. But there have 
been very strong cultural threads running through its history. These orientations provide 
consistent points of reference upon which to base one’s analysis. Schwartz suggests that 
much of what was to result in the Chinese habitus has been in place for millennia in the  
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form of the dominant orientations to be discussed. Smith provides support for this in 
saying that,  
 
Archaeological discoveries made in the early decades of this century 
have shown very clearly that by the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries 
B.C. many of the distinctive elements of Chinese civilization and 
religion were already in being. These were later to form an integral part 
of the Confucian inheritance… What we understand today as 
Confucianism… is in large measure a development of ideas and 
practices which were already in being in the Shang dynasty a thousand 
years before Confucius was born (Smith 1974: 22). 
 
These ideas and practises were, if anything, even more firmly established prior to the 
political unification of the Chinese people under the Qin (221 B.C.) and Han (202 B.C.) 
dynasties. Ancestor worship, a central feature of Chinese culture over the centuries, 
provides a useful illustration of his point:  
 
ancestor worship remains a central religious orientation within Chinese 
culture down to the present. What we have here is the notion that the 
past, present, and future members of a family are bound up in the same 
community over time… What is involved above all is the proper piety 
toward relationships of familial status (Schwartz 1985: 6).  
 
This ancestor worship, an integral aspect of the Confucian social system, has held sway 
in the Chinese world from a time long prior to its inclusion in the Confucian canon. As  
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part of the Confucian system, ancestor worship traversed Chinese culture through its 
millennia of both change and stability, and remained largely as it has always been; a 
system unifying the culture over the span of generations and the breadth of given social 
environments.  
 
Traditional Chinese society was composed of numerous semi-
autonomous local units, each of which was structured around the 
kinship system as its core, and each was only loosely related to the 
others. As a national social system, these units were integrated not so 
much by extensive functional interdependence and centralized control 
as by a fairly uniform institutional framework which enabled Chinese 
people everywhere to act together as a group on the basis of a common 
system of basic values. (Yang 1959: 20). 
 
This ongoing lack of ‘functional interdependence’ requires explanation in an Eliasian 
analysis. If the state in an Eliasian sense formed very early on, why was there still so 
little functional interdependence evidenced in wider Chinese society even well into the 
twentieth century? This is a very important question, and one that goes to the centre of 
this thesis. Rischauer and Fairbank elaborate on the development of the relationship 
between central and local governments during the Han, the period when the pattern was 
set for most of Chinese history. 
 
By the first century B.C. the bureaucracy is said to have consisted of 
130,285 officials... Although the Han bureaucracy can rightly be 
described as huge, it was actually very small when compared with the  
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population over which it ruled; perhaps one person in 400 or 500 
(Reischauer 1960: 96).  
 
He continues in saying that this would remain true for all subsequent dynasties. The 
government was not set up to provide services to the people in the fashion expected by 
Westerners today (Reischauer 1960: 96). It had contact with the people at the local level 
but it was not a very intimate contact. As long as the people paid their taxes, supplied 
the required labour and avoided disturbances they were left alone. “The government 
thus was a relatively small, highly centralized body that floated on a sea of isolated 
peasant communities” (Reischauer 1960: 96). In this sense the Chinese state remained 
quite aloof from the people. There was very little integration of local society into the 
larger social unit of the state. This was as it was intended to be in the Confucian world; 
this was the proper relationship between government and the governed. This was also a 
fundamental difference between China and the Europe Elias describes. 
 
In this environment it was the kinship system that provided both the stability and the 
social functions for an enduring Chinese civilization (Yang 1959: 20). One of the 
primary socio-economic functions of the kinship system was the distribution of 
resources so important to the civilizing process Elias describes. As these semi-
autonomous units retained their self-sufficiency they were integrated only loosely into 
the greater whole through the cultural system, the dominant orientations then prevalent. 
Their control over the distribution of resources remained internal to the figurations. The 
cultural norms that form this common identity as they affect social relations at the local 
level are at the centre of this effort. 
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C.K. Yang observes that over the past two millennia of “recurring dynastic cycles” there 
has been a continuous line of development of Chinese society. There had been change 
but it was generally so widely dispersed and limited that it was fairly easily assimilated 
into the existing system (Yang 1959: 3-4). This was true even in those cases where rapid 
change took place, possibly leading to the impression that major change simply did not 
occur. Leading examples of what Yang is referring to might start with the first unifiers 
of China, the Qin, who instituted a draconian ‘Legalist’ rule from the centre that was not 
well suited to the existing Chinese culture. After only 15 years (221 – 206 B.C.) of 
stretching the Chinese people beyond their limits, the dynasty fell, eventually being 
replaced by the Han in 202 B.C. Also included might be both the Mongol ‘Yuan’ 
dynasty (1276–1367) and the Manchu ‘Qing’ dynasty (1645–1911). Both of the latter 
two were examples of foreign invaders who were more or less assimilated into the 
Chinese world, becoming as ‘Chinese’ as the subjects they ruled. Even when the state 
was invaded and overthrown, in time the dominant orientations, staying intact, 
overthrew the barbarian invaders. China and the Chinese remained as they had been. 
That is, until the twentieth century. 
 
In the modern scene, the immediate vital effect of the Republican 
revolution of 1911 was limited mainly to the disintegration of the 
traditional system of central political control; there was no sweeping 
introduction of any new pattern of society. The subsequent four decades 
of the republican period brought a gradual disintegration of China’s 
traditional institutions and a rather chaotic beginning of a new social 
pattern, but these came largely by the spontaneous process of social  
 
143
change and not by the coordinated and conscious planning of an 
organized political power (Yang 1959: 3-4). 
 
The change that did occur in the traditional order was more along the lines of reducing 
the old order to a state of confusion. No new organizing pattern was introduced to take 
its place. According to Yang, the Communist regime intensified this effort at destroying 
the old order. “The declared purpose of the regime is the remaking of the total structure 
of China’s political, economic, and social life” (Yang 1959: 3-4).  
 
Levy makes the important Eliasian connection. While there have been many revolutions 
in China, “these have inevitably aimed at renovation of the old social structure rather 
than its abolition and replacement. The social movements of the last hundred years have 
increasingly sought a new social organization rather than a renovation of the old” (Levy 
1971: 318). This is highly significant for an Eliasian analysis. Earlier revolutionary 
change never sought to alter anything fundamental in imperial China, any of the 
dominant orientations of Chinese society. In fact, the opposite was normally the case. 
The protagonists of this new period, however, were clearly intent on exactly that.  
 
Elias talks about the period after a dominion has formed the institutions for ruling and 
maintaining monopolies of taxation and violence as the period of statehood.  
 
And only when this complex apparatus has evolved does the control 
over army and taxation take on its full monopoly character. Only then is 
the fiscal and military monopoly firmly established. From now on social 
conflicts are not concerned with removing monopoly rule but only with  
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the question of who are to control it, from whom they are to be recruited 
and how the burdens and benefits of the monopoly are to be distributed. 
It is only with the emergence of this continuing monopoly of the central 
authority and this specialized apparatus for ruling that dominions take 
on the character of ‘states’ (Elias 1994a: 346). 
 
This is an apt description of the Chinese situation from the Han through the Republican 
Revolution of 1911 – well over two millennia. The Confucian canon (which was very 
closely connected to the Chinese system of empire – in fact, the two depended upon 
each other) that formed the dominant orientations and provided the basis for Eliasian 
monopoly-based statehood through Chinese history was not that which was challenged 
with the change of dynasties. That the monopoly should continue to exist in something 
closely resembling its then current form at a given time never seemed to be in question; 
hence the phenomenal stability of the Chinese system. With events of the twentieth 
century the situation changed, however.  
 
The important point for right now is that the dominant Confucian orientations winding 
their way consistently through Chinese social history seem only to have begun to change 
to any appreciable degree after the Republican Revolution in 1911. More realistically 
this is probably truer after the Communist assumption of power, and even the 
subsequent opening, which began only in 1978.  
 
Confucianism 
A basic understanding of the highlights of Confucianism will be useful in analysing the 
development of Chinese culture in Eliasian terms. It is out of Confucianism that the  
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overwhelming importance of interpersonal relations in Chinese culture emerged. It is 
held that China is an ideal candidate to be spoken of in terms of dominant orientations 
primarily because of the historically central position of Confucianism within its 
ideological pantheon. Confucius (551 – 479 B.C.) lived toward the end of the Zhou 
dynasty (1122 – 221 B.C.) just prior to “the era of Warring States (403-221 BC)”, a 
period of great social disruption (Fairbank 1992: 49). The process of state formation that 
Elias describes as operating through the monopoly mechanism, with more or less feudal 
entities vying for control over larger areas, had already begun. 
 
Power had already mostly passed into the hands of the rulers of large 
states who were independent of a central authority, whilst within the 
states themselves constant changes were taking place in a power 
structure as the ‘haves’ sought to hold on to what they possessed, whilst 
the ‘have nots’ sought to wrest it from them (Smith 1974: 15).  
 
According to Mark Elvin, “Experience and reflection had bred a measure of scepticism” 
among the people as they called the old  mores and superstitions into question (Elvin 
1996: 269). Largely because of this, “He insisted on the practical primacy of the human 
world” (Elvin 1996: 270).  
 
The teaching of Confucius was wholly concerned with practical ethics, 
the ways in which human beings may live together in harmony and 
good order. Asked about good and evil spirits in nature, he replied, ‘We 
have first to know how to serve mankind, then we shall understand 
about serving the spirits’ (Martin 1972: 7).   
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For Confucius it was not so much that the spiritual world did not exist or even did not 
matter. It was more that human affairs were far more important. For people to live life 
as it was meant to be lived, human relations had to be properly ordered first and 
foremost. Not having achieved this ordered state, concerning oneself with things beyond 
was pointless. In this he was very pragmatic, and this is thought to be a primary source 
of the renowned Chinese pragmatism.  
 
Confucius himself insisted that he was not advocating anything new but was only a 
transmitter of the ideas he put forward. Essentially what he did was to organize a 
number of ideas then prevalent into a system of social organization. “Sociologists and 
anthropologists have often seen Confucian writing as an intellectual elaboration on basic 
cultural traits of the Chinese people, whose everyday life can be seen as governed by 
Confucian morality” (Stockman 2000: 70). The Chinese culture of the time was already 
strongly relationship oriented and hierarchical. According to Fei “The task of Confucius 
was to set down for each social status its canon of correct behaviour” (Fei 1983: 141). 
This cross fertilization between the culture and Confucianism is important in that it 
reinforces the notion of the strength of dominant orientations through time. Yang is here 
examining the impact of the balance between culture at the more localised level and the 
influence of ‘Confucianism’ as a thought system on the development of the Chinese 
culture as a whole. The focus is on the development of the bureaucracy that effectively 
supplanted feudalism as the organizational structure for Chinese society. He starts by 
saying basically that the bureaucracy had to adapt itself to the requirements of the social 
environment in which it existed. 
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In China, the bureaucracy developed in a social system characterized by 
a diffuse social pattern, local self-sufficiency, local homogeneity but 
national heterogeneity, emphasis on the primary group with its network 
of intimate personal relations, and the importance of an informal moral 
order (Yang 1959b: 135). 
 
The Chinese bureaucracy was adapting to an already existing social 
order with many Confucian-like characteristics, and in so doing, 
reinforcing that same order. In fact, the existing social organization was 
forcing the bureaucracy to change and conform to its needs and 
requirements. 
 
Confucianism came to be adopted as the official ideology of the 
bureaucracy precisely because it was so well suited to such a social 
system as compared with Legalism, the formal and impersonal 
characteristics of which were ostensibly much more conducive to the 
development of an efficient bureaucracy (Yang 1959b: 135). 
 
In this case it was the culture which was dictating the form the bureaucracy was to take, 
pushing aside the primacy of concerns for efficiency. For the bureaucracy to work at all, 
it had to conform to some degree with the cultural norms already in place. Confucianism 
did this. 
 
In this sense, traditional China may be thought of as having two major 
structural components: a national bureaucratic superstructure… and a  
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vast substratum of heterogeneous local communities based on a morally 
oriented social order and the informal primary group. This huge 
conglomeration of local communities was tenuously held together by its 
common acceptance of Confucian ideology, a national bureaucracy, and 
a weakly organized national economy (Yang 1959b: 135). 
 
This social organization based on Confucian values gave China characteristics of both 
the modern European state and medieval feudal Europe. There were both the strong 
(though limited) central authority, and the self-sufficient local communities. It also 
served to cement these seemingly contradictory, antagonistic characteristics in place 
with a remarkable stability.  
 
In analysing Chinese culture it is inappropriate to say either that it is Confucian, or that 
it is merely a situation where Confucianism was an outgrowth of the existing culture. It 
is more accurately described as both. Yang makes this clear. In fact, Loewe even 
apologizes (as do others) for his use of the term ‘Confucianism’. “The term 
Confucianism is here used solely as a matter of convenience, and denotes developments 
of  very different periods which have been ascribed to the same origin” (Loewe 1966: 
96). The same should be stipulated for the present effort. This should indicate the extent 
to which this social system was an outgrowth of many sources within the environment 
over an extended period, as opposed to the thinking of one man. It was through the 
bureaucracy that the Confucian code became the dominant system for ordering society, 
but it is equally true that it was strongly influenced by the surrounding culture. It 
provided the local population with the means of dealing with and relating to a 
centralised state, and the state with the means of ruling the local populations from the  
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centre. With this tacit Confucian understanding between the centre and the periphery, 
the self-sufficient local figurations have managed to successfully fend off state 
intrusions into their lives for over two millennia. The European-style state with 
monopolies of the means of violence and taxation had by this time formed in China, but, 
through Confucianism, the localized social relations were not overly impacted. From an 
Eliasian perspective this is the single most significant departure from European social 
development.   
 
The Confucian classics were oriented toward the achievement of t’ai-
p’ing (Great Peace) through knowledge of the general social order 
based on a harmonious system of human relations and moral norms… 
In a broad sense, the system of Confucian knowledge may be said to 
centre upon the proper ordering of people and their activities as a means 
of achieving the main administrative goal, peace and harmony in an 
extensive empire (Yang 1959b: 138). 
 
From either the central or the local perspective, Chinese society has, for all intents and 
purposes, remained anchored on the principle of the proper ordering of interpersonal 
relationships for at least the past two thousand years and probably significantly longer. 
It is argued here that this is still the case but that with recent social developments, the 
understanding of ‘proper’ has begun to change. 
 
It was Confucius’ belief that if interpersonal relations could be effectively ordered, if 
people would behave properly within their figuration, the longed for ‘t’ai p’ing’ (Great 
Peace) would result.   
 
150
 
Confucius had said (rather succinctly), ‘jun jun chen chen fu fu zi zi,’ 
which in its context meant, ‘Let the ruler rule as he should and the 
minister be a minister as he should. Let the father act as a father should 
and the son act as a son should.’ If everyone performed his role, the 
social order would be sustained (Fairbank 1992: 52).  
 
It is also worth pointing out that Confucius was convinced that this state of harmony had 
been achieved at some point in the past and that his task was to regain something lost. 
This ‘rear view mirror’ perspective is thought to be one of the main reasons why the 
Confucian system has traditionally been so conservative. 
 
Confucius’ understanding of the individual focuses on “the fully developed person using 
the term ren, a Chinese word that combines the characters for ‘human being’ and ‘two.’ 
A full person, therefore, is one who exists in society, in communication with others” 
(Renard 2002: 434). The fundamental importance of relationships to personhood, 
identity, and society is clear. This also represents a central aspect of the dominant 
orientations that have held the Chinese together throughout their history. 
 
This social cohesiveness, what would ultimately push society toward t’ai p’ing, was to 
be achieved first and foremost through adherence to what Confucius called filial piety 
(xiao, [hsiao]) which is  
 
more than simply an ethical virtue. It has in it almost a religious 
resonance. These relationships of persons in terms of their proper status  
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roles, which also include the proper relationship to ancestors, have in 
them a kind of numinous element… It provides almost a paradigm of a 
society where people are bound together by a network of proper 
behaviour and they are also bound to the world beyond in a way by this 
network of proper behaviour (Schwartz 1985: 7-8).  
 
Schwartz thus provides helpful insight into the deeply profound nature in which filial 
piety is held by and affects the Chinese. To violate the mores of filial piety is to go 
against the very essence of what it is to be Chinese. And to do that is virtually 
unthinkable. 
 
Renard discusses filial piety in the following more detailed terms: 
 
Behind all the other virtues, what makes a good Confucian tick is ‘filial 
devotion’ or xiao. The Chinese term is composed of ‘son’ with ‘old’ 
placed above it. Confucius taught that all other moral virtue, and indeed 
civilization itself, flows from filial devotion… Filial devotion 
culminates in doing one’s family proud… Lack of filial devotion was a 
most serious offense. Individuals could be put to death for cursing their 
elders. Filial devotion was the very bedrock of social order… without 
which there could be no exercise of authority in society at large. 
(Renard 2002: 435 - 436).  
 
Filial piety was what enabled people to connect to others, to society, and all the way up 
to the emperor. The means of displaying filial piety within the five cardinal relationships  
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was based on Li. Renard again effectively captures the essence of the responsibilities 
and duties within these relationships.  
 
First and foremost is li, principle or propriety, consisting of a whole 
range of directives for human behavior. Much of li arises from the 
customs that embody the spirit of community. When people can rely on 
propriety in all relationships, as enshrined in time-honored practice, 
they experience assurance and freedom in their relationships… Of equal 
importance is the notion of shu, reciprocity in interpersonal 
relationships. Reciprocity is essential to putting li into action, for it 
governs the five principal human relationships and the ten associated 
virtues (Renard 2002: 434-435).  
 
This whole issue of reciprocity was also clearly central to the Confucian system. 
Reciprocity is based in the Chinese word ‘pao’ (bao) which, according to Fairbank, has 
numerous meanings, all of which come back to ‘response’ or ‘return.’ So basic has it  
been that it has “served as one basis for social relations in China” (Fairbank 1957: 291). 
As in the quote below, relationships in the Confucian system are often defined in terms 
of their reciprocal obligations. Reciprocity also holds a very important place in this 
thesis, for it is closely connected to the development of the phenomenon of guanxi. The 
examination of guanxi will be used to establish that the chains of interdependence were 
extending in a fashion consistent with Elias’s position through the Communist and Post-
Opening periods. Importantly, within the Confucian canon reciprocity relates primarily 
to relationships within one’s close-knit figuration. Those relations are described in the 
following fashion:  
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In the father-son relationship, the father must cultivate kindness, the son 
reverence. The elder brother must deal gently with his younger brother, 
who responds with respect. A mutuality of faithfulness and obedience 
should characterize husband-wife relationships. Let all elders be 
considerate of those younger, and expect deference in return. Finally, a 
ruler must strive to treat subjects with benevolence and benefit from 
their loyalty as a result (Renard 2002: 434, 435).   
 
Filial piety and Li are the glue that holds the Chinese figuration together. The Chinese 
figuration has always been highly localized, as already discussed, and it is these two 
concepts that strictly order the relationships within this localized figuration, based 
primarily on the family, in a strongly traditional, hierarchical fashion. At the same time 
it also provides the means for the individual and their figuration to relate to the state, 
and the state to relate to them and it. With relationships properly ordered in the above 
terms, Confucius deemed that the entire empire would be effectively ordered. T’ai p’ing 
starts with the family and from there naturally extends outward to encompass all of 
society. 
 
In China the distribution of resources had always been determined at the local level 
within the localized figuration. The state has not interfered overly much in these 
relationships. Social stability has depended on that fact. Both li and shu are primary 
contributing principles to this social organization. The overwhelming importance of 
these two ideas is what has kept the figurations so comparatively small and the chains of 
interdependence so short. They are also what have allowed the state to function  
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effectively from the centre of a comparatively vast empire while remaining fairly small 
and at a distance from local life, much in contrast to the Europe Elias describes. 
 
Kinship System 
The localized kinship system is, and always has been, a basic social structure in China. 
Confucianism has been fundamental in reinforcing the kinship system in China. In day 
to day social interaction or relations all of this was based on the lineage, clan, or family, 
which often shared the same borders as the village. The terms are to a large degree 
interchangeable in a Chinese context where the idea of family has long had a degree of 
flexibility. The most common word for family is chia. Cohen suggests that the chia 
“was actually a kin group that could display a great deal of variation in residential 
arrangements as well as in the economic ties that bound its members together” (Cohen 
1978: 183). “Exactly what the term means has never been agreed upon and perhaps it is 
a variable which is subject to local variations” (Osgood 1963: 355). These social 
organizations (specifically in Ming and Qing China but also and more generally in 
traditional Chinese culture) in some cases lasted anywhere from 12 to 27 generations in 
one location, clearly indicating both their resilience and stability (Zhenman 2001). Many 
of them certainly must have been in place considerably longer than the dynasties 
themselves, possibly both the Ming and Qing dynasties in succession. It was within 
these structures that essentially all needs were met. Self-sufficiency was high and these 
figurations controlled the distribution of those resources they depended on. 
 
It is also true that the kinship system was important in bringing about, or at the very 
least allowing for, the ascendancy of the Confucian tradition. As Yang noted, it was 
very much a two way process. At the time of Confucius the extended family system was  
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in place. This is not to say that the Chinese commonly lived together under one roof 
with all, or even most of their blood relations. “The notion that most Chinese lived in 
‘joint’ or ‘large’ families has been thoroughly discredited by now” (Cohen 1978: 183). 
The important point is that the whole familial system was very tightly ordered and 
regulated, each person fitting snugly into their place with their appropriate title 
signifying their relationship to the others in the family. 
 
The teaching of Confucius consolidated this system, making the family 
the all-important unit. A man’s first loyalty should be to his family, all 
his acts must accord with the interests of the family, so that a Chinese 
cannot think of himself as a separate individual apart from his family 
(Martin 1972: 8).  
 
As stated earlier, even the word for person, ren, indicates the social nature of humanity. 
Man’s primary social relationships are to be found within the family. Performing well 
within these relations was a person’s means of establishing their own humanity. To fail 
in this area was to fail to be human. One’s relations within their family were the source 
of their own humanity. Separated from those relations they were lost in a most profound 
sense. 
 
While this understanding of family started with the simple nuclear unit, it clearly 
extended beyond that to the wider kinship group. It also extended far back into one’s 
family tree. Referring to the development during Shang times of many important ideas 
that would become indelibly incorporated into the Chinese habitus, Gelber discusses 
ancestor worship:  
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after death the ancestors dwelt in heaven and would continue their 
active interest in the family. They were the proper people to intercede 
with the gods on behalf of their descendents. In return, families had 
obligations to those ancestors. If such obligations were neglected, the 
ancestors would be angry, stop their protection and disasters would 
ensue. (Gelber 2007: 10). 
 
Ancestor worship has remained a very strong element of Chinese culture since at least 
the Zhou, and is still important today. It has had a significant long term impact and has 
been a dominant thread winding through Chinese social history.  
 
Since it was important to know who one’s ancestors were, families had 
to keep genealogies, and that activity in turn reinforced family interest... 
Ancestor worship was in effect the canonization of filial piety. While 
ancestor worship focused attention on the living in an important sense, 
it did so in terms of the institutional standards and patterns of the 
dead… little room was left for the exercise of discretion. This meant 
that the introduction of the new was inhibited to an important degree… 
it was a strong positive stimulus to the maintenance of the status quo 
ante, and, insofar as the status quo ante was stable, it aided the 
perpetuation of that stability (Levy 19971: 250).  
 
Here we have an important connection between the thought of Confucius, ancestor 
worship, and the longevity of Chinese culture. It was Confucian thought applied to  
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ancestor worship that provided one of the primary supports for the dominant 
orientations that allowed for the extraordinary longevity and stability of Chinese social 
organization. This was so despite the advent of the monopolies of the means of violence 
and taxation, and the Eliasian state. The other closely related support was the Confucian 
understanding of the state already discussed. All of it was grounded fundamentally upon 
the proper ordering of, and behaviour within, the interpersonal relations of one’s 
figuration, which clearly also included one’s ancestors. Where, in Elias’s understanding 
of Europe, control over the distribution of resources moved steadily into the hands of the 
state, in China it remained highly localized. 
 
Describing the impact of this family/kinship system after the chaotic Warring States 
period (403-221 B.C.), Chu suggests the actions taken by the first Qin (Ch’in) emperor 
returned China to order “largely because underlying the different political regimes of the 
Warring States period was a common sociocultural institution begun in the early years 
of the Chou Dynasty (1066-771 B.C.)” (Chu 1983a: 6). The system was clearly in place 
before the Qin. It was sufficiently broad based to include the people of the various states 
involved in the general conflict of the preceding period. And according to Chu, it was 
central in bringing about order after an extended period of confusion.  
 
Much praised by Confucius (552-479 B. C.), this was a communal 
foundation built upon the clan system, which the founders of the Chou 
Dynasty had codified in order to strengthen their family-based imperial 
rule... Task-related cooperation, allocation of rewards, resolution of 
local conflict, and socialization took place largely in the institution of 
clan relations, for which the Chou rulers had developed elaborate rites  
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and rules. The predominantly rural communities were more or less self-
contained miniature social systems with close-knit communication 
within themselves. They were held together by a political-administrative 
structure that maintained only marginal points of contact with grassroots 
areas. It was a system of strong local ties and loose centralized control 
(Chu 1983a: 6).  
 
The Chinese kinship system (what Elias might call the Chinese figuration), steeped in 
Confucianism, was the bedrock supporting the whole social superstructure of Chinese 
culture. Chu discusses the cyclical nature of Chinese social development as it has 
historically swung from long periods of relative stability, through periods of confusion 
when the local structural organization was undermined, and back to the more familiar 
and stable situation where the ‘local communal foundation’ was again allowed to 
prosper (Chu 1983a: 7). Within this kinship system, ‘the local communal foundation,’ 
all roles and relationships were clearly demarcated and understood by everyone 
involved. It was a very tightly regimented, hierarchical structure with little room for 
change and/or mobility. People generally died where they were born, having lived the 
same life as their predecessors for generations before them. If this kinship system is 
posited as the primary figuration for the average Chinese person, as indeed it was, the 
self-sufficiency and all that flows out of that from an Eliasian perspective (low 
differentiation, short chains of interdependence, local control of distribution of 
resources, restricted competition, and restricted mobility) comes into view. It was a 
very traditional social structure. The important fact is that this form of social 
organization was a consistent and powerful element of Chinese culture throughout its 
long history, and it directly impacted (hindered) development in a civilizing direction.   
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Chapter Four – Central Concepts as Manifested in Traditional China 
 
Mobility 
Though Elias did discuss mobility with regard to the European upper class in the 
Renaissance, it is not an issue of central importance to Eliasian thought as a whole. It 
will, however, prove fundamental to applying and understanding his ideas in the 
Chinese context.  
 
High mobility has not historically been a common characteristic of Chinese society. 
People have for the most part been tied to the land, their figuration, their family, and 
their ancestors. To move outside of their figuration entailed leaving all of this, one of 
the gravest of sins. It would be to renounce not only one’s heritage and family, but 
their very identity. For this reason, in that mobility was so tightly restricted by one’s 
figuration, any change in mobility in society as a whole might represent a change in 
the social relations making up the figuration.  
 
There are several different aspects of mobility in the traditional Chinese social 
structure that are worth noting in this regard. Rozman states that there is little research 
on the topic of migration in pre-modern China but observes from the level of 
urbanization that it is safe to say, due largely to a lack of primogeniture and the 
strength of local bonds, rural-urban migration was minimal (Rozman 1981: 175). 
 
The lack of primogeniture also encouraged families to stay together in order to ensure 
there was enough food on everyone’s table. With the passage of time it became 
increasingly difficult to do this without help on diminishing allotments of land.  
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Probably related to the above, Eberhard makes clear in his study on the subject  that 
pre-modern thinkers were strongly opposed to migration (Eberhard 1962: 19). One 
could not fulfil their relational duties to family and ancestors if one migrated. Possibly 
for these reasons also, migration has been against the law at many points in Chinese 
history.  
 
Levy notes that for the traditional Chinese social structure to continue to exist, the 
family needed some means to keep its members in place; 
 
for if they could have fled an unpleasant situation, the power position of 
the family would have been severely limited. As has been suggested 
above, this means lay in the inability of the average individual to find an 
acceptable alternative method of making a living (Levy 1971: 329).  
 
That family members should stay together was never in question. Given that there was 
no realistic alternative gainful employment, according to Levy, there was effectively 
nowhere else to go anyway. There simply was little, if any, choice.  
 
Another perspective holds that the “immobility of the peasant majority on the land is a 
convenience to the government that allows it to tax without delivering any 
administrative services in return” (Stover 1974: 19). There is probably some truth to this 
in that it was in a sense a convenience, but probably not just to the government. From 
the perspective of the present analysis, it was more likely a convenience to all parties 
concerned. The immobility of the peasants may well have made tax collection far easier 
for the government, but in so doing it also facilitated the government staying out of the  
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local communities. There was little need to encroach on local territory and, as discussed, 
there was incentive not to do so. The government may not have provided much in the 
way of administrative services, but that was exactly the way the villagers, in their 
localized self-sufficiency, seemed to want it. 
 
All of this is not to say that migration did not occur. Both internal and external 
migrations have occurred throughout Chinese history but they were usually only 
engaged in as a last resort in times of dire need. The low rate of internal migration has 
already been noted. In terms of external  migration “China has been a net exporter of 
people over history” (Wenzhen 2000: 192). Wenzhen qualifies this, however, by saying 
that the rate of international migration has been “extremely low” as a percentage of 
population (Wenzhen 2000: 192). Migration – internal or external – has historically 
been neither a viable nor a very attractive option.  
 
Competition 
It is worth noting the impact of this social structure on the competition and 
differentiation central to Elias’s framework both because this influence emanated from 
the traditionally small figurational nexus and because it lasted well into the twentieth 
century. Qiang is referring to the Chinese Confucian system of ordering society when he 
says that: 
 
The most salient feature of a system where status is determined by 
ascribed features is the stress on rank and order. When status is 
determined by laws and regulations, it is almost impossible to change. 
The limits of status are almost impassable. Every individual is  
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positioned at a fixed rank to keep the whole hierarchy in order. (Qiang 
2002: 118). 
 
Originality and social mobility were suppressed by a lack of “opportunities of equal 
competition” (Qiang 2002: 118). With achievement having little to do with diligence, 
the incentive to compete was greatly reduced. Qiang further points out that the 
continuing importance of this system indicates Chinese society’s enduring traditional 
nature. In his analysis Potter is talking about specific social situations, also in the 
twentieth century, but in terms of the same traditional social structure. There is a duality 
inherent in traditional Chinese culture which impinges on the issue of competition 
directly: “the hierarchical solidarity of the lineage, and the competitive struggle within 
the lineage stood in opposition to one another as poles of a cultural dialectic; with 
dialectical logic, the expression of these conflicting values was tolerated within a single 
institution” (Potter 1990: 253-254). As evidence of this he points to the organization of 
leadership in the specific social situation that he examined. 
 
The opposition between formal hierarchy and competitive struggle was 
reflected on a duplicated pattern of leadership within the lineage… On 
the one hand were the village elders, leaders who had been chosen on 
the basis of formal kinship criteria such as age and seniority. These 
were often poor and inconsequential men. On the other were the 
effective leaders, who had achieved their position by competitive 
success (Potter 1990: 253) 
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In this case the traditional hierarchy is served through the elders, and the competitive 
edge through the ascendance of those who were more able. Importantly for the point 
being made here, both systems of leadership were simultaneously tolerated within the 
same system. 
 
Everyone understood, according to Potter, that each lineage member “would use and 
exploit others for his own advantage. It was assumed, and borne out by experience, that 
powerful lineage members would do their best to use the collectively owned ancestral 
property for their own personal benefit” (Potter 1990: 253). So it was not that there was 
no competition. That was far from the case. But what competition there was, was 
anything but equal, and social position and status had more or less predetermined the 
outcome. Individuals had little opportunity to change their social position within their 
figuration through any effort of their own and to seek to compete individually beyond 
figurational boundaries was not an alternative. As long as the traditional social relations 
and structure were in place, the competition that drove the civilizing process in Europe - 
integration, increasing differentiation, extending chains of interdependence, and 
internalization of constraint – had little chance of emerging.  
 
Competition between kin was at times intense but the important point here is that this 
competition was internal to the lineage, rarely extending beyond familial, figurational 
and, more often than not, village boundaries. Because the culture remained so intensely 
localized, so too did the competition. It was the same dialectical logic mentioned by 
Potter above that held competition within such relatively tight figurational boundaries. 
Order based on hierarchy was supported by an ideology stressing the solidarity of the 
lineage over competition. For this reason their personal/social or  
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professional/subsistence (normally there was little if any difference between the two) 
relations did not often extend beyond those same borders. There was little need to 
interact in any way with outsiders. Much in line with Elias’s ideas in The Established 
and the Outsiders (Elias 1994c), outsiders were viewed with a degree of suspicion, and 
quite often even hostility, simply because they were ‘outsiders.’ Interacting with those 
outside one’s community, one’s primary figuration, was often strongly frowned upon as 
being improper.  
 
In an important sense it was the family structure itself that encouraged competition, 
while also limiting its bounds. Ancestry and ancestor worship were very significant in 
this context. “Far from being opposed to the drive for competition the pattern of father-
son identification actually encourages it. For every individual can add weight and 
content to this ancestral authority by his achievements” (Hsu 1948: 258-259). As this 
all-important transition from son to father to ancestor played out, achievement ensured 
glory both to the family and to oneself for the duration, as long as it was pursued within 
the proper limits. 
 
Hsu follows this with a defining point that helps to cement in place the position being 
put forward in this thesis. Again, competition was acceptable and at times both 
encouraged and intense, but only so long as it stayed within the proper bounds which 
were limited by the family. 
 
If we look, however, at the objects of these competitive efforts, we find 
that they all come within the framework closely defined by parental 
authority and ancestral tradition. As long as the ambition functions  
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within this framework, the individual has every encouragement to get 
ahead of everyone else (Hsu 1948: 259). 
 
He reiterates this point in even stronger terms when he talks about competition with 
regard to the struggle of life.  
 
This untiring struggle expresses itself, however, within the definite 
limits of tradition. Both the lines of progress taken and the final 
objectives desired are well confined within this framework… As a 
matter of fact, the starting point of competition is the household. 
Brothers, instead of trying to get ahead by independent paths, tend to 
begin by competing for their father’s favor (Hsu 1948: 261-262). 
 
There was one area of competition outside the confines of the family which was 
sometimes pursued. This was the examination system. This line of competition was in 
actuality quite limited in terms of the population as a whole, however. Fei Xiaotong 
(Hsiao-tung) affirms this point when he says that he is sceptical about the ‘popular 
belief’ that in the good old days everyone had a more or less equal chance to become an 
official through the examination (Hsiao-tung 1983: 144). Technically, everyone has a 
chance to be a member of next year’s freshman class at Harvard as well, but the reality 
is far different. In that this was far and away the primary means of social mobility 
outside the family, and given the evidenced strength of family ties in locking one into 
the localized family structure as already discussed, it is understandable that competition 
outside the family must have been minimal. With no ties beyond the figuration, and all 
needs provided for within the figuration, there was neither the opportunity nor the need.   
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Even when competition through the ‘external’ avenue of the exams was pursued, the 
family structure remained decisive. While Rozman claims a more open society than Fei, 
or this thesis, would allow, he does say that, “The family set the immediate, and the 
lineage the outer limits of the social group within which cooperative behavior for 
realization of that goal was to be effected” (Rozman 1981: 94-95). In other words, if a 
child was destined to attempt the examination, he would do so only through, and with 
the help of, the family. In the event that he was successful, all glory would, in turn, 
reflect upon the family as a whole.
35 
 
Suzanne Brandstadter, who has used Elias in analysing China, makes the following 
point flowing directly out of Eliasian thought. 
 
The key words in Elias’ approach to society are interdependency, power 
and process. Human beings are inevitably always interdependent parts 
of what he terms social figurations of power. They can act only within 
these interdependencies, which shape both their actions and the goals of 
their actions. The link between social figurations of power and social 
change is the idea that these figurations are the unintended results of 
intentional, interdependent human action... Highly competitive 
situations lead to the emergence of ‘spontaneous structures’ which then 
shape people’s behaviour and, with time, their habitus (Brandtstadter 
2000: 9). 
 
                                                 
35 It is also worth noting that when one was successful in the examination this provided him with perhaps 
the only opportunity in traditional Chinese society to develop social relations or interdependencies beyond 
the figuration defined by his family or village.  
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Within the traditional Chinese social system as a whole, however, the relations were so 
constraining, and at the same time mutually reinforcing, that a level of stability was 
achieved where all action, having been shaped within these interdependencies, served, 
unintentionally or otherwise, to recreate existing figurational forms. This of course 
included competition. As long as the traditional system remained stable, the state 
remained distant and uninvolved in local figurations, and as long as the state remained 
distant and uninvolved, the traditional social system remained stable. Until the social 
relations within the figurations were broken down in some fashion, this ‘stasis’ was 
unlikely to change overly much (indeed, there were cultural imperatives against it 
changing); the competition that is so fundamental to the differentiation, extending 
chains of interdependence
36, and all other aspects of the Eliasian civilizing process, 
could not occur.  
 
Differentiation and Distribution of Resources 
In that, for Elias, competition was the spur for differentiation, with so little in the way of 
competition in traditional Chinese society it should come as no surprise that 
differentiation was quite limited as well. The Confucian system, because it mandated 
such a highly restrictive and limited order of social relations also ultimately dictated a 
high level of self-sufficiency at the local level, militating against differentiation. In 
addition, the relative non-interference of the state in local society also contributed to the 
need of local society to be self-sufficient. The separation of the two and the self-
sufficiency of the latter were part and parcel of the entire traditional Chinese social 
order. Differentiation in such a necessarily self-sufficient social arrangement as that of 
                                                 
36 The Eliasian chains of interdependence remained comparatively short. People had relationships with 
those they also had direct contact with. Those beyond one’s line of sight were generally not to be trusted. 
The people did not need to, or usually want to, depend on or interact with those outside their figurations.   
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China was always understandably relatively low
37. Not only was there little need for 
specialization at the local level, there was very little opportunity for it. In that most of 
what was needed for life was provided by the local community, and for the most part by 
the family, and that this arrangement was thoroughly embedded in a considerable 
cultural edifice, any specialization would have amounted to a dangerous waste of time 
and resources. With the remarkable stability of Chinese culture being the key, this 
characteristic never significantly changed.  
 
For differentiation to have occurred on the same scale as in Elias’s Europe, something 
would have had to interfere with the traditional figurational structure, disrupting social 
relations at that level. Elias would have had it that the control of the distribution of 
resources would have had to have been removed from local figurational control. Tied to 
the whole dynamic of the Chinese figurational complex was the fact that what resources 
there were, were to be found within the local community. As the relations within the 
local figurations provided most of the resources and most of the social functions, as well 
as the fact that the state had little to contribute to, and strong incentive not to interfere 
with local affairs, the distribution of resources was controlled from within these 
localized figurations. This was dictated by the figurational arrangement and the strictly 
ordered social relations therein. As these social relations remained stable, and this was 
after all the highest goal of Chinese society, so too did the control of the distribution of 
whatever resources there were. Zheng Zhenman suggests that, “It would not be an 
exaggeration to say that in the local society of Ming and Qing Fujian there were no 
social functions which could not potentially be performed by families or lineages” 
(Zhenman 2001: 23). From the present investigation it is clear that this fact extends to 
                                                 
37 Eastman’s 1988 study (Eastman 1988) arguing that there was specialization as far back as the 
eighteenth century is noted, but again, if looked at objectively, it serves to confirm the point made here; 
relatively speaking, differentiation in China has always been limited.  
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most of the rest of Chinese society over most of the course of imperial history. Zheng 
further stipulates that Western studies of the lineage continue to be influenced by 
Maurice Freedman and his thinking that, “The Chinese lineage group was essentially an 
inheritance group characterized by lineage corporate property, and that its development 
therefore was rooted in issues of control and allocation of resources” (Zhenman 2001: 9 
citing Freedmen). This is a fundamental point, in that Freedman is confirming these 
local social figurations, the ones that the state by definition left untouched, as the same 
ones that controlled the distribution of resources, a function fundamental to the 
civilizing process. With the control of the distribution of resources left in local hands, it 
would be difficult for the Eliasian civilizing process to progress any further.  
 
The state did not interfere at this level in China because of the Confucian tradition 
which dictated the symbiotic and distant relationship between the village environment as 
it existed and the state.  The two were and remained interlocked and interdependent, 
mutually reinforcing and, in a sense, guaranteeing each other’s continuing existence and 
strength. The firmly fixed social organization and the ‘understanding’ between the state 
and the local figurations allowed for little shift in the social structure in terms of 
competition, differentiation and extending chains of interdependence. Hence, for 
Eliasian purposes, there has also been little movement, or even chance for movement, in 
a civilizing direction – the internalization of constraint. This remained largely true right 
up through the end of the Qing dynasty.  
 
In all of this it has always been the tightness of the local figurations that has inhibited all 
those characteristics which are deemed vital to the eventual internalization of constraint, 
to the civilizing process. These figurations were tightly bound into a more or less  
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symbiotic state-local social formation that fed on itself, virtually guaranteeing its own 
continuance, and therefore as well, the continuance of the traditional localized social 
relations. Though Europe emerged from a past in many ways similar to that of China, 
this state-local society relationship so characteristic of China never developed in 
Europe. 
 
Confucius elaborated on the social relations ultimately constituting this social order, and 
in so doing cemented them into the Chinese social structure. Chinese social order, and 
ultimately its stability and longevity, were centred around (though not limited to) the 
kinship structure. For the purposes of this thesis it is important to see that these ordered 
social relations, and the habitus associated with them, ostensibly made up the dominant 
orientations that have guided Chinese civilization for over two millennia. The figuration 
of the Chinese person was tightly bound within this set of ordered relations for 
essentially the entire period and, as far as has been determined this has been true in a 
universal sense within Chinese civilization. It was within these figurations that virtually 
all social functions, including the distribution of resources, took place. Given this, 
 
if we take this Confucian view of life in its social and political context, 
we will see that its esteem for age over youth, for the past over the 
present, for established authority over innovation has in fact provided 
one of the great historic answers to the problem of social stability. It has 
been the most successful of all systems of conservatism (Fairbank 1992: 
53). 
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Though coming from a slightly different perspective, Max Weber’s thoughts on 
China as outlined in his ‘The Religion of China’ (Weber 1951) are much in 
agreement with Fairbank’s (and for the purposes of this thesis, Elias’s) observation 
about Chinese conservatism. Weber talks about Confucianism as being the source of, 
and tightly tied to, both the Chinese sib which might accurately be compared to the 
figuration for the average Chinese person, and the political system entailing the 
emperor’s role in relation to Chinese society. 
 
For Weber it was all founded on the Confucian principle of accepting the world as it 
was, and adapting to it, in contrast to the Puritan rejection of the world and looking 
to salvation in the world beyond. Confucianism defined the world according to the 
five cardinal relationships that for the average person were encompassed within the 
sib, and which in turn were a given, a part of the natural order of things. This resulted 
in very strict insider – outsider relations as opposed to the Puritan way, which was 
far more all-inclusive. A tightly monitored and antagonistic relationship between the 
individual and the outside world fed into a social system that strongly, and it must be 
said quite successfully, resisted change.  
 
Weber also describes the emperor in familiar terms, with his authority and power 
being secure only as long as social order and harmony were maintained. If the social 
order were disrupted, he had failed, and was subject to removal. This, of course, 
happened repeatedly throughout Chinese history, all the while with the Chinese 
social order remaining relatively undisturbed. 
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In this situation, local Chinese society was largely self-governing and stable, centred 
on the healthy Confucian/Weberian sib. As such it tended, for the most part 
successfully, to hinder social development in the European sense, and to promote a 
backward-looking conservatism (hence the considerable importance of ancestor 
worship as both contributing cause and effect of this phenomenon). Over the course 
of centuries, none of the other social forces that arose in China were strong enough to 
overcome this established social order for any length of time. This comports quite 
well with the Eliasian analysis of this thesis.
38 
 
Face and Guanxi 
Elias’s primary concern in his theory of the civilizing process was to show how the 
internalization of constraint occurred in the European context. The Chinese civilization 
took a decidedly different path from that of Europe in this regard. The most pressing 
evidence supporting this proposition is the importance of face in the Chinese world. 
Without digressing into which came first, it would seem that face and a Confucian 
system of social values are mutually reinforcing. The important point is that the Chinese 
culture is one still relying primarily upon external constraint, much as it is still 
Confucian, and this is represented in the centrality of the concept of face in everyday 
interaction. Internalization of constraint simply has not occurred to this point on the 
same scale seen in the West. It is argued that this has largely been a result of the highly 
successful Confucian system of conservatism highlighted earlier.  
 
                                                 
38 This is obviously a highly simplified presentation of Weber’s analysis of China, as it is fairly 
complex with numerous other factors involved, but it accurately captures the ideas most important to 
this thesis. It is also held to capture the most fundamental forces for conservatism in Weber’s analysis 
of China.  
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As Elias discusses the German context, for people brought up with a code of honour, life 
is to a large degree guided by the opinion of other people, by external constraint (Elias 
1996). Ruff explains that honour “embraces the value one places on oneself, but even 
more importantly it also represents the esteem in which society holds one” (Ruff 2001: 
75). Speirenburg talks of honour as having “at least three layers:  a person’s own feeling 
of self-worth, this person’s assessment of his or her worth in the eyes of others, and the 
actual opinion of others about her or him” (Spierenburg 1998: 2). As far as these 
definitions go, they bear a certain similarity to the Chinese situation with the external 
constraint of face.
39 Whether or not the social change China is currently undergoing 
ultimately leads beyond face to internalization will remain an open question. At this 
point, and by way of introduction, it will be worthwhile offering a brief discussion of 
both face and guanxi in order to situate what follows. 
 
Face 
Goffman states that:  
 
face may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively 
claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a 
particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of 
approved social attributes – albeit an image that others may share, as 
when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion by 
making a good showing for himself (Goffman 1967: 5).  
 
He goes on to say that, 
                                                 
39 A study of face with reference to Elias’s honour, as well as shame, is worthy of a thesis in itself, but 
will not be pursued in any further detail here.  
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face clearly is something that is not lodged in or on his body, but rather 
something that is diffusely located in the flow of events in the encounter 
and becomes manifest only when these events are read and interpreted 
for the appraisals expressed in them (Goffman 1967: 7). 
 
It is clear in this work, however, that Goffman is proposing a conception of face that he 
intends to be cross-cultural, and therefore universal, in its application. Bond starts by 
asserting a similar idea but finishes with a qualification; “concern about face is a 
universal phenomenon. What constitutes a desirable face, however, is culturally more 
specific” (Bond 1986: 249). He goes on to say of this universalizing approach that it 
shows “face-work in anonymous and mobile societies of the western world… However, 
in order to generalize them to an oriental culture like that of the Chinese, the 
hierarchical structure of society with its permanency of statuses should be taken into 
consideration” (Bond 1986: 244). Exemplifying this idea, Bond goes on to talk about 
social situations in the U.S. where everyone starts from roughly the same place socially 
and more or less wrestles for position (Bond 1986: 245). In a similar social situation in 
China, everyone knows everyone else’s standing and is simply expected to behave 
appropriately according to their own relative position. The same can be said to hold true 
to a greater or lesser degree in other western cultures, as compared to China. The key to 
understanding the Chinese situation might be to think of face as a tool used primarily 
(though not only) in the maintenance of social harmony, whereas in the West it is used 
less in the interests of harmony than in the struggle for ascendancy. In that social 
harmony has always been a, if not the, primary concern in social interaction in China,  
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this distinction is pivotal. It also goes to the heart of understanding Chinese face as an 
external constraint. 
 
Chinese Face 
In his 1944 study, Hu highlights two clearly distinct ways that the idea of face is 
understood in Chinese culture. The first is mianzi, which “stands for the kind of prestige 
that is emphasized in this country [U.S.]: a reputation achieved through getting on in 
life, through success and ostentation. This is success that is accumulated by means of 
personal effort or clever maneuvering” (Hu 1944: 45). Drawing on past studies of face 
in China, Yan says that “social face is achieved and possessed mainly by people in the 
upper classes and that ordinary people do not care much about their social face” (Yan 
1996: 138).
40 The other kind of face, referred to as lian, “represents the confidence of 
society in the integrity of ego’s moral character, the loss of which makes it impossible 
for him to function properly within the community. Lian is both a social sanction for 
enforcing moral standards and an internalized sanction” (Hu, 1944: 45). These moral 
standards are based on “faithful compliance to ritual and social norms” (Gabrenya 1996: 
312). The norms involved come out of the doctrines of Li  originally codified by 
Confucius well over two millennia ago (Freeman 1996: 89). In fact, according to 
Gabrenya, Hu goes on to indicate that, ‘the western concept of face corresponds to the 
Chinese mianzi but is wholly lacking in the connotations of lian’ (Gabrenya 1996: 312 
citing Hu). With reference to the purposes of this paper, it is the socially (externally) 
constraining aspect of Chinese face, prevalent in both mianzi and lian, that is of primary 
concern.  
 
                                                 
40 With the rapid economic expansion and now changeable social mobility in China one might 
logically conclude that this is changing. This specific issue will not be explored in this thesis.  
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As a reasonable starting point in understanding the notion of face in China it is a good 
idea to appreciate its universal importance. Redding and Wong explain the absolute 
centrality of face to all social interaction.  
 
Many societies, and especially those of the Orient, have developed 
levels of sensitivity in interpersonal matters which are difficult for 
outsiders to comprehend or attain. It is as if the more collectivized a 
society becomes, the more sensitive must be the social mechanisms 
which maintain social harmony, as escape from the network is not an 
option, and the network must stay intact (Redding 1986: 286). 
 
Chinese society ranks very highly in its collective orientation. The authors go on to say 
that “In the Chinese case, the social lubricant is ‘face’” (Redding 1986: 286). In other 
words, face is the primary tool that allows for the maintenance of social harmony at 
such a high level of sensitivity in the Chinese culture. This of course requires the 
constraint of any behaviour that might be construed as antisocial or disruptive, and as 
such it is accurately described as a social constraint. Citing Benedict, So points out that 
“the punishment for losing face is to feel shame” (So 2006: 92). “True shame cultures 
rely on external sanctions for good behavior… Shame is a reaction to other people’s 
criticism” (So 2006: 94 citing Benedict).  It is worth remembering here “Elias’s 
assumption that the civilised habitus is rooted in the soil of shame” (Smith 2001: 161). 
The “sustained use of the concept of repression is one indication of… the importance 
Elias put on shame as an agent of social control in European history” (Scheff 2004: 
233). This, of course is prior to the internalization of constraint through the civilizing 
process. Here lies an important connection between Chinese culture and that of Europe  
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prior to the internalization of constraint. For the Chinese, the ‘agent of social control’ 
has always been face, similarly to shame a predominantly external constraint, with the 
primary difference between China and the West being that for the Chinese this is still 
the case. Constraint in China never internalized to anywhere near the same degree as in 
the West. 
 
This is where the social nature of face becomes important.  
 
Social control is a village-wide affair; its chief instrument is public 
opinion. For the kind of behavior that is approved by most of the 
villagers, a person is everywhere honored and praised. Disapproval, 
therefore, is a powerful check... Social isolation is a terrible punishment 
(Yang 1945: 150). 
 
Receiving approval and praise is to gain face while disapproval represents a loss of face. 
Either way it is expressed by one’s peers in the court of public opinion.  
 
It is reasonable to describe face as a purely social phenomenon in China in the sense that 
it is for the most part, only manifested in situations where there are two or more people 
interacting. “The notion of face permeates every aspect of interpersonal relationships in 
Chinese culture because of the culture’s overarching relational orientation” (Ge Gao 
1996: 289).
41  In fact, relating back to Goffman’s understanding of face, it is best 
understood here too, more as a part of the interaction itself than an inherent part of any 
of the individuals involved in the interaction. It might best be visualized as a common 
                                                 
41 As has already been stipulated, the relational nature of Chinese culture is closely tied to its Confucian 
tradition which, in turn, is also closely tied to the formation and maintenance of the state in China.  
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but fundamentally necessary commodity, such as rice in Chinese culture, which is 
bought, sold, or traded. In this sense it is external to the participants in any interaction. 
 
It is the threat of losing, and the anticipation of gaining face from others that motivates 
people to behave in certain ways. “All social encounters may be regarded as exchanges 
of resources” (Bond 1991: 58). The primary resource in all social interaction is face and 
it is the social other that grants and/or registers this gain or loss. Smith describes the 
operation of Elias’s external constraint in the following way: “When the judgements of 
others within a social network are crucial to one’s success or failure, then the shaping 
power of that figuration upon the psyche or social personality is very high” (Smith 
2001: 162). In fact, in the Chinese case it is even today almost impossible to ‘succeed’ 
without the positive judgement of those in one’s figuration.  It is posited here that face is 
the external constraint that Elias would look toward were he analysing Chinese society, 
and it is the ongoing importance of face that is held to exemplify China as a culture 
whose people are still largely guided by external constraint. 
 
There are two important ideas here that must be kept in mind in grappling with this 
concept. First, face is a concern to everyone in Chinese society, and at virtually all 
times, and second, this fact is a logical result of interpersonal relationships being such a 
vital consideration at the individual interpersonal level. These facts in and of themselves 
are the very aspects of the Chinese notion of face that often make its use and effect 
incomprehensible to western people. They also make face an important link in 
understanding the Eliasian connection that is being proposed. This should become a 
little clearer in the following section on guanxi. 
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Guanxi 
At its most basic level guanxi is simply an exchange relationship but is also defined as 
connections and sometimes simply as relationships. Tied to this exchange relationship in 
the Chinese context is an element of affect, which for the Chinese is a defining point. 
The reciprocal giving and receiving of gifts and favours generally serves to cement the 
relationship and the affect between the participants. 
 
While guanxi is not quite as integral to daily life as the notion of face, its importance 
should not be underestimated. Guanxi and face might helpfully be thought of as two 
sides of the same coin. Some of the main tenets of guanxi are as follows:  
 
The pre-eminent characteristic of personal relations in China today is 
instrumentalism. The principle that underlies it is guanxi, which means 
connectedness or particularistic ties, but it is best left untranslated. 
Guanxi is based on reciprocity, the traditional concept of bao, where 
one does favors for others as social “investments,” clearly expecting 
something in return. It is not a cold exchange, but is intertwined with 
renqing (human feelings, empathy) which raises it to a higher plane, and 
may also be based on a degree of ganqing (affect) (Gold 1985: 660). 
 
This last mentioned sentimental aspect of guanxi is important and probably what makes 
it uniquely Chinese. “Chinese frequently stress that true guanxi must possess an 
affective component” (Gold 2002: 7). If it does not, it becomes something else. 
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As pointed out earlier, reciprocity is a fundamental aspect of interpersonal relations in 
the Chinese social context. “The Chinese believe that reciprocity of actions (favor and 
hatred, reward and punishment) between man and man… should be as certain as a 
cause-and-effect relationship, and, therefore, when a Chinese acts, he normally 
anticipates a response or return” (Fairbank 1957: 291). Fairbank suggests this even 
extends to supernatural relationships (Fairbank 1957: 291). People not only welcome the 
reciprocal give and take of social relations, but expect it to the point where, if it is not 
forthcoming, the relationship is not likely to last. 
 
The technique of establishing and manipulating guanxi is guanxixue, 
literally, the study or art of guanxi. People exist in a guanxiwang or 
network of guanxi. Those individuals with whom they maintain a 
supply and demand relationship are guanxihu, literally, guanxi 
households.  Guanxi is a power relationship as one’s control over a 
valuable good or access to it gives power over others, but a guanxiwang 
itself is composed of both vertical and horizontal connections, thereby 
differing from the standard patron-client relation, although the latter is 
an example of it (Gold 1985: 660).
42  
 
In the traditional situation “villagers see their guanxi network as ‘society’, the local 
moral world in which they live. Within this world, their pursuit of personal interests is 
intermingled with the fullfillment of moral obligations” which play a vital role in all 
social interaction (Stockman 2000: 88 citing Yan Yunxiang). In those figurations of 
which one was a part in the past the boundaries usually did not extend beyond the 
                                                 
42 The connection between guanxi and Elias’s control over the distribution of resources comes to the fore 
here and will be made more obvious later in the thesis.  
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village. This was true for cultural reasons. With changing social circumstances, 
however, this appears to have been changing. One’s guanxiwang is an extension of the 
more strictly family based traditional figuration in Chinese society. This new guanxi 
was “an ‘extended form’” which fit Yang’s description as much more instrumental 
(Stockman 2000: 88). In the developing situation one’s guanxiwang was moving beyond 
traditional boundaries. Stockman cites Kipnes as saying that guanxi should be seen “as a 
set of practices of Chinese people responding to the varying social and political 
situations in which they find themselves” (Stockman 2000: 89 citing Kipnes). “Yan’s 
distinction between primary and extended guanxi is an example of the well-known 
sociological distinction between primary and secondary groups, or between ‘insiders’ 
and ‘outsiders’” (Stockman 2000: 89). The important distinction here is that where in 
the past ‘outsiders’ barely existed, in this new situation they were becoming a vital 
resource. This did not change the fact that the same moral obligations did not 
necessarily apply to ‘outsiders’ as to ‘insiders’. 
 
The more extensive the guanxi network one has the more face one is likely to have. 
Having as much as possible of both can only serve one’s interest. In social interactions 
involving guanxi, face is given and taken, gained and lost. The more guanxi one has, 
and hence the more face, the more power and “self-determination” one has (Yang 1994: 
196). 
 
Establishing guanxi requires a great deal of posturing and dissembling 
to make the initial contact. One must invite the target to a meal or 
present a gift (ginke songli) or deliver an intangible favor to 
demonstrate sincerity and efficacy and thereby suggest future benefits  
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from having guanxi with him. One gets face (mianzi) or status from 
showing he can get things done and the amount of face is in direct 
proportion to the size of one’s guanxiwang. Conversations abound with 
bragging about the extent of one’s guanxiwang and the ends it can be 
mobilized to serve… Guanxi is an informal, unofficial relationship used 
to get things done, from simple tasks to major life choices (Gold 1985: 
660).  
 
Important for this analysis is the fact that face and guanxi are fairly closely related. It is 
also wise to keep in mind, however, that while face is closely tied to guanxi, it is not 
limited to it. Face is an aspect of social relations and social interaction, and social 
relations and interaction are fundamental to guanxi, but social relations are not only 
guanxi-related, and neither is face. All guanxi involves face, but not all face 
considerations involve guanxi. Face applies to a much broader range of social 
phenomena. Their connection comes out of their common emergence from a Confucian 
social system in which relationships were paramount. “Guanxi practice has been traced 
to the constraint of Chinese culture, which in turn has been shown to have developed in 
the context of the officially sanctioned ideology of Confucianism and the legal tradition 
of imperial China” (So 2006: 128). In fact, according to King, “Confucian social theory 
has the theoretical thrust of developing a person into a kuan-hsi [guanxi] oriented 
individual. The Chinese preoccupation with kuan-hsi… building has indeed a built-in 
cultural imperative behind it” (King 1994: 114 ). Within this social context as it 
currently exists: “The Chinese tend to see the manipulation of human relationships as 
the natural and normal approach for accomplishing most things in life” (Pye 1992: 173).  
 
183
By extension, according to Pye, they are also very conscious of the need to be adept in 
such practises (Pye 1992: 174).  
 
Face and guanxi, as they tie into and relate to each other, are all about the manipulation 
of relationships, which is essentially built into the Chinese culture and, from an Eliasian 
perspective, a part of the Chinese habitus. Yang states that “the Chinese relational 
construction of personhood represented by the importance of face provides the 
mechanism for the art of guanxi to constrain the actions of a gift recipient. Threats to 
one’s face represent threats to one’s identity” and a damaged face/identity makes social 
and/or guanxi dealings far more difficult (Yang 1994: 196). In other words, the potential 
of gaining and/or losing face through social interaction involving guanxi, as most 
meaningful social interaction does in China, is what acts to control or constrain, in an 
Eliasian sense, the actions of the people involved. In the above passage Yang 
demonstrates the already noted external nature of face as a constraint, as well as its 
connection to guanxi in the Chinese world. As So describes it it is one’s standing in their 
guanxiwang, represented by their face, that “provides collateral” for guanxi interaction 
(So 2006: 93).  Face is essentially the controlling mechanism that makes guanxi work in 
modern China. “The larger one’s face, the more prestige and security one possesses and, 
therefore, the more self-determination one enjoys in social transactions” (Yang 1994: 
196).  
 
There is also a clear connection between guanxi and power. Gold noted earlier that 
guanxi is ‘a power relationship’ because one’s control of a given resource gives one 
power in relation to others. Gold also says something reminiscent of an issue raised in 
the Eliasian analysis in Part One: “Guanxi relationships are by definition unequal,  
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although the locus of power shifts and may never be in complete balance” (Gold 2002: 9 
citing Hwang, Wang and Zhai). That all relationships are effectively balances of power 
and, in that they are constantly changing, never equal, holds true in the Chinese case as 
well. What the expansion of guanxi represented from an Eliasian perspective was an 
increase in competition for power chances, for control of balances of power. The 
weakening of the traditional order facilitated changing figurations whereby one could 
effectively enter these competitions. 
 
In guanxi relations, one of the primary resources involved, and usually the one 
determining which way the balance leans, is face. Face is what is controlled/exchanged 
before anything else, and also what facilitates greater access to more resources through 
better guanxi.
43 On the same page Gold goes on to say: “Effective use of guanxi can 
provide face (mianzi)… that is, prestige and status” (Gold 2002: 9). This provision 
and/or exchange of face in guanxi dealings is integrally related to the power relations of 
the individuals involved. “By losing or giving away part of one’s substance in guanxi 
exchange, one paradoxically gains or increases one’s face. Conversely, the size of one’s 
face is inversely related to the amount and frequency one receives of another’s 
substance in the art of guanxi” (Yang 1994: 196). Giving in a guanxi exchange is 
tantamount to making an investment; what one gains is, or at least is potentially, 
significantly more valuable than what one has given up. The return on investment is 
essentially the resulting increase in face, and this increase comes, in effect, at the 
expense (but not normally in a hostile fashion) of the face of the recipient. This is true at 
least until the gift or favour is returned in appropriate fashion. The one who is giving is 
therefore actually the recipient of face (power), and the one receiving, the ‘loser’. This 
                                                 
43 The reader is urged to bear in mind the ‘face as commodity’ analogy here.  
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results in a situation where people continuously try to manufacture the indebtedness of 
the powerful through gifts and favours, when in fact it is only the powerful (those with 
the most face) who have the ability and resources  to do so effectively. There does, 
however, remain a realistic chance for mobility, and strong incentive to expand 
relational ties beyond traditional social networks. 
 
It has been suggested that the emergence of guanxi in Chinese society was largely a 
result of a communist system in which resources were, for a number of reasons, hard to 
come by on a regular basis (Yang 1994, Gold 1985, Walder 1986). This may indeed be a 
significant contributing factor to the growth of the phenomenon, but emphasis is 
misplaced on their lack of availability, when from an Eliasian perspective it should be 
on their changing locus of control. Beyond that, the situation changes considerably with 
the more open economic environment after 1978 (at a time when resources were rapidly 
becoming more available) as guanxixue exploded in its use and importance.  
 
So and Walker also describe Matteo Ricci as acknowledging what today would be called 
guanxi some 400 years ago among candidates for the exams (So 2006: 9). Specifically 
their point is the relatively long duration of guanxi, or what they call guanxi base, as a 
social phenomenon (by guanxi base he is referring to the basis for the guanxi 
relationship, such as native village, or same surname). Jacobs also acknowledges Ricci: 
 
One of the first, (and yet finest) ethnographers of China, Matteo Ricci, 
described the classmate guanxi which he observed almost four hundred 
years ago: ‘In this acquiring of degrees there really is something worthy 
of admiration in the relationship between candidates of the same year.  
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Those whom fortune has brought together in attaining a higher degree 
look upon one another as brothers for the rest of their lives. There is 
mutual agreement and sympathy among them, and they help each other 
and one another’s relatives as well, in every possible way’ (Jacobs 
1982: 215 citing Ricci).  
 
Based on this, it seems clear that some sort of relationship based system of reciprocity 
more or less equating to guanxi has existed for a relatively long period in China.  
 
The Ricci quote above is typical of studies of or references to guanxi in the past in 
China which almost exclusively focus either on officials (whether military or otherwise) 
or graduates of the examination system. It should be remembered that for most of 
Chinese imperial history, success in the examinations or via other means in government 
represented far and away the primary means of mobility, whether social or geographical. 
Other than these two avenues, physical movement, except in times of crisis in which 
case it was not usually a matter of choice, was not a very realistic alternative. Nor was it 
generally desired, for more often than not it meant some level of social isolation. 
Relationships extending much beyond the highly localized boundaries already discussed 
simply were not an option for most Chinese. Therefore, neither was the formation of 
guanxi ties outside those same boundaries. This renders these past guanxi relations in a 
much different light than those of the later half of the twentieth century in which people 
of all walks and classes of life were engaged.  
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The phenomenon of guanxi is probably best understood as a case of an existing cultural 
trait (in its simplest terms, the paramount importance of relationships in Chinese 
society) adjusting to changing social circumstances.  
 
The central idea is the primacy of social relationships. Sociologists 
often refer to Liang Shuming, a Confucian social reformer of the 1920s 
and 1930s, who stated that Chinese society is neither individual-based 
nor society-based but rather relationship-based... On the one hand, he 
claimed, China had only a weakly developed concept of the individual 
self. On the other hand, he argued that China had only a weakly 
developed notion of the group. What is central to Chinese society is the 
quality of human relationships (Stockman 2000: 72-73).  
 
In the past the traditional values and the gift economy were based on renqing principles 
emerging primarily out of this notion of human relationships and the Confucian tradition 
(the two of which are difficult to separate, though it seems likely that the chicken of the 
primacy of social relationships came before the egg of Confucian theory). What social 
and/or economic expansion of relationships there might have been prior to the 
revolution of 1911 (and even, to a degree, 1949) stagnated in cultural precepts that 
promoted stability but sacrificed potential growth, and in this situation what gift 
economy might have existed had been comparatively much more restricted in its use. 
Generally it did not extend any further than the kinship community which normally 
meant the village boundary, and which can accurately be thought of in Eliasian terms as 
the primary figuration for most Chinese of that time.  
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Guanxi in recent times 
At this point the Eliasian connection becomes even clearer. Guanxi relations existed 
previously and clearly for a fairly extended period. It also seems to have grown in 
importance under the Communist regime for the reasons stipulated. But it is also the 
case that it only came into full bloom after China started opening up to the world, and 
life’s task had shifted beyond just meeting basic subsistence requirements to pursuing 
more ambitious economic goals. For this reason, it would seem to make sense to look 
beyond the nature of traditional Chinese culture or the exigencies of communism for 
explanations of the explosive growth of guanxi in more recent times. While it is difficult 
to say exactly what the extent of the practise of guanxi was prior to 1949, and even prior 
to 1978, based on the already referred to reports of Walder’s informants it is reasonable 
to say that it was not the seemingly all-pervasive social phenomena in either of those 
earlier times that it has become in today’s China.  
 
Fei’s summary statement of one way of thinking about the Confucian system as it plays 
out in society is quite relevant to the discussion of guanxi; “Confucian ethics cannot be 
divorced from the idea of discrete centres fanning out into a weblike network” (Fei 
1992: 68). Understood in this fashion, the Confucian tradition might be thought of as 
intended to order first one’s family and members of one’s primary figuration, and 
moving beyond that to include individuals of whatever other figurations one might be a 
part of, ultimately extending to the whole empire. In this way society could be properly 
ordered. Until recently, this web of relations was realistically restricted in terms of daily 
activity to those within one’s kinship group or village. As pointed out, the reciprocal 
nature of social relations was simply a longstanding part of the existing culture, but in  
 
189
the past this reciprocity was generally restricted to relationships within these narrow 
boundaries. 
 
It is proposed that in conjunction with the impact of Revolutionary, and later 
Communist policies on the Confucian social structure, including the significant 
integration of local society as well as industrialization and the radical economic growth 
in post-1979 China (and the concomitant growth in competition and differentiation), 
very fertile ground was provided for the equally rapid growth of guanxi. As a result 
guanxi networks (guanxiwangs), figurations, then extended over a much wider area, 
even nationally and internationally. Seen in this light, guanxi networks are effectively 
understood in Eliasian terms as a type of figuration. For Elias, with European 
industrialization and the growing competition and differentiation that was its inevitable 
accompaniment, the figurations of the average individual expanded considerably. In 
other words, the number of people interacted with and/or relied upon, directly or 
indirectly, in meeting one’s daily needs grew substantially. According to Elias, these 
same figurations were also the source and locale of constraint on the individual. It was 
the people in one’s figuration who constrained, and for whom one ultimately restrained, 
one’s behaviour as the chains of interdependence grew more extended. It was the 
lengthening of the chains of interdependence within one’s figuration that ultimately 
resulted in the internalization of what had been external, social constraint.  
 
In the past in China, one’s guanxiwang, restricted to within one’s figuration, was 
normally limited to the family/clan/village. What reciprocal give and take there was had 
been confined to within those relationships deemed appropriate within the traditional 
social structure. Given the explosive growth of guanxi phenomena during the  
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Communist and especially the Post-Opening periods something must have changed. 
Now that the peasants had been ‘allowed’ to compete for a better life, they did. This 
entailed the use not only of traditional values such as kinship ties but led to the 
expanding use of guanxixue well beyond traditionally acceptable bounds. It is posited 
that within these expanding guanxiwang there lies a good example of Elias’s extending 
chains of interdependence. This thesis will establish that this Eliasian phenomenon can 
be traced to Eliasian causes and, therefore, that a civilizing process is in motion in the 
Chinese world. 
 
The basic groundwork has been laid against which the current Chinese social situation 
can be analysed from an Eliasian perspective. An examination of the evidence within 
Chinese culture should provide an answer to the question of whether a civilizing process 
analogous to that which occurred in Europe is occurring in Chinese society. 
 
In order to appreciate the dominant orientations in a culture extending over the two and 
a half millennia that we are concerned with, it will be worthwhile working through a 
review of some of the relevant aspects of that rather extended period, and how the 
orientations we are concerned with were laced into the bigger picture. This will be done 
in the following section and should establish the necessary background for 
understanding what is being put forward in terms of Eliasian theory. This, in turn, will 
lead directly into the more detailed examination of the end of the Qing dynasty and into 
the Chinese transition into ‘modernity’ in the twentieth century with which we are 
primarily concerned.  
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Chapter Five - The State Formation Process in Ancient Imperial China 
 
In China’s state formation process we will be looking for the monopoly mechanism as 
well as the monopolies of violence and taxation, and the death of both the aristocracy 
and feudalism. In as much as the state that emerged in China was in many ways 
different from that in the West, we will also be looking for a means of explaining these 
differences. Integral to these explanations is the failure of Qin Legalism, reasons for the 
success of the subsequent Han dynasty (and hence succeeding dynasties), the advent of 
the Confucian literati, and differences in the way the state dealt with local social 
relations/figurations.  
 
In The Civilizing Process Elias refers to two monopolies that are really two aspects of 
the same monopoly.  
 
The society of what we call the modern age is characterized, above all 
in the West, by a certain level of monopolization. Free use of military 
weapons is denied the individual and reserved to a central authority of 
whatever kind, and likewise the taxation of the property or income of 
individuals is concentrated in the hands of a central social authority. 
The financial means thus flowing into this central authority maintain its 
monopoly of military force, while this in turn maintains the monopoly 
of taxation. (Elias 1994a: 346). 
 
Elias further says that neither can stand without the other. He is here giving a fairly clear 
description of what, for him, a domain needs to achieve before it can truly be called a  
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state: monopolies of violence and taxation, and the apparatus to administer them (Elias 
1994a: 346). He also says that,  
 
Forerunners of such monopoly control of taxes and the army over 
relatively large territories have previously existed in societies with a 
less advanced division of social functions, mainly as a result of military 
conquest. It takes a far advanced division of social functions before an 
enduring, specialized apparatus for administering the monopoly can 
emerge (Elias 1994a: 346). 
 
Looking at the ancient imperial civilization of China, it looks at first glance as if Elias’s 
ideas may not be adequate for this context. The Chinese system was certainly enduring, 
it had monopolies of violence and taxation, yet the division of social functions was very 
limited, and remained so for millennia. The first step in a discussion of a civilizing 
process in China, particularly of how these seemingly contradictory characteristics fit 
together, will have to be to answer the question of whether, and if so when, these 
Eliasian parameters actually did develop. 
 
The Monopoly Mechanism Leading to Chinese Statehood 
 “The Shang are commonly described as the rulers of the first East Asian state” (Barnes 
1999: 131). It would be a while before a state in Eliasian terms emerged in what is now 
China, however. Lucian Pye describes the long transition from a highly feudal 
agglomeration to a more unified entity that might qualify as a state. The Shang regime, 
beginning in roughly 1500 B.C., fell to the Chou in 1122 B.C. The Chou did little to 
alter the existing social order. According to Pye, “The Chou conquest did not bring  
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about a sharp break in social organization. The feudal aristocracy continued, and the 
Chou emperor could not effectively control his vassal lords, whose domains eventually 
became semiautonomous kingdoms and city-states” (Pye 1972: 36). Feudalism (of a 
sort) was clearly the dominant mode and would remain so for a while to come. While 
there was a definite unification of sorts, if we are to refer to it using the word state, it 
must be as a feudal state. 
 
This unification (what is considered by most historians of China to be the ‘official’ 
unification under the Qin dynasty occurred later) occurred very early in Chinese history 
as compared with the Europe of Elias’s analysis.  
 
As Jacques Gernet points out, at the end of the seventeenth century the 
first modern state, the kingdom of France, was just getting organized 
while China had long been a ‘great centralized empire governed by a 
uniform administrative system.’ Again, emperors have been quite 
different entities, East and West. Modern Europe, for example, at one 
time had emperors of France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany and 
the British Empire plus the Pope at Rome all making history 
simultaneously. China ideally, and most of the time in fact, had only one 
emperor on earth, like one sun in the sky (Fairbank 1992: 46). 
 
The two regions, Europe and China, clearly experienced two different time lines of 
social development. “Most of the European territory had, of course, once fallen under 
the control of a single empire governed from Rome... but by 1500 the territory had  
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broken up into hundreds of separate political units” (Tilly 1974: 277).
44 Tilly estimates 
the number to be over 500. Kapteyn also comments on this point; “whereas unity 
prevailed in ancient Egypt and other now-lost empires, as well as in China (the oldest 
state now existing), Disunity was the rule in Europe” (Kapteyn 2004: 177). 
 
As this Chinese empire is examined more closely it should become clear that it qualified 
as a state in Elias’s terms from around the time of the first unification through most of 
the rest of its history. The process leading to Chinese statehood, as described by 
Fairbank, closely resembles that of the state formation process in the Europe of Elias’s 
work. 
 
In 771 B.C the Zhou house moved its capital… thus inaugurating the 
Eastern Zhou. Already Zhou power was being gradually diminished by 
the growth of many aristocratic family-states out of its central control. 
By the so called Spring-and-Autumn period (771-481 BC) there were 
about 170 such states… The states formed alliances and leagues and 
engaged in a diplomatic-military free-for-all, some absorbing others. By 
the era of Warring States (403-221 BC) only seven major states 
remained in the competition (Fairbank 1992: 49). 
 
The Zhou dynasty, a larger central state surrounded by smaller feudal states, lost its 
central importance as it lost control of the surrounding feudal domains in the Spring and 
Autumn Period. Throughout this period, however, Elias’s monopoly mechanism was 
inexorably moving the Chinese world toward a centralized authority. Twitchett suggests 
                                                 
44 One might be tempted to pursue an Eliasian comparison between Europe and China with the starting 
point for Europe being the Roman Empire. This will not be explored here. 
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the nature of Chinese feudalism was already changing at this point. While the Chinese 
world might be referred to as feudal for the first four or five centuries of Zhou rule, 
thereafter the term should be used with more discretion. By the Warring States period 
the principalities “had become completely independent” (Twitchett 1986: 22).  
 
Cotterell describes a very important aspect of the Spring and Autumn period that 
emerged out of this changing feudal situation; the emergence of the shi.  
 
Many comprised little more than an enlarged feudal household, situated 
in the fortified city which housed the ancestral temple. In bigger 
territories the ruling house shared power with its chief supporters, who 
were granted lands and offices, and relied on the service of a knightly 
class, the shi, whose forefathers were officials or lords… They were 
usually small landlords holding minor appointments. The growth of this 
class from 770 BC, the consequence of the blurring of feudal 
distinctions and the disappearance of many states, altered the balance of 
society and led under the empire to the shi becoming along with the 
peasant-farmers (nong) the mainstay of Chinese civilization (Cotterell 
1990: 45).  
 
Through Confucian teaching the virtues of the shi became “the essential character of the  
educated man” (Cotterell 1990: 45). Twitchett elaborates on how the shi eventually 
developed; “(b)y the late Warring States period a new class of landlords and 
officeholders had already c(a)me into being - the direct ancestors of that class of 
scholar-gentry which was to continue as the dominant elite throughout Chinese imperial  
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history” (Twitchett 1986: 29). He further suggests that this growing class came out of 
the shi, mentioned above, and that in their teaching they focussed on the problems of the 
times. (Twitchett 1986: 29). The shi were forerunners of the scholar officials of 
Confucian bent who would have so much to do with the unique Chinese state 
development.  
 
Here Fairbank makes an observation that relates to an earlier point. Talking about the 
Warring States period he points out that at about this same time: 
 
Already visible were two components of the eventual Chinese imperial 
government - military rulers and scholar-teachers. Both were concerned 
with the performance of ritual and ceremonies to keep society in proper 
accord with the cosmic order of which it was a part. Our understanding 
of the ruler’s role has been recently advanced by Mark Edward 
Lewis’… study of sanctioned violence as a key to China’s state power 
and social order. He finds that the ruler’s authority in each state was 
based on ‘ritually directed violence in the form of sacrifices, warfare 
and hunting.’ Since hunting as violence against animals was practice for 
war against men, the two major state services were actually sacrifices 
and warfare. Both involved the ritualized taking of life, and this defined 
the realm of political power (Fairbank 1992: 49).  
 
Simultaneously there was a growing interest in controlling violence within territories (as 
in the above quote) as well the growth of a means of administering them with the minor 
gentry entering the courts (having come from the earlier mentioned shi class). These are  
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the seeds of two related and very important developments, from an Eliasian perspective. 
The first is an early pointer toward the eventual monopoly of violence. The second and 
possibly more important development was the advent of the scholar teachers, as already 
noted a precursor to what would become the Confucian literati, whose impact would be 
so enormous in the ongoing stability and administration of the empire. Notice also that 
Fairbank’s primary point with regard to the shi is that they were closely related to the 
ritual aspect of the sanctioned violence mentioned. In Eliasian terms they represent the 
pacified model providers of the Chinese context.
45 As will be suggested shortly, they 
may also be representative of the dividing line between the respective civilizing 
processes of China and the West. Long before Elias’s monopoly mechanism unified 
China through the Qin dynasty, there is strong evidence of trends toward both the 
monopoly of violence and of taxation. 
 
Qin 
The Warring States Period saw the simultaneous slow destruction of the old feudal 
order, and the beginning of the end of the aristocracy that represented it. A number of 
more minor feudal states were engaged in fierce competition for control over more and 
more territory in a clear example of the monopoly mechanism that Elias described: 
“Medieval and early modern Europe resemble Warring States China in some respects - 
over centuries of warfare hundreds of independent political units were eliminated” 
(Kiser 2003: 524 citing Tilley). The large number of small family-centred domains 
originally numbering about 170 struggled against each other as the monopoly 
mechanism played out, consolidating into larger entities until there were only seven 
remaining. These are the seven ‘major principalities’ to which Twitchett referred 
                                                 
45 This is an interesting and valuable line of inquiry in the Chinese context that merits further research, but 
will not be pursued directly in this thesis.  
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(Twitchett 1986: 22).
 46  These larger groupings were the social units that would 
continue to struggle for dominance through the Warring States Period.  
 
Destruction of Aristocratic Power over the Military 
Gernet describes the centuries leading up to the Qin unification as a time of new ideas 
and economic growth, but also of social upheaval. “The old aristocratic society could 
resist neither the blows inflicted on it by the new heads of state seeking to monopolize 
power nor the deeper and more powerful influence of economic changes” (Gernet 1982: 
73). One of the major blows to the aristocracy dealt out by the Qin in this period was 
their change in military organization. Whereas the aristocracy traditionally, as in 
Europe, held the military to be their own domain based on hereditary lines, the Qin had 
different ideas:  
 
it was the Qin which first broke the power of the hereditary aristocracy 
in the army by promoting after 350 BC only the brave and the able to 
the highest ranks. Henceforth the army was simply a war-machine with 
no scope for noble display (Cotterell 1990: 49).  
 
The military was becoming functional along different lines. Its sole purpose was to 
defeat the enemy with little regard for the nobility that had previously been so 
important. Continuing with the Gernet quote above: 
 
The great families who traced their descent from remote antiquity were 
ruined, removed from their position of power and finally destroyed. The 
                                                 
46 A feudalism of sorts continued to exist within them, though it was changing. In fact, it is arguable that 
some, or possibly all, of these principalities were Eliasian states in themselves toward the end of the 
Warring States period.  
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cults which they had preserved so jealously down the ages disappeared 
at the same time as their estates and cities (Gernet 1982: 73, 77).  
 
Legalism Imposed 
Another very important change occurred during the Warring States period. The Qin, 
under the leadership of Lord Shang (d. 338 B.C.), imposed the draconian Legalism for 
which it would become so well known. It was also in the interest of enforcing this 
Legalist system that the bureaucracy was initially fostered, making clear the connection 
between the shi class, the later scholar-teachers, and the government. This Legalism was 
directed specifically at weakening family ties in the interest of strengthening the state. 
Local social ties were being attacked with the hope of supplanting them with loyalty to 
the state.  
 
Legalist doctrines of government aimed at enforcing laws to support 
agriculture and strengthen the state over the family. For example, group 
responsibility was decreed not only within each family but among units 
of five or ten families, so that all within each unit were collectively to 
answer for any individuals’ wrongdoing. Under this system one’s best 
protection was to inform on one’s malefactors without delay. Group ties 
and loyalties were thus undermined in favor of obedience to the state 
(Fairbank 1992: 55). 
 
This is a very significant development for a Chinese culture in which the family was so 
important. This attempt at undermining the family in the interests of the state and  
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enforcing failures to uphold the new law with strict negative sanctions was, for obvious 
reasons, not popular, and contributed to the eventual downfall of the regime.  
 
Monopoly of Taxation 
Kiser and Cai note how this household system was also used as a means of more 
effectively collecting taxes. 
 
The household registration system created by Duke Xian was further 
developed and intensified by Lord Shang. This system was the main 
central database for the administration of taxation and for military 
recruits… Lord Shang introduced a poll tax in the Qin state, based on 
data from the household registration system, and created a centralized 
bureaucracy to collect it (Kiser 2003: 528).
47 
 
The Qin successfully instituted a system of taxation as well as the means of collection, 
first within their own smaller state and later throughout all of China. A monopoly of 
taxation throughout the empire was coming into place. Furthermore: 
 
people could not leave their locality without authorization... This kind 
of social control mechanism held everyone under fairly constant local 
supervision and thus made tax collection and military recruitment much 
easier (Kiser 2003: 528). 
 
                                                 
47 According to Twitchett “the basic idea of dividing the population into small units for control purposes 
has, with variations and elaborations (the best known is the pao-chia system), been repeatedly carried out 
in imperial times and even as late as in republican China” (Twitchett 1986: 37). 
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The Legalist system was unparalleled in China in its focus on and success in controlling 
the population. It not only legally restricted an already culturally constrained mobility, 
but effectively allowed for the two monopolies that Elias held to be central to the 
existence of statehood; control of the means of violence and taxation. 
 
Given the increasing centralization, the rolling destruction of the aristocracy, the rise of 
the new scholar class, the focus on peasant-farmers as fundamental to China, and the 
monopolization of the means of violence and taxation, a major social restructuring was 
occurring. “The appearance of the centralised state and the parallel destruction of the old 
society can best be described as a revolution” (Gernet 1982: 80). Gernet compares this 
to the advent of the Greek polis in the west in its significance. This restructuring was 
clearly headed a very different direction from that of the state formation process in 
Elias’s Europe, however. 
 
At this time, during the Warring States period and prior to unification, Confucianism did 
not have the same status it would later achieve.  
 
The philosophers of the various schools of thought in China did not 
quell the disorder, and Confucianism would become an important 
school of thought only later, under the Han. Yet the Warring States 
context of sanctioned violence, with its killings and its ceremonies, 
helps us understand how the Confucian teaching arose and why it was 
eventually embraced (Fairbank 1992: 51).  
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The massive social dislocation of the Warring States period imbued a longing for the 
social stability and security that the Confucian code promised. Much progress along 
these lines was being made by the large remaining states vying for overall control. In 
this sense the Qin were not really pioneers. “The Qin state was not the first to reform, 
but one of the last” (Kiser 2003: 527). But they were the most effective. “Able rulers 
had begun to build there a centralized administration with uniform taxes, law codes, a 
salt monopoly, and central army. Other states were comparable… However, the most 
powerful growth occurred in the state of Qin” (Fairbank 1992: 54).  
 
All this was occurring long before the eventual unification under the Qin; the monopoly 
mechanism, and therefore state formation process, had long been in motion. The 
individual states, including the Qin, were steadily edging toward the Eliasian 
understanding of statehood with the closely related monopolies of taxation and violence. 
It was the speed and strength of the Qin growth in these areas in particular that allowed 
them to ultimately triumph in the centralizing struggle for dominance. 
 
Qin Law 
Gernet discusses Qin law as it formed during the Warring States period and how it is 
different from the old order with its new focus on supporting the state. This is valuable 
in understanding the brevity of Qin rule, as well as the subsequent direction of Chinese 
civilization. 
 
Objective, public, and superior to all men and excluding any divergent 
interpretation, it [law] is the means of ordering individuals 
hierarchically in accordance with a general scale of dignities and  
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indignities, merits and demerits. At the same time it is the all-powerful 
instrument which makes it possible to guide everyone’s activity in the 
direction most favourable to the power of the state and the public peace 
(Gernet 1982: 81). 
 
A system based on the above precepts was destined from the outset to run into difficulty 
in the Chinese world. It must be remembered that the Confucian social order already in 
existence focussed more specifically on, and gave priority to, social relations at the local 
level, and primarily within the family. The idea of imposing social order through law 
and from the top down (essentially replacing the family with the state) was anathema to 
Confucianism. In the Confucian understanding, the emperor was to serve as the model 
for all Chinese, but that model was to be distant and aloof, one which the people were to 
follow simply because it was the right thing to do. If the emperor had to reach down and 
touch local social relations, he had, in fact, failed. 
 
Herein lay the problem. In setting the law above man, and doing so in extremely harsh 
fashion, by making the aforementioned substitution the Qin were in effect denying the 
importance of the (primarily familial) social relations that had for so long ordered 
Chinese society. By requiring the people to inform even on relatives the government 
was asking them to violate norms that had been central to their existence for centuries. 
They were meddling in the most basic of figurations of the Chinese people. In strictly 
enforcing this new regime of laws, the Qin regime was setting themselves up for future 
troubles that weaker leadership would not overcome. 
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Prior to unification the Qin (as well as, in differing degrees, many of the other six 
remaining states) had already done much to destroy feudalism and the aristocracy, 
gained control of the means of violence and taxation, and established the means of 
administration that would facilitate these institutions staying in place. They had also 
instituted a legal system that intruded brutally into the lives of the people all the way 
down to the family level. 
 
Monopolies of the Means of Violence and Taxation under the Qin Unifiers 
That there were still many lines of thinking and many conflicting parties with different 
ideas about how things should be in ‘China’ is without doubt. “However that may be, it 
is clear that by the time the emperor of the first Chin [Qin] dynasty conquered the other 
warring states in 221 BC there had long been a common culture and aspirations to 
political unity” (Harrison 2001: 9).  
 
The unification of China, ending the period of Warring States and 
creating the Qin Empire, was finally completed in 221 B.C. The 
administrative advances developed by the Qin in the Warring States era 
were further developed and extended to the rest of the country. The 
short-lived Qin Empire (221-206 B.C.) marks a second stage of 
significant bureaucratization. Creel concludes that this system produced 
‘a centralized control of the state that may well have been more 
systematic and effective than any that had previously existed elsewhere’ 
(Kiser 2003: 528). 
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The Qin managed to extend their system of administration, of command and control, to 
the bounds of a then massive empire through their still developing bureaucracy. The 
innovation of the Qin was not restricted to the administrative sphere alone. Gernet here 
lists a number of important reforms. 
 
These measures included the creation of one single type of copper coin 
with a square hole in the middle… the unification of the measures of 
length and capacity; the creation of new standard characters… and the 
standardization of the gauge of cart wheels. The ancient walls which the 
different kingdoms had built on their frontiers to defend themselves 
against their neighbours were pulled down and the possession of arms 
was made illegal  (Gernet 1982: 106). 
 
All of these innovations are important beyond their face value but most important from 
an Eliasian perspective was the banning of weapons. “The First Emperor also deprived 
all but his own soldiers of their weapons and collected the whole of the hereditary 
aristocracy of China, supposedly 120,000 families, at his capital, Hsien-yang, near the 
site of the ancient Chou capital of Hao” (Reischauer 1958: 87)
48. This represents an 
attempt by the First Emperor to bring the means of violence completely under his own 
control and, while the effectiveness of this effort cannot be fully assessed at this point, it 
can be assumed that between this, the emperor’s command of the military, and the 
rigorous penal system then in place, the means of violence at the local level was 
significantly constrained. The Qin rulers had long since controlled the military within 
their domain, and now they had taken the means of violence out of the hands of 
                                                 
48 A parallel might be drawn between this situation and the ‘courtisation’ of a similar class of warrior 
nobility in Versailles, France during the reign on Louis XIV.  
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individual people. They can thus be accurately described as having a monopoly of 
violence. 
 
Another nail in the coffin of feudalism was implemented by the Qin upon unification as 
well. From this, though rearing its head periodically in one form or another, feudalism 
would never fully recover. Bodde records the words of the original participants in 
interesting fashion, providing some insight into the thinking of the people and the time: 
 
Of greater importance was Li Ssŭ’s personal demand, made in the same 
year of 221, that feudalism be abolished, a demand which was to have 
far reaching consequences in China’s history… ‘The Grand Councillor, 
(Wang) Kuan, and others said: ‘The feudal lords now for the first time 
have been destroyed. The territories of Yen, Ch’i and Ching (i.e. Chu) 
are far removed, and if kings are not established for them, there will be 
no means of keeping them in order. We beg that the sons of the imperial 
family be established in these positions. May it but please Your Majesty 
to give his consent’ (Bodde 1967: 78). 
 
Most of the new emperor’s advisors were advocating setting up a feudal type system of 
governance for the empire. Li Ssŭ came forward and pointed out that a feudal system 
had not worked in the past, resulting in fragmentation and warfare between the different 
feudal lords, with the ‘Son of Heaven’ being unable to stop them. Shih-huang agreed 
with Li Ssŭ. 
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 Shih-huang said: ‘If the whole world has suffered from unceasing 
warfare, this comes from there having been feudal lords and kings. 
Thanks to the aid of my ancestors, the empire has now for the first time 
been pacified, and for me to restore (feudal) states would be to implant 
warfare. How difficult then to seek for peace and repose! The advice of 
the minister of justice is right’… ‘(Ch’in Shih-huang then) divided the 
empire into thirty-six commanderies, and in these commanderies he 
established Administrators, Military Governors and Overseers (Bodde 
1967: 79). 
 
With that, Shih-huang set in motion the means of the final destruction of the feudal 
system and the lords who benefited from it. Hereditary fiefs were to become a thing of 
the past, ultimately to be replaced by centrally appointed officials. Twitchett describes 
this move as central.  
 
What was crucial about the 221 reform… was its unequivocal rejection 
of the idea of reestablishing separate kingdoms or principalities (kuo), 
with the indirect rule that this necessarily entailed, and its decision 
instead to universalize the commandery/county system, thus providing 
the instruments for a uniformly centralized jurisdiction over all parts of 
the empire (Twitchett 1986: 55). 
 
This move, on top of the changes in the military, while not yet completely eliminating 
the aristocracy was another strong blow to their already weakened position and further 
dampened their chances as competitors for power within the Chinese state. The  
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subsequent relocation of the ‘120,000’ feudal families to the capital area further 
entrenched this move away from feudalism and the aristocracy. This also mirrors to 
some extent, and in a much earlier era, the courtization of the formerly feudal warriors 
in Europe. Although the process as a whole was different, in the end result there is a 
comparison with the passing of the European aristocracy. This process was important in 
that it allowed for the Eliasian monopolies to more effectively form and become secure.  
 
The virtual elimination of competitors for the throne was very important for later 
developments as well. So cites Fairbank in pointing out that where Europe had quite a 
few emperors and a pope, China really had only one under heaven (So 2006: 125 citing 
Fairbank). For the Europeans the pressure was much greater simply because there was 
far greater competition in Eliasian terms. In China, Elias’s monopoly mechanism had 
effectively been brought to completion with Qin unification. Acknowledging the 
periodic historical breakdowns in social order after which the traditional system 
repeatedly snapped back into place, after unification the Chinese emperors generally had 
only to control their officials who were by and large, as part of the complex Confucian 
social order, fairly loyal. “For most of China’s history, the weak internal competitors did 
not pose an important threat to the ruler’s monopoly of power” (So 2006: 126). The 
distant peripheral areas rarely required military force to keep them in control. When the 
Chinese state was stable, as most of the time it was, this was the case. The pressure to 
revert to a more feudal like system that would almost certainly lead to fragmentation, 
simply ceased to be a part of the Chinese social equation. 
 
Viewing a similar (but not identical) point from a different perspective, So argues: “As 
for competitors outside the state, China was in a powerful position because, unlike  
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Europe, it had enjoyed monopoly power for the most part throughout its history” (So 
2006: 125). With unification under the Qin this became both the ideal and the reality. 
Where as in Europe the different national entities were surrounded by competitors, in 
China for most of its history there has been one social group, the Chinese, with one 
emperor, the Son of Heaven. Even when China was invaded and conquered by foreign 
groups, the foreigners ultimately became assimilated into, and at one with, the Chinese 
cultural world. When competitors did succeed in subduing China they were simply 
made Chinese. This complex social and political system would stand China in good 
stead for the next twenty one centuries. 
 
Shi-huang’s brutally strict and intrusive rule was more than the people were able to bear 
for long, however.  
 
Under the Qin, the First Emperor’s ruthless exactions of men and taxes 
year after year exhausted the people and the state’s other resources. 
After 37 years as ruler of the Qin state, he suddenly died at age 49 in 
210 BC. His empire quickly disintegrated (Fairbank 1992: 57).  
 
Under his weaker successor, the Qin collapsed in 206 BC. The Han emerged victorious 
from the ensuing struggle for leadership four years later. The Qin rulership was short-
lived, it is true. “Yet so vital were the political and cultural changes of these years that 
they gave the epoch an importance out of all proportion to its brevity” (Twitchett 1986: 
20). The First Emperor of Qin, upon unification, had further established the monopolies 
of violence and taxation as well as effectively eliminating feudalism and all competition 
for imperial power. Had his empire lasted, something more closely resembling the  
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civilizing process of Europe might have occurred, yet it was not to be. The entire 
structure of his government was to have very long-lasting implications: “For the 
classical imperial system, for which Confucianism became the philosophy par 
excellence, was founded by Ch’in [Qin] (221 B.C.) on anti-Confucianist Legalist 
principles, and this paradox, right from the start, remained at the core of Chinese 
history” (Levenson 1959: 252). All of these revolutionary changes would generally hold 
true throughout the coming two millennia of imperial Chinese history. 
 
In consciously attempting “to destroy all that recalled the old society” (Gernet 1982: 
82), much of which was defined by the localized familial figurations, The First Emperor 
had encroached on sacred ground and hence overstepped his bounds. As a result, the 
Han would be welcomed as successors to the throne of the Son of Heaven. 
 
The Han state was located in the area in which the Qin first 
implemented its bureaucratic system, and its administration retained 
some of Qin’s administrative techniques. Han gradually became more 
powerful and started to challenge Chu’s hegemony. With the support of 
other kingdoms, Han defeat(ed) Chu, and Liu Bang established the Han 
dynasty in 202 B.C. (Kiser 2003: 531). 
 
Continuation of the Monopolies of the Means of Violence and Taxation during the 
Han Dynasty 
The succeeding dynasty, the Han, learned an important lesson from the Qin failure. 
Legalism, at least the Qin understanding of it, no longer seemed a viable option for 
maintaining rule. There were certainly aspects of it that appealed to Han rulers, and that  
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they fully intended to keep. This effectively included both the monopolization of the 
means of violence and taxation. They knew, though, that they needed more than just the 
strong arm of the law to stay in power. It was clear to them that changes had to be made; 
some accommodation would have to take place if they wanted to stay in power longer 
than their predecessors. 
 
Although it is clear that most of the components of Han political 
institutions were created in the Warring States and Qin periods… its 
bureaucratic administrative system was not adopted immediately by the 
Han state that succeeded it. The quick collapse of the Qin state 
inevitably made people question both the efficiency and the legitimacy 
of a centralized bureaucratic government... Clearly some modifications 
were necessary to maintain better security of rule.  Early Han emperors 
reached the same conclusion as modern historians: ‘[H]ad the system 
been allowed to crystallize in its pristine legalist (Qin) form, with tight 
centralised control over every segment of the structure, it is unlikely 
that it could have lasted so long’ (Kiser 2003: 530 citing Bodde, 
parentheses his). 
 
The Han dynasty was established using many of the very Qin administrative techniques 
that they knew would not serve them in strict form for the longer term. The question for 
the Han seemed clearly to be what mixture of central control and local freedom was 
optimum for allowing them to rule unchallenged. That they would keep many of the Qin 
innovations was without doubt. The strong state that they engendered was as important 
as the longevity that equally mandated their loosening of state control. Accommodation  
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had to be made to the desires of the people in the interest of security of rule, but not to 
the point where that very security of rule would be threatened. Confucianism proved to 
be the solution. 
 
At the cultural level, the transition from Qin to Han was marked by a 
move from Legalism to Confucianism as the main legitimising 
ideology. Confucianism argued that states should not (and cannot, as the 
Qin example showed) rule by force alone. Moral concern for the people 
and benevolent conduct were necessary for a regime to retain the 
‘Mandate of Heaven’ (Kiser 2003: 531). 
 
The implications of this decision are important from an Eliasian perspective because 
they ultimately left the control of the distribution of resources in the hands of the local 
figurations. This was a very important move away from the state-formation and 
civilizing processes that Elias described. This transition to a more distant central state 
took time, however. According to Gernet, it is wise not to overestimate this change, at 
least initially. “In spite of appearances, the First Han emperors were the heirs of the 
Ch’in [Qin] rulers and continued their work” (Gernet 1982: 110). He says further that 
this is not the traditional view of China scholars. “Although the Han founders 
considerably softened the extreme harshness of the penal laws of the first empire, the 
political and administrative system that Liu Pang put in place differed little from that of 
the Ch’in [Qin]” (Gernet 1982: 111). Importantly, they kept the administrative 
bureaucracy but just as important would be the ‘softening’ of the penal code, for this is 
where the system most directly impacted and disrupted local social relations. In this  
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sense they had started the process of removing the interference of the central 
government in local affairs. 
 
Rischauer offers an interesting explanation of the softening of the penal code. The first 
Han rulers were not men who had emerged out of the old aristocracy, as was The First 
Emperor. They had much humbler beginnings, and this affected their approach to 
governing. In dealing with the peasant masses “they showed themselves more pragmatic 
and flexible” as well as being significantly less demanding (Reischauer 1960: 92).  
 
That having been said, there was still a pronounced need for strong central authority. 
 
The ideal of a perfectly ordered hierarchical society which is described 
as Confucian could not withstand the grim realities of crime, dissidence, 
or invasion without some effective measures of legalist controls. But a 
conspicuous change of balance is discernable in the Former Han period 
(Twitchett 1986: 106). 
 
For the new regime to survive, a combination of value systems – Legalist and, as it turns 
out, Confucian – were a necessary adaptation to the Chinese social reality.  It is this 
change that is central to understanding China’s civilizing process in Eliasian terms. 
According to Gernet the transition from Qin to Han was a more gradual shift to a 
combination of the Legalist and Confucian traditions than is sometimes thought; one 
that started quickly but which took at least most of the former Han (roughly two 
hundred years) to coalesce. Rischauer reiterates Gernet’s earlier assessment: “Han’s role 
in Chinese history, in actuality, was to consolidate the new imperial system that Ch’in  
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had started” (Reischauer 1960: 92). They did this over the course of the succeeding four 
centuries. But, again, the aspects that they consolidated relate mainly to the idea of 
central rule and the administrative bureaucracy.  
 
But the foundations of Han power were no different in origin from those 
of the Ch’in [Qin] kingdom and empire. The same conceptions 
predominate in the philosophical and religious domain... It was only in 
the long run and as a result of a complex process of evolution that the 
Han empire departed further and further from its origins (Gernet 1982: 
110-111). 
 
In continuing with much of what was Qin, the Han allowed feudal-like fiefs, but they 
did not represent a return to the feudalism of old  
 
In short the same ‘Legalist’ empire was perpetuated not only in the 
territories directly dependent on the central power but also in the ‘fiefs’ 
(feng-kuo) granted first to the founder’s companions-in-arms and later 
to relatives of the imperial family. Its power was based on the direct 
control of peoples and individuals by the state (Gernet 1982: 111). 
 
Having feudal-like elements within such an expansive domain was probably 
unavoidable but a distinction should be made. “It would certainly be a mistake to see in 
the creation of these ‘kingdoms’ a sort of resurgence of the fiefs of antiquity; the ancient 
‘feudalism’ had disappeared for good” (Gernet 1982: 115-116). Having said that, Gernet 
further points out that these kingdoms retained enough freedom to be a threat to the  
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centre and for this reason the centre continued to try to destroy them through the second 
century (Gernet 1982: 116).  
 
After the crushing of a rebellion by seven of these local kings, “These private realms... 
were never again after 154 B.C. a threat to the central government” (Reischauer 1960: 
94). The Han central authority sealed the fate of these kingdoms once and for all with a 
change in inheritance laws that was to last until the present day in China. 
 
As early as 127 B.C. a law was adopted which was to lead to the final 
breakup of the fiefs and the downfall of the imperial nobility. It ended 
the rule by which the title and possessions were passed on to the sole 
legitimate heir and it enjoined that they should be shared out equally 
between all sons (Gernet 1982: 116). 
 
This simple yet brilliant stroke prevented wealth from accumulating in any one family’s 
hands, thus preventing the rise of powerful families and a resurgence of feudalism. 
 
Also seen in the Han is a continuation of the Qin taxation system – while possibly less 
demanding, at the same time more precise. Gernet describes the Han censuses of this 
period as being “among the most precise in history. Every subject was liable to a 
personal tax payable in coin (this tax was levied even on children of tender years), to 
annual stints of forced labour and military service.” (Gernet 1982: 111).  
 
The level of social control was certainly impressive, even in being less oppressive than 
that of the Qin. Tight control was, in a sense, facilitated by the incorporation of a  
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Confucian structure that made it palatable to the people. The centralizing state was 
moving in the same direction as the Eliasian European states of a later time in gaining 
ever greater control over the domains that they ruled, but at the same time moving in a 
decidedly different direction in remaining structurally relatively small and non-intrusive. 
Sitting on his throne in the distant capital the emperor controlled things from afar, 
ensuring that all under heaven was in proper working order, while at the same time 
leaving the local population, for the most part, to their own devices. The integration that 
would be expected in an Eliasian analysis of this social situation was not occurring. 
 
The Han Dynasty Adopts Confucianism 
The adoption of Confucianism was a pivotal event in Chinese development. 
 
The Han ruler’s daily regimen of ceremonies and rites required the 
guidance of learned men at court. Han Wudi in particular fostered 
learning as one channel (in addition to recommendation) for recruitment 
of officials. He saw education as a way to strengthen his new upper 
class against the older aristocratic families, and he accepted 
Confucianism as the ideology in which the state’s officials should be 
trained. To the despotic statecraft of Qin Legalism the Han added a 
monumental structure of ideas of largely Confucian origin that provided 
an all-encompassing state philosophy (Fairbank 1992: 62). 
 
For Elias, a more realistic explanation for the ‘choice’ of Confucianism than it being the 
will of a given emperor might be that it was a better fit with (and may accurately be 
described as) the system by which the people largely already lived. The Confucianism  
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that was adopted was already practised in a less gentrified fashion by the people. For 
centuries they had already lived by the very hierarchical, tightly ordered social relations 
that it promoted. In addition, the Confucianism that emerged accommodated their other 
more localized beliefs. “The ideas that survived best were those which had the greatest 
appeal to the uneducated, superstitious masses. This is the clearest evidence of how 
completely the successive triumphs of Ch’in and Han had broken with the aristocratic 
past” (Reischauer 1960: 101-102). The system of governing had come a long way in 
adapting to the requirements and needs of the governed as opposed to forcing the 
opposite. 
 
The essential point about the Legalist-Confucian amalgam was that 
Legalism was liked by rulers and Confucianism by bureaucrats. A ruler 
could use the material inducements of rewards and punishments… to 
keep the common people in order. But his administrators needed 
something more than benefits or intimidation to inspire their best 
efforts. (Fairbank 1992: 62). 
 
Confucianism was the local social order, and its adoption allowed the bureaucrats to 
maintain that order even as the emperor continued his Legalist stance. The ruler seems 
to have had at this point an effective monopoly of violence (as well as taxation), but the 
ability to use violence, as well as the need, was held in check by the Confucian side of 
the philosophy that Fairbank described above as ‘all-encompassing.’ As pointed out 
earlier, the ruler needed something more than Confucianism to cope with the realities of 
ruling the empire, but he also needed more that an iron fist. He controlled the means of 
violence and could resort to its use if need arose but, if he were performing his role  
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satisfactorily and all was well, there should be no need. This was a widely understood 
‘agreement’ between the state and the people, and in this sense, represents the most 
important difference in social development between China and Europe (in Eliasian 
terms).
49  
 
Han Confucianism came into its own when the imperial academy was 
founded in 124 BC... The Han emperors, who had already asked for 
talented men to be recommended for examination and appointment, 
now added classical training to the criteria for official selection. By the 
mid-second century AD, 30,000 students were reported at the academy 
(Fairbank 1992: 67). 
 
The Han emperors needed officials to help them govern and would from now on draw 
them from the ranks of officially certified Confucian scholars. The examination system 
over time slowly eliminated whatever was left of the hereditary aristocracy and 
therefore what had once been the most serious set of competitors for power. The 
Confucian literati, already having a fairly long history themselves, inherited much of 
aristocratic power, but without the independence to follow their own course. From the 
time of its official establishment Confucianism gained in stature and importance until it 
became the unquestioned centre of political, cultural and social control, a position it 
would hold until the beginning of the twentieth century. This edifice of Confucianism 
promoted a social order that by its nature didn’t allow the centre to encroach on local 
affairs, hence mandating a significant distance between the locality and the centre. 
 
                                                 
49 An interesting line of inquiry that will not be explored in this thesis would be an analysis of the 
Confucian state with regard to that of Hobbes and the social contract.  
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“Thus the general tendency throughout the second century was towards increased 
centralization. The influence at court acquired by the literati as advisors and the toning 
down of the legislation inherited from the Ch’in rulers did not affect this basic 
orientation” (Gernet 1982: 116). This, too, was likely true for Confucian reasons. 
“China ideally, and most of the time in fact, had only one emperor on earth, like one sun 
in the sky” (Fairbank 1992: 46). Fairbank continues a little later on the next page with 
the following, “Unity was so strong an ideal because it promised stability, peace, and 
prosperity” (Fairbank 1992: 47). These were Confucian ideals for sure. Centralization 
continued but, crucial to an Eliaian analysis, it did so without integration. As part of ‘the 
deal’ of ruling the empire, this would remain the case. “For all the confusion and 
disruption of later Han times, not to mention the four confused centuries that followed, 
the great principles of China’s unity, which the Han consolidated, were never again 
entirely lost” (Gelber 2007: 22). “The Han dynasty bequeathed to China an ideal and a 
concept of empire that survived basically intact for two thousand years” (Twitchett 
1986: 103). In that the system of governing was so tightly tied to the social system 
holding the empire together at the local level; that the local and the imperial had been so 
strongly linked, it might also correctly be said that the Han had bequeathed a social 
structure of equal duration to that of the empire.  
 
Confucianism made for a highly effective blend with Legalism to govern a massive 
Chinese empire, and so it would remain until the twentieth century. Feudalism had been 
effectively destroyed. Confucianism was entrenched as the guiding moral and governing 
principle. The people were more or less pacified. The traditional social structure had 
survived the Legalist onslaught and remained, for the most part in place, entailing small, 
self-sufficient, tightly knit figurations, short chains of interdependence, and low  
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differentiation and integration (in Elias’s European sense). The Confucian social system 
that had developed over the centuries by its nature consistently supported a strong but 
small and rather distant central state. The state, in turn, supported the traditional 
Confucian social order, it being seen to be beneficial to its own interests in maintaining 
peace, harmony, and stability, as well as its own central position at the top of the 
hierarchy. The traditional Chinese state/local social relationship might be called 
symbiotic in their mutual reinforcement of, and dependence upon, each other. Each, in 
the interests of maintaining its own ongoing position and existence ensured the 
continuing stability of the other. With the Eliasian monopolies in place and a stable, 
enduring social organization reinforcing the existing state/local society relations, any 
change that did occur, occurred within the system as opposed to changing the system 
itself. This brings us back to Elias’s idea that once the monopolies are in place it is no 
longer a matter of changing the system as a whole but a matter of who will control it 
(Elias 1994a: 346). With these conditions in place, the Chinese culture understandably 
remained on a centralizing trend throughout its early development, a tendency that 
subsequently remained both the ideal and the fact throughout China’s long imperial 
history (Fairbank 1992: 46). 
 
Relationship between the State and Local Society and its Impact on Local Social 
Relations during the Han Dynasty 
It takes a far advanced social division of functions before an enduring, 
specialized apparatus for administrating the monopoly can emerge. And 
only when this complex apparatus has evolved does the control over 
army and taxation take on its full monopoly character. Only then is the 
fiscal and military monopoly firmly established. From now on social  
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conflicts are not concerned with removing monopoly rule but only with 
the question of who are to control it, from whom they are to be recruited 
and how the burdens and benefits are to be distributed. It is only with 
the emergence of this continuing monopoly of the central authority and 
the specialized apparatus for ruling that dominions take on the character 
of ‘states’ (Elias 1994a: 346). 
 
This quote has been presented before. It is presented again here to highlight the central 
question of the thesis: how can this Eliasian understanding of state formation be 
reconciled with a Chinese context that appears to have been similar to that in Europe in 
some ways yet significantly different in others. The complex administrative apparatus 
had evolved and the control over taxation and the military were there but the ‘advanced 
division of social functions’ was decidedly not. 
 
When the imperial political order arose to replace feudalism in China, 
rule based on the hereditary status system yielded to the development of 
a monocratic (centrally controlled) organization of appointed officials, a 
development which continued for the next two thousand years (Yang 
1959: 134).  
 
This occurred for the most part during the Han dynasty, over two millennia ago. 
Feudalism and the hereditary aristocracy largely disappeared after this, but the family 
institutions at the local familial/village level that went with it, did not. The Eliasian state 
existed, but so too did those social structures that the emergence of the state was 
theoretically to change.   
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According to de Reincourt, Confucianism remained the only code of ethics having “any 
chance of lasting success in the Celestial Empire” (de Reincourt 1965: 66). This was so 
because it had been for so long “congenial to the basic instincts of the Chinese people” 
(de Reincourt 1965: 66). And this code of ethics took the family as its absolute centre. 
So while feudalism may have disappeared in the political sense that the ruling class was 
now a bureaucratic officialdom, the social structure underpinning a feudalism of sorts, 
had not. 
 
In China, one’s ethical familial duties had little to do with the state and sometimes even 
came into conflict with those legal duties to the state. It is also true that within the 
Confucian system each person had duties to both the family and the state. “Everyone 
thus had two roles, and was both a family member and a member of society with both an 
ethical and a social identity” (Zhu Yong 1997: 99). Their filial duties were generally 
considered to be more important, however. 
 
The required unconditional observance of the law by all members of society was 
“acknowledged by generations of emperors and officials from the time an empire with a 
centralised government  emerged” (Zhu Yong 1997: 100). But because of the 
importance of kinship, the law was biased in favour of family ethics. “Legal structures 
had to adjust to kinship relations and varied according to people’s kinship identities” 
(Zhu Yong 1997: 100). Zhu goes on to say that Chinese law was very cautious when 
dealing with issues where duty to family was in conflict with duty to the state. Because 
social life was so complex, situations often required compromise. For this reason, Zhu 
argues, compromise was well developed in Chinese law.  
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In Europe legal responsibilities shifted from the family to the state over time, where in 
China the situation was far different:  
 
during the time of Xia, Shang and Zhou there was a mixture of the state 
and the family, the state could be viewed as an extended family, while 
the family was a minor state. Blood relations were closely enmeshed 
with political relations, and society became a network of blood and 
political ties centred on the family. Over a long period of time, an inner 
cohesion protected the family from state interference. All this was 
recognised by the law, which defined a family member as a bearer of 
both legal and kinship responsibilities (Zhu Yong 1997: 104).   
 
This understanding of social and legal relations extended to the brink of modern times in 
China. It is clear that the state was limited in its capacity to interfere in family matters, 
and, by extension, local matters, in the sense that local society was thoroughly family 
and clan based. The state intrusiveness and control of resources necessary for the 
transformation of local social relations that is so important to Elias was not possible 
under these circumstances. “In China it was the family, and not the individual, which 
was the political and social unit. In reality the family clan was seen as a miniature State, 
a complete entity executing quasi-civil and judicial functions” (Patterson 1990: 54). Not 
only was the family the basic social unit but the functions it carried out obviated the 
need for state interference or state help. Chinese law also came to support this localized 
social understanding. 
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Ethical relationships formed a continuum from the least close to the closest, and 
kinship duties also varied along a corresponding scale. When two or more 
ethically related people were involved, the problem arose as to who one owed the 
major responsibility. As a solution to this conflict, a principle based on the 
closeness of the relationship was worked out under ancient Chinese law. That is to 
say, one was obliged only to the person with the closest relationship (Zhu Yong 
1997: 103).  
 
The state, being the most distant ethical relationship for the individual, occupied a 
fairly low position in this regard. “According to Tang law, one could conceal one’s 
knowledge of an offense committed by a family member” (Zhu Yong 1997: 103). 
There is probably no clearer example of the priority of family and clan over state. 
This is, of course, in direct opposition to the law imposed for a short time by the 
original unifiers of China, the Qin, whereby one was obligated to inform on even 
their closest relative if that person transgressed the law of the land, and not to do so 
was in itself severely punishable under Qin law.
50  
 
Chu discusses the developing situation of relative non-interference. The First 
Emperor of Qin is given credit for abolishing the feudal system and restoring order 
but Chu points out that order returned quickly primarily because of the common 
“communal foundation built upon the clan system” (Chu 1983a: 6). He then refers to 
the ‘clan networks’ as the ‘backbone’ of the local communities, which “were held 
together by a political-administrative structure that maintained only marginal points 
of contact with grassroots areas. It was a system of strong local ties and loose 
                                                 
50 An interesting and revealing parallel is the fact that it is also in direct opposition to the requirements 
of the Communist regime.  
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centralized control” (Chu 1983a: 6). The First Emperor’s demands on the local 
people had quickly become so onerous that his regime collapsed only three years 
after his own death. The Han introduced a different approach characterized by 
‘nonaction’ where they “simply removed the interferences and excessive demands” 
on the local populace (Chu 1983a: 7). This seems to have initiated a repeating cycle 
of events in China that has continued until recent times.  
 
This cyclical pattern of i-chi i-luan (chaos and order) has been repeated time 
and again in Chinese history, compounded on several occasions by invasions 
from northern barbarians. Before a dynasty collapsed, its local communal 
foundation first began to erode. Chaos followed. Then a new political order 
was established that allowed the local communities to recuperate and even 
prosper, until another round of administratively induced chaos gradually set in 
(Chu 1983a: 7).  
 
It has always been the family/clan/kinship system that has held Chinese society together. 
Things remained stable as long as this structure was in place and there was not too much 
interference from the central government. Elsewhere, Chu asks what has held Chinese society 
together through all the turmoil since 1949: “Just as in the past, a major element is the local 
communities, now embodied in the communes, subdivided into production brigades and 
production teams” (Chu 1983b: 251). It seems that, as has already been noted in the 
discussion on dominant orientations, this underlying social fact has always been true in China.  
 
Clan relations at the local community level were the warp and the weft of 
China’s social fabric. The systemic functional requisites were fulfilled largely in  
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the local community, and through that fulfilment the traditional Chinese system 
derived support for political integration. The latter was maintained through a 
national bureaucratic structure symbolized in the person of the emperor and 
buttressed by a written legal code and the cultural value of submission to 
authority. The system, which drew strength from local communities, functioned 
best with minimal interference from the central administration (Chu 1983a: 9-
10).  
 
When the system eventually broke down it was largely because of the decline of the 
local social structure. It was also the local structure that held it together both in good 
times, and through chaotic times. Finally, the localized system seemed to function most 
effectively when left alone. The Chinese state can be said to have early on achieved 
monopolies entailing the capability of intervening in subject’s lives. In this sense it 
might be said that the ancient Chinese emperors had a monopoly of the means of 
violence (the corresponding existence of a monopoly of taxation has been evidenced as 
well), but that they generally chose not to use it to interfere too directly in the lives of 
the people. They were consciously careful to avoid impacting local social relations, the 
backbone of Chinese civilization, in too disruptive a fashion.  
 
Confucius emphasized order and hierarchy, with the common people 
entirely subordinate to the just ruler. Heaven remains the key, not as a 
divine tyrant but as the provider and embodiment of a system of law 
based on universal norms. Given that, the Confucian system was based 
on the idea of harmony as the basic principle of cosmic and human 
order. The ruler should not interfere in day-to-day affairs. Instead, he  
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should rule by right conduct and by example. Right conduct was the 
basis not only of status but of power, and the ruler ought to be a father 
to his people (Gelber 2007: 15). 
 
This non-interference on the part of the central government and the emperor was 
culturally, and later legally, mandated. The Confucian understanding of the state and its 
relation to the people was “one that emphasized a ‘light’ state” (Schwartz 1985: 16). 
This arrangement served both the people and the state. 
 
Unique to the Chinese situation was a social structure that virtually mandated this 
arrangement. This significant distance between the local community and the state was 
integral to the way Chinese society was organized for most of imperial history:  
 
whether or not state power (or a band of gallant men as its embryonic 
form) was supported by local society depended on the extent to which it 
acted as protector of local society. Local society and state power formed 
a kind of support-protection bond. In this sense, it is not necessarily 
unreasonable to understand the rationale for the state to lie in its 
function of preserving and sustaining local society. (Michio 1985: 84). 
 
Central to this ‘protection’ was maintaining the form in which the local society already 
existed. Protecting that essentially meant being part of the order by staying out of the 
way. This was ‘preserving and sustaining’. The local communities took care of their 
own affairs. This included providing for one’s own needs without state interference. The  
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king should embody the proper role model but “he should not employ policies that 
encroach on the livelihood of the people” (Schwartz 1985: 16).  
 
There were certainly other more aggressive views of the state and it prerogatives, but 
the important point is that while the state may have had ultimate authority (Schwartz 
1985: 17), it was not an authority that was exercised with any regularity, and it is held 
here that it was not one that the people felt compelled to obey on a daily basis. It was 
always more a case of authority by moral example. In this sense it has long been the 
case in China that, “the distance between the ruler and his subjects is characterized by 
the saying ‘heaven is high and the emperor is far away’” (So 2006: 111 citing Fei). 
From an Eliasian perspective this is an important idea. The monopoly of violence by the 
state exerted little direct constraining influence over the people. The state was to be 
avoided and, because it could be, it was. The social relations, or the figurations, at the 
local level were not overly affected by the state’s monopoly of violence. The people 
(and the bureaucracy) were already pacified by the Confucian order. For that reason, 
control over the distribution of resources was left untouched in the hands of the local 
figurations. The localised communities were relatively uninhibited by the state, and 
because of this, the traditional social relations that were so binding on the Chinese 
people remained exceptionally stable. 
 
“The huge conglomeration of communities was tenuously held together by its common 
acceptance of the Confucian ideology” (Yang 1959b: 135). It was always the culture, 
and not the state, which held China together. This is probably the central insight 
explaining the state’s lack of intervention into the lives of the people. The state had a 
more or less well understood agreement with the people that it would not interfere  
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overly in their lives, or the people with the state, as long as each fulfilled their roles 
relative to each other. The Confucian system defined these roles in considerable detail. 
There was a fine balance between the extension of the authority of the state and those 
areas of figurational life at the local level in which the state was not welcome. This was 
mandated by the Confucian system, and over the centuries had become very much a part 
of the Chinese social and individual habitus. It was ideally the way society was to be 
organized. Stepping outside of or beyond these bounds except under extraordinary 
circumstances was unacceptable. To do so invited disaster, a lesson the Qin collapse and 
overthrow had instilled in the Han, and a lesson that, for the most part, remained firmly 
in place for all succeeding dynasties. 
 
There has been little doubt that the Chinese extended family system has 
been a determining factor in the growth of a specifically Chinese 
society. The family was always conceived as the basic and indivisible 
unit of social organization, and all political philosophies stressed the 
importance of a stable and strong family system as the foundation for a 
stable social order (Twitchett 1959: 97). 
 
The traditional family structure was not something to be overcome in building the state, 
but something on which the state should be built. And so it would be, to a greater or 
lesser degree, for the duration of the imperial order. 
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Chapter Six - Changing State-Local Relations: The Qing Dynasty and the 
Revolution of 1911 
 
State Intrusiveness in Qing China 
Governmental power was as centralized as the emperors could make it. 
Provincial officials were not local leaders; they were men who had 
passed the Civil Service examinations based on the Confucian classics, 
and had been appointed to office by the central government, usually in 
some location far from their original homes. However, this bureaucratic 
system did not stretch down below the county level. The county 
magistrate appointed by the emperor had to work through local people 
in actually running the villages (Moise 1986: 24).  
 
The local communities continued to be beyond the centre’s direct control in Qing China, 
much as had always been the case. There was a mediator in the form of the county 
magistrate who in turn had to deal with local leadership. There was thus a significant 
buffer between the local communities and the emperor. Hsu also mentions two groups 
of scholars, the official gentry who were a part of the bureaucracy, and the scholar 
gentry, who were not. He talks about the scholar gentry as being a more or less 
intermediary group between the ruling class and the local population. They usually lived 
in their native place, whereas the official gentry, as part of the bureaucracy, did not (Hsu 
1970: 96). The local scholar gentry, in turn, represented the interests of the local people 
in their own home territory. “At any given time the number of people who had passed 
the lower examinations and thus acquired gentry status was much larger than the  
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number actually holding bureaucratic appointments; the ones not in office formed the 
leadership of local society” (Moise 1986: 25). 
 
In any case the discussion is held in terms that are very similar to those used when 
referring to Han China after it solidified rule over the then Chinese empire, as well as to 
Imperial China in general. This governmental organization, the relationship between the 
government at the centre of the empire, and the empire at the local level, was still 
current two millennia later. It was still a ‘light’ government with as little contact as 
possible with local society, one where legitimate authority was maintained through 
moral example at the top. Mosher is talking specifically about the bureaucracy of the 
Qing government when he says that “the number of officials did not exceed 40,000” 
(Mosher 1983: 59). He goes on to say that it was only after the end of the Qing that the 
number of government employees “expanded rapidly” and after the advent of the 
communist regime that it “exploded” (Mosher 1983: 59).  
 
Local Social Relations in Qing China - An Eliasian Perspective 
Writing in 1970, Hsu says of Chinese society through the ages, and of Qing China in 
particular, “With their special status and functions, small wonder that the family and 
clan have been considered the characteristic institutions of the traditional kinship 
society of China” (Hsu 1970: 95). The traditional family centred structure of Chinese 
society, as dictated by the Confucian social order, was still very much intact through the 
Qing period. Both the family and the clan are described by Hsu in very similar terms to 
that which had existed through much of Chinese history.  
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Until the late Ch’ing [Qing], the traditional Chinese family resembled a 
miniature kingdom in which the head occupied the place of the 
sovereign, with authority to enact family law and make life and death 
decisions for its members. The government, recognizing this familial 
omnipotence, never intervened in the domestic relations between father 
and son, husband and wife, and brother and sister (Hsu 1970: 523). 
 
The government pointedly refrained from interfering in local familial relations, thus 
remaining as far as ever from the control of the distribution of resources so important to 
the civilizing process. This was both because local social relations remained so strongly 
intact, and to ensure the continuance of that fact. Later, speaking of the farmers, who he 
says made up over 80% of the population at that point, Hsu says, “They lived in small 
villages rather than on separate homesteads, and as long as they paid their taxes, 
performed the corvee labor, and accepted the obligations of the pao-chia and li-chia 
systems, they were left pretty much to themselves” (Hsu 1970: 97). In the traditional, 
highly self-sufficient, cellular structure of the local communities the farmers were left to 
take care of their own affairs without interference from the central government. This 
was as it had always been and generally as it would remain throughout the Qing period.  
 
With this social structure firmly in place, whatever competition there undoubtedly was 
remained within traditional spheres. Given both the hierarchical nature of their strictly 
ordered figurations, and the constraining economic conditions in which the peasants 
lived their lives, there was little chance or incentive to compete for a better life. “To 
understand the rural economy of China, one has to bear in mind the fact that, with a 
very small farm under cultivation, land is closed to ambition” (Hsiao-tung 1983: 134).  
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There was just nowhere to go beyond the spheres in which they already carried out their 
day to day activities. There was very little, if anything to compete for external to their 
figurations. 
 
As would be expected under the circumstances, differentiation remained quite restricted 
throughout the Qing period. Rozman is talking about Qing China with reference to 
social development in Russia and Japan when he notes 
 
the lack of growing occupational differentiation in China. Within a 
standard marketing area of twenty or thirty villages a variety of part-
time and full-time activities met local needs, but submerged as they 
were in an overwhelmingly peasant environment, few actually severed 
their ties with the routine demands of the agricultural cycle. The local 
division of labor took almost complete ascendance over more broad-
based specialization (Rozman 1981: 153). 
 
In this sense the environment of Qing China that Rozman describes applies to most of 
traditional China throughout most of imperial history. 
 
For Elias, with a lack of differentiation the chains of interdependence between people 
remained short. This was much in tune with the traditional society of China. The social 
organization had not changed very much, and certainly not in ways that would allow for 
significantly extended chains of interdependence. People in general simply had very 
limited contact with those beyond their native village boundary. When they did, say at a  
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market town, interactions there were relatively infrequent and the connections were of a 
different sort than those within their native village. 
 
Understandably limited under the circumstances were both social and physical mobility. 
From an Eliasian perspective this is important because, were they more significant this 
would imply a weakening of traditional social ties and an environment where extending 
chains of interdependence would be more likely. Another important factor was thrown 
into the works toward the end of the Ming and through most of the Qing dynasty, 
however. The population of China expanded dramatically during this period. Estimates 
of Chinese population growth indicate that there were 143 million people in 1741, and 
432 million in 1851 (Gernet 1982: 168). This was extraordinary population growth 
(some have referred to it as “too startling to be true” (Fairbank 1965: 89)) by any 
standard, and undoubtedly resulted in some of the movement evidenced at the time. 
Rozman has argued that despite this, rural-urban mobility remained relatively ‘slow’. 
He goes on to point out that the peasants were held in place by the village culture 
(Rozman 1981: 175). There was apparently not much to be found in the cities that could 
not also be found locally in a more familiar environment (Rozman 1981: 159). For the 
purposes of this thesis this type of movement is forced anyway, in the sense that there 
simply was not enough land available to feed and house a population growing at this 
rate. Historically, according to Rozman, this has generally been the case. “Only in 
famine conditions did poor people sometimes flock to the cities, and their march could 
usually be headed off by foresight in distributing relief to affected areas” (Rozman 
1981: 175). 
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In this sense the above mentioned movement is far different from that evidenced after 
the opening in 1978, when people moved less in the interest of survival, but more 
because they chose to seek out better opportunities elsewhere. In terms of mobility 
resulting from changing social relations, the Qing period was little different from other 
dynastic periods. There was relatively little, despite the exceptional circumstances of 
population growth. 
 
As mobility was low and the chains of interdependence were short, guanxi-type 
relations normally remained restricted within traditional boundaries. As always, 
relationships beyond those lines were a rare thing. There are examples of ‘exceptional’ 
guanxi relations, however. One example comes from Rozman: “t’ung-hsiang refers to 
the common local origins of persons who associated together. Second only to family 
and kinship ties, and accommodating nepotistic hiring practises, it established the main 
criterion for recruitment to organizations and associations through business 
relationships” (Rozman 1981: 169). He goes on to say that while the Chinese certainly 
did not have a monopoly on this phenomenon, it seemed to be more prevalent there than 
anywhere else. In traditional China this would apply in the cities and with regard to 
migration when one needs to find employment at their destination. Generally it serves to 
reinforce this thesis’s main idea on the issue; even when people did move beyond local 
figurations, an exception in itself, they still relied on traditional social relations. 
 
The nature of the emperors’ dealings with the literati also provides good evidence that 
the social foundations were there during the Qing for the later emergence/expansion of 
guanxi relations. 
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The emperors tried to emphasize impersonal norms, but purely personal 
relationships played a tremendous role. The Chinese elite was bound 
together by a web of personal relationships (guanxi) based on kinship, 
shared educational background, and past favours given and received. 
Doing favours for one’s friends often took precedence over adherence 
to imperial policy. The emperors made a point of not appointing Civil 
Servants to positions in their home provinces, because this was where 
they had the most and the closest personal relationships (Moise 1986: 
24-25). 
 
Not only does this show that the literati operated with guanxi principles, but also that 
the emperor was well aware of this fact and, in much the same fashion as had been done 
for centuries, took measures to deal with it. 
 
Guanxi relations also existed among the gentry but they too were guanxi relations that 
would be expected in traditional Chinese society. The gentry were the only ones who 
had access to close social connections beyond the local community, and these relations 
were closest with other members of the gentry. In this case Lojewski is talking about the 
changing taxation system under the late Qing. 
 
Those households that were able to evade their tax liabilities were 
known as the influential households (ta-hu). The majority of the 
influential households belonged to the official gentry, although some 
members of the scholar gentry (chin), and even commoners with wealth  
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and connections with the official gentry, could belong to the influential 
households (Lojewski 1976: 128-129). 
 
These ‘connections’ could accurately be described as guanxi relations. Those involved 
were using their connections for instrumental purposes – primarily in this case to avoid 
tax liability. These connections were even more important than the law, or should we 
say, the threat that the law represented.  
 
Because the gentry were small in number, they also tended to act together to protect 
each others’ interests and privileges (Lojewski 1976: 132). Together they formed a 
guanxiwang or, Elias would say, a figuration. These figurations among the literati, 
especially those who studied together or were from the same area, were quite strong. 
Yang refers to a novel written at the time that talks about them as being determinative of 
a career (Yang 1959b: 157 citing Li Pao-chia). They certainly extended well beyond 
village boundaries, but in this sense were ‘proof of the traditional rule’, so to speak. 
These figurations had long been a part of the traditional order and hence, for the 
purposes of this thesis, might be described as being ordered in a traditional fashion, 
within the traditionally acceptable set of social relations. They were also relatively rare 
in that it was only the literati, a small minority, who were in a position to take advantage 
of them. 
 
“On the fringes of the empire as at its heart the ideals of culturalism permeated much of 
popular culture but were closely linked to elite values and practices” (Harrison 2001: 
32). This ‘culturalism’ was still Confucian in nature. As we move toward the end of 
Qing rule and the beginning of modern times for China Confucianism remained the  
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dominant cultural system, as it had been for most of the previous two millennia. It was 
this social ordering mechanism – the backbone of Chinese civilization – that continued 
to hold China together.  
 
Breakdown of the Qing - Arrival of the West  
The following discussion of the impact of the West focuses on the reasons why the 
Chinese state ultimately became so aggressively intrusive. It was this eventuality that 
led to changes in the traditional order unlike anything previously experienced in China. 
 
 “The institutional deterioration of the Chinese state began before the close of the 
eighteenth century and did not end with the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911” (Lupher 
1996: 33).  This was not due primarily to centrifugal feudal tendencies. The Qing had 
not acquiesced overly in this area. In fact, “when a memorial presented in 1768 again 
suggested the system of assigning official powers to the heads of large clan groups, the 
Ch’ien-lung emperor rejected it with a reprimand, pointing out that large clans often 
caused trouble” (Liu 1959: 76). The empire was apparently showing weakness in many 
areas, however. Lupher further suggests that the Chinese state would not show 
institutional strength on a traditional scale again until the Communist ascension to 
power (Lupher 1996: 33). It seems to have been a process which, once set in motion, 
accelerated through the nineteenth century, each new problem feeding and building on 
the ones before, and continued until the dynasty’s momentous collapse in 1911. “In the 
nineteenth century China slipped into the downward phase of a dynastic cycle, that oft-
repeated pattern of initial vigor, subsequent stability, slow deterioration, and eventual 
collapse which had characterized the administrative and political history of most 
regimes” (Fairbank 1965: 80). According to Fairbank, in the 1800s it was obvious that  
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the Qing dynasty was on the downside of its long rule. There would be significant 
differences between this instance of dynastic decline and that of pervious dynasties, 
however. For one, new players were entering the Chinese world: 
 
Western powers began to beat upon the gates and demand the opening of the 
empire to Western diplomatic contact, trade, and evangelism, all of which were 
subversive of the old Chinese scheme of things… by mid-century the dynasty was 
in dire peril from the ancient twin evils of ‘internal disorder and external 
aggression,’ which had proved the undoing of so many dynasties before (Fairbank 
1965: 80).   
 
The end of the Qing dynasty is often thought to have brought about a shift which the 
traditional Chinese social system had long resisted, that from a traditional society to a 
modern one. “That the West altered the course of modern China is not in dispute” (Pong 
1994: 12). Hsu refers to the resultant social change as an “epochal transition from 
traditional China to its modern counterpart” (Hsu 1970: 539). There continue to be 
diverging opinions on the extent of social change fostered by contact with the West 
during the Qing, and more particularly the late Qing. The impact of the Restoration 
movement, initiated in response to this contact with the West, is also understood in 
different ways.
51 More important for this thesis are the changing Chinese perceptions of 
both the problem itself and the effectiveness of the solution. 
 
                                                 
51 Pong briefly outlines the differing positions on this issue, ranging from little, to quite significant (Pong 
1994). 
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Throughout much of Qing rule, the traditional Confucian culture remained intact. To 
say, however, that China was untouched by events would be highly misleading. 
Probably more important was the unmistakable realization among the Chinese that the 
old social order not only had not kept them at the pinnacle of cultural achievement, but 
may, in fact, have been responsible for their precipitous fall. It was this realization that 
was to initiate the radical changes that would follow. The major upheaval during the 
Qing that would set the stage for everything to follow in the twentieth century, and into 
the twenty first, began primarily in the mid-nineteenth century. “Massive internal 
uprisings, defeat in two foreign wars, and continued external threats could have toppled 
the two century old Manchu ruling house” (Pong 1994: 1). That there was considerable 
internal struggle even without the arrival of Western power on the scene goes without 
saying, but it was this foreign incursion that was to have the most significant lasting 
impact. 
 
Historically, foreign threats had come from nomads of the Asian interior. This new 
threat was coming from the sea, bringing with it the insidious opium, and with that an 
entirely different approach to ‘diplomacy.’  
 
But now in the 1830s Indian opium rather quickly became a major 
import... Worse than that, British officials turned up at Canton for the 
first time demanding recognition as diplomats representing a sovereign 
power that claimed equality with the Son of Heaven. Worst of all, this 
incredible presumption was backed by superior naval gunpower 
(Fairbank 1987: 85). 
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This was apparently completely incomprehensible to the Chinese who for millennia had 
worked within a system that had, to their understanding, produced beneficial results for 
all involved. Who was this barbarian coming to the gates of China with absurd claims of 
equality when they could easily acquire all the benefits of Chinese civilization merely 
by admitting their rightful place and paying the proper tribute to the Son of Heaven? 
There had been others before them who came “to learn, to admire, to pay tribute. But 
not to negotiate, least of all as equals. The British, even the French and Americans, were 
therefore wholly new phenomena for the Chinese tradition of how to deal with 
foreigners” (Gelber 2007: 182). 
 
Opium Wars 
With the Chinese refusal to recognize Britain’s demands and their lack of understanding 
of the scope of the situation, the stage was set for events to unfold from which the 
dynastic system of over two millennia would never recover. “By the middle of 1842 
Chinese forces had been humiliatingly defeated by relatively tiny British forces whose 
men had scant respect for most of the Chinese” (Gelber 2007: 189). Even now, 
however, in the face of a situation that had gone from bad to worse, where the emperor 
had gone from the pinnacle of civilization to becoming “a semicolonial anachronism” 
(Fairbank 1987: 85), the Qing continued to rely on the only ways that they knew to deal 
with outsiders. 
 
Not terribly surprisingly, “The concessions following the British war on the seacoast 
were remarkably similar to the concessions made to militant Kokand on the Central 
Asian frontier a few years before” (Fairbank 1987: 93). For good or ill, the Chinese 
stuck to their tried and true methods of dealing with the ‘barbarians’. In this case they  
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had failed to take in the enormity of the problem, or the inadequacy of their response. 
The resulting defeat in the Opium War and the humiliating settlement foisted upon 
China was more than the Celestial Empire could bear… for long. It was a crippling 
blow to Qing prestige and by accepting opium imports they had provided unequivocal 
evidence that they “had put their own dynastic interest first” (Fairbank 1987: 93). “From 
this time the Manchu grip on China began to slip, though they were clever enough to get 
the foreigner’s support and survive for another seventy years, until 1911” (Fairbank 
1987: 95). 
 
It was not long before others, most notably the Americans, were jumping on the British 
bandwagon to take advantage of the new treaty concessions. “It meant conceding to the 
US a status of equality that would have been inconceivable five years earlier” (Gelber 
2007: 191), and that to a country barely a century old, in comparison to China’s twenty 
centuries. Beyond that, the other European powers, and eventually Japan which was 
rapidly becoming a power in its own right largely through the Meiji restoration 
(ironically providing an excellent example of a course the Chinese might successfully 
have taken), were forging their own treaties and agreements. “After 1860 all these 
changes led to more, and more varied, demands on China from everywhere” (Gelber 
2007: 209). 
 
Throughout the course of this calamitous century, “The combined pressures of 
population growth, corruption, famines and floods, made worse by ineffective 
government, spawned the dark omens of dynastic decline: banditry, riots and rebellion” 
(Grasso 1991: 35). At this point the Qing government was clearly in trouble. 
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But something far larger and more important was happening as well. “While the 
Manchus were beginning their century-long fall from their throne in Beijing, all of 
China was beginning a far greater slide from its traditional historical perch” (Grasso 
1991: 30-31). The inadequacy of rule of a declining dynasty was not the only thing 
being questioned and eventually rejected. Now, in a profound sense, it was China itself. 
Where in the past when the monopolies of the given dynasties weakened and came into 
question, in an Eliasian sense it was only a matter of who would replace them within the 
existing system. Now there was a growing uneasiness with the system itself as it was 
being questioned for the first time, and this went to the core of Chinese civilization; the 
very dominant orientations manifested in the local social order that had effectively been 
Chinese civilization for over two thousand years.  
 
Restoration and Reform 
Over the course of the remaining seventy years of rule as the Qing clung tenuously to 
power, the shape of Chinese society was to be scrutinized in more depth than ever 
before. Gelber suggests that it was not so much the loss of physical resources and 
treasure as it was contact with all things foreign, and especially ideas, that impacted 
China (Gelber 2007: 203). As the foreign presence had greater access to China and her 
people, it was inevitable that there would be at the very least a cross fertilization of 
ideas and influence. Given all the events leading up to the treaties and a more open 
China, and the resulting fact that China was now increasingly perceived by the Chinese 
as weak, it is understandable that they would question their own position in the world. 
Gelber mentions three ‘forces’ at work pointing toward the need for modernization: 
“First… there was the enormous shock and affront to deep-seated assumptions of  
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Chinese superiority. Second, there was the evidence of Chinese inadequacies in the 
modern world... Third, there was the position of the Qing court” (Gelber 2007: 212). 
 
After about 1861 there was a growing response to all the problems China was facing. 
This was to take the form of the ‘T’ung-chih Restoration’ (Tongzhi Restoration) which 
was basically an earnest attempt on the part of those in positions of power to refit China 
for the exigencies of the moment. Unfortunately, the reformers of this period were 
looking in the wrong direction for solutions. “The premise that a revival of Confucian 
values and institutions, modified or not, could provide strength and stability was 
erroneous because China was slowly being Westernized in spite of bureaucratic 
decisions” (Beckmann 1962: 147). The Opium Wars in particular, and all that came 
with those humiliating defeats, spawned a central aspect of the Restoration that was to 
have ironic implications for future developments. This was dubbed the ‘Self-
Strengthening’ movement, and referred mainly, but not exclusively, to the military 
aspect of the reform. The whole idea was to make China stronger in the face of her 
circling adversaries. 
 
By using the term ‘self-strengthening,’ Li was deliberately appealing to 
tradition... It was considered necessary, on certain occasions, for 
mankind to strengthen itself so as to maintain harmony with celestial 
rhythms... Such circumstances allowed the utilization of barbarian 
strengths (Western technology) to build up the wealth and power of the 
state so it could protect itself. Yet it was important not to alter the basic 
framework of Chinese culture… In other words, practical Western  
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knowledge could be used as a ‘means’ to reach Chinese ‘ends,’ namely 
to conserve Confucian tradition (Grasso 1991: 53). 
 
Once again the Chinese were resorting to tactics that had always worked for them in the 
past, tactics grounded in the Confucian tradition: “it is important to understand that the 
main intent of the court-sanctioned restoration… was not to create a new order  but was 
rather an intrinsically conservative response to dynastic decline” (Grasso 1991: 54). 
These were methods which had been used time and again to rejuvenate declining 
Chinese dynasties. Some aspects of the West, those which apparently made it so strong, 
were to be adopted. This had primarily to do with military technology. Spence is 
referring to the military changes being proposed and made at the time with reference to 
the overall policy objectives the leadership had in mind. “But all that was mere 
preamble to what was considered the great central task: the Tongzhi Restoration 
statesmen sought nothing less than the re-establishment of the basic values of Confucian 
government” (Spence 1990: 195). As had so often been the case in the past the 
institutions of Chinese rule were not seen to be the problem, and, therefore, in classic 
Eliasian fashion, were not to be changed. There was no need to change them. In fact, 
they should be strengthened. The problem was a failure to rule in the manner prescribed 
by tradition and by those institutions.  
 
Never was it assumed that dynastic decline was caused by inadequate 
institutions… Throughout China’s history issues of social, economic, 
and political structure were overlooked as sources of dysfunction; in 
fact, it was assumed that each new dynasty had to continue the 
institutions of its predecessor (Grasso 1991: 55).   
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At least among these statesmen the opinion was that if the Confucian tradition were 
strengthened and purified, all would be well again. As Elias points out, once any state 
and its monopolies are functioning effectively, there should be no need, real or 
perceived, to change the institutions themselves. The people would not seek to change 
the monopolies of power, but only those who controlled them (Elias 1994a: 346). This, 
in the Chinese case, had been true for thousands of years. The problem in this new 
situation was that these tactics were wholly inadequate for the task confronting the 
Chinese, and, in fact, may have made things even worse. 
 
The great aim of the T’ung-chih Restoration was the revival of 
Confucian values and institutions, but so modified that they might 
endure… Restoration statesmen had no desire to create a new society. 
They wanted to restore a society that they confidently believed had 
been based on immutable truth and that could therefore, with 
adjustments, flourish in any age (Wright 1966: 63). 
 
Later in the same work Wright says that the success of the Restoration depended on 
how well the local traditional culture could be reintegrated without getting in the way of 
military and diplomatic modernization. Some of the reformers had wanted to 
professionalize the subadministrative levels of government, to give them salaries and 
make them part of the bureaucracy, hence bringing them more under the control of the 
central state. This was never carried through “For a variety of reasons” but, again, the 
need was quite visible to those seeking to make what they felt were the necessary 
changes (Duara 1988: 60). The main idea was to extend the reach of the central  
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government into the local community but because of the nature of local control it could 
not succeed (Wright 1966: 125). In response to Wright,  Pong asserts, “That the 
Restoration failed is not the question – the degree of the failure is” (Pong 1994: 2). This 
desire on the part of central authorities, however, continued into the next century as 
China moved toward dynastic collapse and the formation of the Republic.  
 
Sino-Japanese War and the Failure of the Restoration 
The reasons for the failure of the Restoration are not easy to pin down. It remains clear, 
however, that the reforms did not achieve the desired goal of restoring China to her 
‘rightful place’. While some progress was seen as being made, the truth of the situation, 
at least as the people understood it, soon became apparent. In July 1894 the crowning 
blow came with the Sino-Japanese war. Japan’s victory was quick and complete. It was 
now unmistakably clear that whatever knowledge the Chinese had; social, cultural, 
scientific, military, was, in Wilterdink’s terms, “relatively inadequate” for the situation 
(Wilterdink 1977: 111). The Japanese had proven their membership in a club in which 
the Chinese did not belong.  
 
Japan’s decisive victory was a great blow to China’s national pride. It 
was bad enough that the emperor had to give way to Europeans. Being 
crushed by the ‘dwarf bandits’ of Japan, inhabitants of an island 
backwater that had always sat in the celestial shadow of the peacock 
throne and had borrowed heavily from Chinese civilization, was a 
humiliation beyond endurance (Grasso 1991: 56). 
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According to Gelber the very “nature and swiftness of the Japanese victory made Japan 
the very country to emulate” (Gelber 2007: 232).  
 
From the loss to the Japanese onwards, the demand for change grew in intensity. Now 
pressure to change the system itself was starting to be voiced much more openly for the 
first time. The nature of the monopolies, which had not been questioned for millennia, 
were coming under increasing scrutiny. It would no longer be perceived as acceptable to 
change only those who ruled within the traditional Chinese structure. Now the structure 
itself would have to change. Given the established existence of the monopolies of 
violence and taxation this is in contrast to the way Elias would have had it; but given 
also the simultaneous existence of the traditional social relations, it was necessary in 
order for the civilizing process to continue. This also represented the driving force 
behind the central government’s subsequent focus on gaining direct control over local 
society. Now, for the first time since the Qin, the Chinese leadership was moving in an 
Eliasian direction, the continuation of a civilizing process.  
 
Hsu suggests that it was during the Qing that China entered modernity: “The Confucian 
state and society and the old ways of life which persisted during the early and middle 
stages of the dynasty went through a radical transformation under the Western impact 
after the mid-19th century” (Hsu 1970: 539). Many events led up to this transition, all 
mainly resulting from nineteenth century contact and conflict with the West. It was 
these Western incursions that forced the modernizing responses from the Qing and later 
rulers. “For the holders of power, China’s great revolution began in the 1830s. The 
Chinese place in the world rather suddenly began to turn inside out” as the realization of 
their own inadequacies was forced upon them (Fairbank 1987: 84).   
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Beginning the Assault on the Traditional Order - Qing Reform  
Many in the government had come to realize the need for change. At the same time 
there were many reform movements springing up among the gentry (Grasso 1991: 57). 
The change now being called for, however, was of a different nature. It was not a call 
for restoration of the old but one closer to revolution – of throwing out the old and 
bringing in the new. “By the turn of the twentieth century the demand for change 
permeated Chinese society” (Grasso 1991: 70). In searching for answers to their 
pressing needs, there seemed to be an awareness among the reformers that even the 
traditional social relationships at the local level had to be altered. To put the matter in 
Eliasian terms, the hold of the traditional figuration needed to be broken. The very core 
of Chinese civilization had to be re-examined, and possibly even discarded. 
 
“There were varying ideas on how China could achieve a position equal to that of Japan 
and thereby enable herself to control her own affairs” (Stokes 1964: 275). At this point 
even the Empress Dowager, a strenuous opponent of reform in the past, came to 
acknowledge the need for change. She finally “came to understand that nothing short of 
new policies could save the dynasty. She was not converted to reform in principle, but 
she did realize that the dynasty would have to make concessions to reform proposals” 
(Beckmann 1962: 198). With this realization came a frantic dash to catch up, before the 
race was lost and the dynasty finished. “Even the Manchu court was awake. Tz’u Hsi 
was a changed woman, a convert, though perhaps an unwilling one, to reform. She had 
made a complete volte-face, as the leaders of Japan had done some forty years earlier” 
(Stokes 1964: 277). Regardless of her motivation, this was a radical turnabout as she 
affirmed “that it was no longer sufficient to learn foreign languages and how to  
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manufacture weapons – to do so was only to change the skin and hair of China whereas 
changes in the vital organs were essential” (Stokes 1964: 283). 
 
Reform, some of which was to prove highly significant, was initiated through the 
remainder of the dynasty and, though it would prove too little too late for the sake of the 
dynasty itself, the trend was set. This process would ultimately focus on the very 
traditional social relations that had proven so intractable a stumbling block to the 
continuation of a civilizing process.  
 
The military was reorganized and brought more firmly under central control. Probably 
most important in this regard, the occupation of soldier was no longer looked upon with 
contempt. “Many who took officers’ courses were men of good family - the soldier was 
no longer to be scorned in China” (Stokes 1964: 279). Steps were taken to reorganize 
the government (Fairbank 1992: 242). There was a new legal code abolishing collective 
responsibility, a new constitution encouraging greater representation of elected officials 
was put forward, foot binding and slavery were banned, young people deemed capable 
were sent overseas to study for officialdom (Stokes 1964: 280-285). Changes to the 
education system were perhaps the most important of all. “In 1901 an imperial edict 
called for the building of a national school system, and in 1903 a ministry of education 
was established. In the following year the new ministry produced a plan for a system 
based on that of Japan.” (Beckmann 1962: 203).  
 
Central to the education reforms was the abolition of the examination system. “In 1905 
the total abolition of the ancient examinations was decreed… It may be considered that 
the abolition of the examination system in 1905 was in the long run of greater  
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significance than the overthrow of the Ch’ing in 1911” (Stokes 1964: 284-285). Since 
Han times the Chinese had relied upon these examinations to provide its officialdom, 
and thus, they were a centrepiece of the entire civilizational framework. Now, with this 
one act, they were to disappear from the social scene in startling fashion. In their place a 
completely new system was to emerge, and do so rather quickly in historical terms. 
 
In 1904 elaborate plans for a system of government schools were drawn 
up. These schools, controlled by a board of Education, were to range 
upwards from kindergarten and primary schools to high schools and 
universities. ‘Western’ subjects were to be taught, though the Chinese 
classics were not to be ignored… In 1905 only about 100,000 students 
were receiving a ‘modern’ education; however, by 1910 there were 
probably a million and a half children at western-style schools (Stokes 
1964: 284). 
 
This was radical not only in that it struck at the very nature of officialdom, but also in 
that it pointed toward a far more universal education based on Western content. It would 
be difficult to overestimate the importance of this shift in social organization. By 
eliminating the examination system the relationship of the state to the local community 
was necessarily changed and hence, so too was local society. Important new social 
groups were forming. 
 
Broadly speaking these were the yang-wu experts, comprising those 
who had knowledge of foreign languages and learning, those with 
managerial capacities, those who had acquired Western technical skills  
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– military and so forth – and those who started modern businesses 
(Bastid 1976: 124).   
 
Bastid follows this up by saying of their impact on society that, “in long-run terms, their 
role can only be construed as marginal” (Bastid 1976: 124-125). From the perspective 
of the present thesis it is argued that this conclusion is wrong. This change was, in fact, 
very significant. Nevertheless, Bastid’s research remains important to this thesis 
 
For example, she puts forward an important ‘working hypothesis’ in arguing that when 
looking at this period the important point is that we indeed see a change “from a 
traditional agrarian society into a modern agrarian society… The important thing is the 
notion of a different type of agrarian society” (Bastid 1976: 125). She follows this idea 
by positing the formation of an ‘agrarian bourgeois’ that was no longer beholden to “the 
central government’s bestowal of titles and degrees” and whose power no longer rested 
on the performing of certain duties and “the upholding of customary bonds” (Bastid 
1976: 126). Their power was based instead in wealth and strength, sometimes military. 
These people made up the new social groups referred to above. Fairbank refers to a 
group resembling, but not yet quite, an agrarian ‘bourgeois’ that was no longer based in 
the countryside but in the treaty ports from where they had their rents collected 
(Fairbank 1992: 244). All of this is insightful in pointing toward the breaking of 
traditional bonds, those which had always been so important in holding Chinese society 
together. In this case, the position of the officialdom that had effectively formed for 
millennia the middlemen between the state and local society was coming under threat 
by this rising new class. The newly-threatened gentry had been the very group that had 
always been so important in enabling local society to remain self-sufficient and cellular,  
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and with the state so distant, the one group in China that had always been virtually 
untouchable. Add to this the elimination of the exams, and the entire traditional 
arrangement between the state and local society was changed beyond recognition. “This 
great turning point stopped production of the degree holding elite, the gentry class” 
(Fairbank 1992: 243). The void being created would have to be filled.  
 
State Intrusiveness during the Qing Reform Period 
Duara describes what he calls the cultural nexus of the period. It was to be this ‘cultural 
nexus’ that had come under attack as being at the centre of China’s failure. This thesis 
argues that the ‘culture’ aspect of his ‘cultural nexus’ was largely determined by the 
Confucian tradition, the dominant orientations of Chinese society, and that the local 
figurations were one (the most important) ‘institution’ in the framework. In attacking 
this ‘cultural nexus’ the government was attacking the roots of their own civilization, as 
was their intent. 
 
Hierarchical institutions, such as those of the market, kinship, religion, 
and water control, and networks, such as those between patrons and 
clients or among affines, provided a framework within which power 
and authority were exercised. The term ‘culture’ in ‘cultural nexus’ 
refers to the symbols and norms embedded in organizations that were 
meaningful to their members. These norms encoded religious beliefs, 
sentiments of reciprocity, kinship bonds, and the like, which were 
transmitted and sustained by the institutions and networks of the nexus 
(Duara 1988: 5). 
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He elaborates in somewhat more detail on these networks in the following way: “Also 
part of the nexus are informal networks of interpersonal relationships found, for 
example, between affines, patrons and clients, or religious teachers and disciples” 
(Duara 1988: 16). It is these ‘informal networks,’ especially within kinship groups and 
between affines that form the bulwark of local figurations. 
 
not only local power structures but the imperial state itself had relied 
significantly on the cultural nexus to establish their authority among the 
rural communities of North China through at least the end of the 19th 
century. The fateful efforts of the 20th-century state to penetrate rural 
society through means outside the cultural nexus and to destroy parts of 
it would ultimately undermine the state itself (Duara 1988: 5-6). 
 
The state had always relied on the traditional Confucian local relations for recognition 
of its authority (and the localities had relied on the state’s Confucian obligations), and a 
significant part of that was the gentry elite. Where the European state had to overcome 
and take control of the localized feudal figurations, the state in China relied upon them 
(though true feudalism had passed from the scene) for its own ongoing existence. As 
long as the traditional Confucian order remained stable and strong, so, too, did the state. 
This was clearly changing in response to the arrival of the West and the decline of the 
Qing. Having said this, however, it is also clear that it was not a smooth transition. Qing 
society remained, for the most part, a traditional Chinese society to the very end.  
 
Up to the time of reform the state’s presence in rural areas was still typically limited. 
This was the proper way of ordering things in traditional China, hence Rozman argues  
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that traditional Chinese society was alive and well at the end of the Qing Dynasty even 
as reform measures were being implemented to bring it to an end (Rozman 1981: 167). 
Duara talks about the change in approach in late Qing policy toward the countryside. 
Basic to the whole reform movement, he argues, was the centre’s involvement in rural 
society. This was symptomatic of the situation as well as of the radical nature of the 
change being called for. Referring to the turn of the century, he argues that 
 
this moment dramatizes the notion of a state moving to break with the 
past and begin a new epoch. Much of what happens in the next half-
century originates in the historical events of the time... These 
developments culminated in the modernizing drive known as the late 
Qing reforms (xinzheng), which attempted to transform the relatively 
weak institutional involvement of the nineteenth century Qing state in 
rural society (Duara 1988: 58). 
 
Duara talks about two processes at about this time, one economic and the other “the 
efforts of the state to deepen and strengthen its command over rural society” (Duara 
1988: 1). It was the state’s efforts to gain greater control of the rural population that had 
the greatest impact. In pursuing this initiative they would be attacking exactly those 
local figurations, the breakdown of which Elias sees as vital for the civilizing process. 
For Elias, only as these traditional social links are broken down do the chains of 
interdependence between people extend, ultimately forcing the internalization of 
constraint. 
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In most of this area, however, state strengthening, which had also been 
taking place since the turn of the century, had, by the 1940s, greatly 
transformed local society - indeed it had changed the links between 
politics, culture, and society in rural north China. The subsequent, 
seemingly irreversible course of development of this state resembled 
the process in early modern Europe that Charles Tilley and others have 
called ‘state making.’ (Duara 1988: 1-2). 
 
“The task of the reformist state included more than bureaucratizing subordinate 
personnel at the county level. It would also have to formalize the apparatus of 
subcounty government in order to make it more amenable to state interests” (Duara 
1988: 60). This need was the other arm of the local modernization process, and given 
the resilience of the traditional social structure it would be no easy task. The interests of 
the locality would have to be subordinated to those of the centre, hence mandating that 
they forfeit a considerable amount of their autonomy and self-sufficiency in becoming 
more formally a cog in the wheel of the larger state government apparatus. This would 
be to turn the traditional social order on its head. 
 
The earliest reports suggest that subcounty police and education 
facilities were first established around 1901 in Shandong and 1903 in 
Hebei. The taxes levied on the villages for these expenses began to 
accelerate with the formation of local assemblies dominated by the 
gentry. As Philip Kuhn has shown, gentry management of local 
community projects had been common since at least the late 19th  
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century, but the practice was legitimated by the official constitutional 
movement in 1908-09 (Duara 1988: 61). 
 
This thesis holds that the state had essentially formed with the original Qin unifiers of 
China, and certainly with the Han dynasty, but the intrusion of the state into local 
society characteristic of the European civilizing process had not occurred. With this 
self-strengthening movement made in desperation by the Qing, the intrusion had begun 
in earnest. Early in the twentieth century the Chinese state changed rapidly. “But in 
North China, one of the most important aspects of state strengthening - the ability to 
penetrate and absorb the resources of local society - continued more or less 
uninterrupted during the entire period” (Duara 1988: 3). In other words, the Qing 
government set in motion a trend toward central control over resources at the local 
level, thus violating the long-standing state-local society arrangement that had been 
integral to the traditional Chinese social order. This control is, of course, a pillar of the 
civilizing process described by Elias allowing it to gain its full momentum.  
 
Change at the Local Figurational Level. 
Hsu talks about change at the local level as being quite significant. 
 
The kinship society of China, with its age-old customs, values, and 
emphasis upon the family and clan as basic units, was shaken to its 
foundations during the last decade of the dynasty. The Confucian 
concepts of family loyalty, filial piety, chastity, Three Bonds, and Five 
Relationships gave way to the Western ideas of individualism, freedom, 
and equality of the sexes (Hsu 1970: 523).  
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All of this change struck squarely at the foundations of what had always made Chinese 
society unique, at its very identity, and therefore at the identity of those making up that 
society. While at the moment in time of the first decade of the twentieth century the 
relationships traditionally making up local society were not as yet changed all that 
much, the trend was set. A new way of thinking, of seeing the world, was in place. Hsu 
continues in talking about the Western ideas that,   
 
striking at the very roots of family relations, won currency among the 
young. Furthermore, the opening of modern schools at the turn of the 
century in effect meant that the government had taken over from the 
family the responsibility for educating the youth. Thus, when the state 
intervened in family relationships, it struck away the political prop for a 
kinship society... Concomitantly, the legal support of the family-
centered society also crumbled. (Hsu 1970: 523). 
 
Here again we see the importance of the implementation of the new education system 
and the radical nature of the change involved. For the first time in the history of 
imperial China, young people were to be educated by those outside the family. The 
change itself was quite radical and it promised to deeply impact traditional social 
relations in the future. Not only were the young being influenced by ideas from afar, but 
they were now often being taught those ideas in schools by people from outside their 
primary figuration. 
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From the middle of the nineteenth century through the revolution of 1911, there were 
lost wars, the not inconsiderable influence of opium, numerous internal rebellions 
(including the hugely destructive Taiping), significant economic stress, increasing 
contact (and conflict) with western peoples and ideas, and the growing, if not always 
eagerly accepted, realization that change was both necessary and inevitable. This led 
first to what came to be referred to as the ‘Restoration.’ Later it transitioned into more 
realistic reform efforts during the last decade of the Qing, and it would be followed in 
the Republican period and the Communist period after that, by an increasingly intense 
assault on the traditional Chinese culture in wave after wave of reform. The Chinese 
were driven in this direction by a myriad of causes, but most of all by the inescapable 
realization of their own failure in the face of a seemingly universal foreign onslaught. 
According to Perdue, “the 1911 revolution which created Republican China had 
profound roots in the long-term trends of Chinese society; it was not merely the result of 
a faddish fascination with Western parliamentary government” (Perdue 1988: 286). 
Whether viewed as a negative (or even hostile) reaction to their own tradition, or as a 
continuation of it in one form or another, this fact holds true and is as Elias would see it. 
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Chapter Seven - Assault on the Traditional Order under the Republic 
 
The politics of the period between the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the advent of 
the communist regime are beyond the scope of this thesis. A summary description will 
suffice in situating what follows. After the fall of the Qing dynasty there was a failed 
attempt to create a republic, during which there was a great deal of ‘warlord’ and 
regional fighting and confusion, followed by pseudo-unification under the Nationalists 
in Nanjing in 1927, and finally civil war leading to the advent of the Communist regime 
in 1949 and the expulsion of the Nationalist Regime to Taiwan. The entire period will 
be referred to as the Republican period, while acknowledging that it encompasses far 
more than just that. The primary goal of this section is to outline the social change that 
was occurring during this period with reference to those areas already deemed important 
to the Chinese civilizing process. The issue of primary importance continues to be the 
steady encroachment of the centre on local autonomy and self-sufficiency, and its 
possible effect on traditional social relations. 
 
In effect... the 1911 Revolution was an elite Revolution, whose tale is 
told in the activities of the elite. But elitist Revolutions still have 
implications for the masses, and the problem becomes one of 
determining from the scattered and fragmentary sources just what those 
implications were (Esherick 1976: 250). 
 
The Republican Revolution was indeed an elite revolution, but this thesis holds that its 
impact on the peasantry in social terms was significant. This is true even if one only 
looks at the fact that it was this revolution that finally broke the political backbone of  
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traditional China and allowed for social change to commence. In this sense the lives of 
the peasants were perhaps impacted as much as at any other time in Chinese history. 
 
Ramon Myer provides a good example of exactly this point. He argues that after the fall 
of the Qing dynasty, “Patron-client relationships rapidly deteriorated. Tenants struggled 
to hold on to their traditional subsistence rights, but they could no longer depend on the 
former imperial government to check patron expectation and honor patron obligations to 
their clients” (Myers 1980: 244-245). Under the traditional situation the tenant could 
depend on the right to both employment and subsistence. “These conditions existed 
prior to 1911, but afterwards tenant rights to subsistence eroded away… Landlords 
withdrew such traditional obligations as to fetch a doctor and pay medical fees when 
their tenants became ill” (Myers 1980: 245). These aspects of traditional society in the 
village, the obligations between landlord and peasant, had a long history in China. They 
were a very important part of the social and political order that had remained so stable 
for so long in that through them many of the functions were performed that allowed the 
state to remain so distant and small. The alteration of this landlord-peasant relationship 
was a momentous event. With the perceived changing needs of Chinese civilization and 
the changing notions of government, actions were being taken that were affecting social 
relations at fundamental levels.  
 
Labor Allocation Patterns   
Fei-Ling Wang’s study focussed on what were called Labor Allocation Patterns, or 
LAPs, which are easily understood as part of the dominant orientations and changing 
social organization of this thesis. In this perspective, Wang is talking about “the patterns 
and the norms that guide the organization of labor in production, that is, the allocation  
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and the reallocation of labor force across the boundaries of industry, institution, rank 
and profession, and geography” (Wang 1998: 59). This is relevant because of its 
correlation to the control of the distribution of resources in traditional China. Labour, as 
a major resource itself, is allocated to those activities which produce the greatest return 
in resources for those concerned to take advantage of them. The area of control of the 
allocation of labour is highly correlated with the area of control of the allocation of 
resources. In the traditional structure this was done primarily within the family. Wang 
points out that with the changing economic and social context from roughly the middle 
of the nineteenth century through the middle of the twentieth there was a significant 
shift in LAP toward an emerging ‘market LAP’ (mainly in the urban areas).
52 This new 
structure was different in many ways than anything that had come before and both 
reflected and resulted in significant changes in social structure.  
 
First, the workers employed and managed under this LAP were usually 
permanent workers, although many of them had a strong desire to retire 
to their old villages – a dream that was gradually broken. Second, 
despite the widespread existence of ultra-economic ties between the 
workers and their employers, economic considerations were generally 
the main concern of both (Wang 1998: 90). 
 
The two points made here are relevant to what this thesis is arguing. First, in the past 
when one moved to the city or somewhere else to work (in itself a rare occurrence), it 
was strictly temporary and always with the intent to return to one’s home and family as 
                                                 
52 This process had started in the 1840s and 50s. By the 1890s there were 100,000 in industry. In the 
1920s there were about 3.8 million people employed in industry. By the 1940s there were 8-10 million 
(Wang 1998: 89).  
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soon as possible. According to Wang this was changing. The age old ties to one’s home 
village were apparently loosening. The second point also implies a significant shift in 
the very way that relationships were viewed and understood. In this case economic 
considerations were beginning to take precedence over personal ones. Considering the 
nature of the historically very negative Chinese view of commerce, and the sacrosanct 
perspective on personal and familial relationships, this too, is quite significant.
53 
Though relatively small in absolute terms (in that it was primarily an urban 
phenomenon), it was happening on a fairly broad basis. It should also be said that some 
rural areas near the large industrial cities were impacted as well. Wang goes on to 
suggest that these developments set the stage for the Post-Opening success stories like 
the Sunan model, the Wenzhou model, and the Dacuzhuan model (Wang 1998: 90-91). 
 
The impact of these changes in social relations was not to be quite as restricted as their 
initial geographic distribution. This new model of relations appears to have 
subsequently spread to nearby rural areas. This thesis holds that, using an Eliasian 
perspective, it was the progressive weakening of traditional social relations such as 
these that contributed to growth in urban areas (migration) and even industrialization. 
The traditional social relations of the millennia-old dominant orientations of Chinese 
society had to weaken before these other events could occur to the extent that they did. 
There were a number of factors that caused these ties to weaken to this extent, all 
stemming if not completely, in large measure from the Centre’s perceived need to 
change in order to survive. 
 
 
                                                 
53 In the Confucian social order, those who pursued commerce held a position near the bottom of the 
social hierarchy.  
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State Intrusiveness during the Republican Period  
At about this same time (1900-1910)  there were concerns among the pro-democracy 
reformers that the reform councils then put in place at the more local level would only 
serve to consolidate the power of the already existing gentry (Spence 1990: 279). They 
were understandably uncomfortable with this possibility in that it might inhibit 
continuing reform.  
 
This fear was borne out in the months after the Manchu abdication, as 
old scores were settled and powerful local incumbents took over a range 
of new posts designed to bring the authority of the central government 
much deeper into the countryside than the old Qing magistrates had 
ever been able to do (Spence 1990: 279-280). 
 
Herein lay the difference. New leadership was seen to be a basic need of modernization 
and it was felt that the state should provide it. This new leadership would be far more 
directly linked to and held accountable by the centre. These links could most effectively 
be established with existing local power holders, be they gentry, representatives of the 
new rising class referred to as yang-wu, or someone else. As part of the state 
strengthening process, the “bureaucratic penetration of society” was seen as being vital 
and this was the means (Duara 1988: 60). Central control over local life was a major, if 
not the major, requirement for modernization as many of the reformers understood it. 
The aforementioned attack on the official gentry, the men who effectively supplied the 
stabilizing link between the centre and the locality in the traditional system, was the first 
step. The already mentioned void that was being created where leadership had been had  
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to be filled but, regardless of who the individuals filling the void were, it would be filled 
by people far more directly responsible to the state.  
 
Zanasi refers to Fei Xiaotong in one of Fei’s studies of Kaixiangong, who says that the 
old elite were simply replaced with officials from the state (Zanasi 2004: 140). The 
difference was, obviously, that in this new situation the direct link between the locality 
and the state was established with the state assuming ever greater control. The central 
state had simply reached another rung down the social ladder. In the past this over-
extended reach of the government had always been consciously and intentionally 
avoided, this avoidance being an inherent part of the social order.  
 
With the formation of the Republic the newly emerging political arrangement with its 
closer ties to the locality were gradually becoming cemented into the government 
structure. New “magistrate’s examinations were introduced in 1913… these exams 
produced a younger breed of professionally trained administrators as opposed to the 
classically trained scholars of the Qing” (Duara 1988: 61). The traditional system 
certainly was not overthrown in one step. Many of the former officials remained in 
powerful positions and many of the functions, such as tax collection, were carried out 
“through the existing, informal structure of subcounty administration” (Duara 1988: 61). 
But the trend was set. The governmental structure of the locality was changing and the 
centre was becoming more of a factor in local social organization and relations. From an 
Eliasian perspective, the locality, and the people therein, were finally becoming more 
integrated into the larger state. 
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Nationalists 
“By the spring of 1927 Chiang had almost completed his Northern Expedition, giving 
China the first semblance of unity since the fall of the Manchu [Qing] dynasty” 
(Schurmann 1967: 89-90). Even as the Nationalists assumed a fairly strong position of 
power, they retained a very similar understanding of what had to be done at the local 
level. 
 
Both Nationalists and Communists aimed at breaking down the long-
established network of socioeconomic power in the village.  Because 
that network was seen as the stronghold of feudalism and a major 
obstacle to modernization, they agreed that its removal was crucial if 
China was to be saved from ‘backwardness’ and colonialism (Zanasi 
2004: 138). 
 
Further elaborating on this thought, Zanasi continues, “Displacing the local elites was as 
important for the Nationalist reformers as for the Communists” (Zanasi 2004: 139). 
Their primary focus was essentially the same as that of the Republicans before them, 
and the Communists who would follow. 
 
When the Nationalists captured power in the North in 1928, they were 
determined to institutionalize local government at the level of the ward. 
Initially the wards were expected to be self-governing bodies with 
elected officials, but by 1933 they had become ‘purely administrative 
arms of the county government’ (Duara 1988: 62).  
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The Nationalists consolidated, and in fact increased, power over the locality after they 
took power. The wards were seen by the Nationalists as part of the nation-building 
process as opposed to just contributing to state-strengthening, requiring that they be 
integrated into the central apparatus. There continued to be many of the weaknesses of 
the old order, but the process of change was also continuing. Duara says of the ward’s 
tasks that they “included not only population registration, land investigation, taxing, and 
policing but also supervising the construction of the infrastructure of a modern nation: 
education, participatory institutions, and an integrated economy” (Duara 1988: 62). 
These were functions that, if carried out at all, had for the most part been done at the 
local level previously, largely within the existing local social structures. 
 
The Village 
A second level formally recognized by the state was the village. In the 
early 1900s the county administration recognized the village headman 
and his assistant and, in some places, a leadership council. Village 
leaders were now responsible for managing the new schools, 
constructing roads, and undertaking various projects designed to bring 
the village within the ambit of the state-led nation-building process… 
After 1928, the Nationalists sought to impose a more ambitious plan for 
bringing all of rural society within a distinctly formal relationship with 
the state (Duara 1988: 63).  
 
While self-government was talked about a good deal, Duara makes it clear that little 
was actually allowed. The local level of government was performing many of the 
functions previously carried out by traditional social structures, but doing so under the  
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close supervision of the county and, therefore, under a chain of command leading 
directly to the centre. 
 
The village was becoming progressively more important in the larger scheme of things. 
The place of the agents who had formerly collected taxes from the villages was being 
made superfluous as the village became more closely linked to the centre. One of the 
main means of doing this was the tankuan, a tax assessed against the whole village as 
opposed to individuals within the village.  Under this new system it did not matter how 
much land individual peasants owned. With the tankuan the state-local society 
relationship changed.  
 
The state would deal with a single village, which now had a formal, 
unmediated administrative link with the state. In its new transactions 
with the state, the village could borrow little of the strength of the 
cultural nexus that it had once used to resist the incursions of 
entrepreneurial brokers (Duara 1988: 65).  
 
In other words, whereas in the past the culture had dictated that state–local society 
relations be conducted at a certain distance, this was no longer the case. The villages 
now had to provide the assessed amount of money directly to the state, with no 
mediators in between. This new tax system also forced changes in the village as it, in a 
sense, became more important.  “Thus, state penetration forced the village not only to 
develop a fiscal system, thereby making it an important managerial center, but also to 
devise distinctive methods of assessment, making the particular village in which one 
lived a matter of some moment” (Duara 1988: 197).  
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Growth in Provincial Power 
Through all of this the provinces were enabled to collect ever larger amounts of revenue 
from local society. In Hebei and Shandong Duara puts the annual increase at 42 and 
56% respectively over the roughly twenty years from 1913 to 1934 (Duara 1988: 67).  
 
The enormous expansion of provincial income suggests the increasing 
control of the province over the resources of society, and through 
increases in expenditures, the weightier role it was playing in society as 
well. This is a point of considerable importance. The bureaucratic 
power of the central state had become parcelized, but in the process the 
fiscal foundations of the provincial units had been strengthened, a fact 
that would enable them to play a more important role than they had 
heretofore (Duara 1988: 67).  
 
As the state as a whole grew increasingly integrated in Eliasian fashion, from the village 
through the ward, county and province, each level gained in importance. Here we see 
the provinces gaining both in financial strength and in control of resources. In this 
sense, as the centre effectively gains more control over the various levels of society, it 
starts to look a good deal like Europe’s civilizing process in motion in the Chinese 
context. The peasantry had to start looking to different sources to meet needs that had 
been met locally in the past. This translates directly into changing local social relations. 
 
The progressive governmental intrusion into local affairs 
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in many cases exacerbated the peasants’ plight by imposing new 
burdens. Because the Nationalists endeavored to extend their control 
down to the villages, the size of the bureaucracy at the hsien, or district, 
level grew. More administrators and tax-collectors were appointed, and 
the size of the police and militia expanded. These new local authorities 
provided few palpable services that benefited the peasants, but they had 
to be paid. (Eastman 1986: 154). 
 
This was an expense that the villages could ill afford at that point as the economy was in 
a depression. It subsequently played an important role in the continuing agitation for 
change and would contribute to the eventual Communist victory. 
 
Local Social Relations – An Eliasian Perspective 
Regarding the centre’s dealings with the countryside Fairbank draws the following 
conclusion. He describes the effort to restructure the rural situation as running head-on 
into difficulties deeply embedded in the culture. It seems that any attempt to aid local 
society, which involved altering local social relations in one fashion or another, usually 
in an Eliasian civilizing direction, required change at all levels. The social structure was 
so tightly integrated at the local level that any changes there were likely to impact 
society on a much broader level. Yet the need for change remained urgent as the 
problems festered and grew. “The local self-government program of the Nationalist 
regime was frustrated by this same syndrome. It was unable to penetrate the village 
level except superficially from the top down” (Fairbank 1992: 301).  
  
 
271
Because they are quite difficult to define clearly, the achievements of the Nationalists 
are a subject of much debate. They attempted land reform but had little success 
(Beckmann 1962: 460). They implemented cooperatives and aided agricultural output 
significantly (Beckmann 1962: 459). Many of their programs can only be described as, 
at best, partly successful. One of the major problems was their indecisiveness which 
Beckmann exemplifies with the following: “In 1928 the Nanking  government had 
abolished official Confucian rites on the ground that the principles of Confucius were 
despotic and superstitious, but by 1934 the old master had been recanonized” 
(Beckmann 1962: 462). Lloyd Eastman suggests that the Nationalists tiptoed around the 
issue of land reform and tenancy, and change in general, because of its centrality to 
those living in the countryside. There was great fear of the instability that might result, 
“the outcome of which they could neither control nor predict” (Eastman 1986: 152). 
 
Lupher carries this point a step further in suggesting that the Nationalists left both the 
local and the regional powers alone for similar reasons. “In the Nanking decade, no 
genuine destruction of competing centers of political power occurred at the regional or 
local level” (Lupher 1996: 38). Nationalist leadership saw this as the most secure way to 
maintain power. This would contribute significantly to the undoing of the Nationalists 
in the end but for the time being it allowed for a moderate pace of change in the village 
communities. Even as this change was occurring, however, the traditional order 
remained strongly in place in the locality. 
 
Drawing again on the related notion of Labor Allocation Patterns used by Wang in his 
study, both a resilient stability and yet significant change are evidenced. “In short, by 
the mid-twentieth century, Chinese labour allocation continued to be a largely family- 
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based traditional LAP. But new patterns emerged” (Wang 1998: 91). In other words, the 
dominant orientations of such long duration remained largely in place in most of China 
at least through the Nationalist period. This is certainly true in terms of influence over 
the distribution of resources where the family and/or the village remained in control 
despite the many changes coming from the centre. 
 
Economically, the family has been the most important unit of 
organization in production, for not only has agriculture been almost 
exclusively a family undertaking but also in industry and commerce the 
family has been the most numerous organizational unit in investment 
and operation. There is hardly one  major aspect of traditional social life 
that is not touched by the ties and influence of the family (Yang 1959: 
5). 
 
Most of what social change there was, could be found in and nearby the cities, and had 
not yet penetrated the countryside as significantly as the reformers might have hoped or 
thought. 
 
Once again we see that where the traditional social structure is strong, those aspects of 
society with which this thesis is concerned are in a state not indicative of an Eliasian 
civilizing process. Integration and differentiation remain low, the chains of 
interdependence are short, and competition and mobility are limited. Whitely might be 
useful in understanding this, with his Eliasian analysis of developmental processes in 
the scientific community. Basically the idea is that the closer the new idea is to the old,  
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the less resistance it will run into (Whitely 1977: 423).
54 If this thesis can take the 
liberty of applying this to the Chinese social context at this point the Confucian system 
was so well integrated and all-encompassing that almost any new ideas were at best 
marginal, making resistance to the  new almost insurmountable. That was certainly the 
case with ideas advocating modernization.  
 
Land, in the traditional sense, remained paramount at this time. In Repbulican China it 
was, as it always had been, the central determining factor of the quality of life. 
 
It seems to us that this village represents a basic type of farming 
community in interior China. The life of the peasants is characterised by 
the use of traditional farming techniques on rather fertile land and under 
strong pressure of population. In these fundamental ways Luts’un 
represents, in miniature, traditional China (Fei Hsiao-tung 1945: 19). 
 
In all of Fei’s studies of the different villages this fact was clear. And this was the social 
fact around which the Chinese social system had always been built. The traditional self-
sufficiency of the Chinese peasant holds true at this point as well. 
 
It should be constantly borne in mind that a large part of the farmer’s 
consumption is of products he supplies himself and that commercial 
transactions involving farm products are, in general, a minor part of the 
peasant’s economic activities. Only those who are wage earners and 
                                                 
54 This, of course, also relates to the Han adoption of Confucianism as the natural choice for ordering 
society.  
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those who have not enough rice depend on the market for their food 
supplies (Fei Hsiao-tung 1945: 106). 
 
In one section describing the selling of land Fei leaves the reader with a feeling that it 
generally is not done. The land is part of the family, a part of its identity. One woman 
explained that “land is the foundation of a family, that it secures not only one’s own 
living but the living of future generations” (Fei Hsiao-tung 1945: 128). This same 
woman goes on to talk about how the villagers have experienced a lot and found that 
land is all that lasts. People will sometimes sell land at the death of the head of the 
family. This generally pertains to the planned for residue to be set aside after the land 
has been divided between his sons. If the sons can not finance the funeral they may sell 
this residue because “a decent ceremony for a dead ancestor is considered more 
important than the prosperity of the living descendents” (Fei Hsiao-tung 1945: 125). 
This is purely Confucian in its filial piety; about as traditional - in the Chinese sense of 
that term - as it gets. 
 
In Chinese Village Close-up Fei draws a brief comparison of the individual in the 
Chinese society of the time as opposed to individuals of other, non-agrarian types of 
societies.  
 
In a mobile community, nomadic or industrial, an individual has his own 
locus. He moves about by himself and acquires his social status on his own 
behalf. But for a settled peasant, it seems that all of his activities are bound 
to the group. The family is a self-sufficient and self-supporting group, in 
which he maintains his existence and perpetuates his kind. It is the center  
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from which his relations, kinship, local and professional, ramify (Hsiao-tung 
1983: 126). 
 
The individual was far more tightly bound into his figuration in this traditional rural 
Chinese society, as opposed to modern societies, reflecting the fact that while change 
may have occurred, the civilizing process had not yet progressed very far. 
 
Differentiation remains one of the most accessible and effective measures of change in 
social structure across time. It is true that there was some limited trade with the outside 
world through temporary markets or the nearest market town  but a majority of the 
needs of the people of any given village were met through the activities of the people in 
the village itself, and often those of any given household (Fei Hsiao-tung 1945: 47). It 
has also often been true in China that people’s needs have not been met sufficiently, and 
famine has been the result, but this had been due largely to a lack of resources. 
According to Tawney “The fundamental fact, it is urged, is of a terrible simplicity. It is 
that the population of China is too large to be supported by existing resources” (Tawney 
1932: 103). That famine has been a recurring crisis in China is not the issue, however. 
The question is how the majority of the people attempted to meet whatever needs they 
may have had. Most of the felt needs that were met had been so almost exclusively 
within a very narrowly defined community.  
 
Feuerwerker, conservatively and with some discretion, says that in terms of gross 
domestic product it appears that there was not any significant positive or negative trend 
in the Chinese economy in the Republican period (Feuerwerker 1977). There were 
certainly some fits and starts due to wartime circumstances but generally the economy  
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remained flat. Output grew slowly, if at all, and per capita income was the same at the 
end of the period as at the beginning. The rural population made up about 75 percent of 
the Chinese population as a whole. Rural agriculture alone accounted for about 65 % of 
national output and if all other aspects (handicrafts, transportation) of the rural sector 
are counted the figure likely moves up over 75% (Feuerwerker 1977). Feuewerker 
further shows that in 1933, 365 million out of 500 million people in China were devoted 
to agriculture in making a living. That represents 73% of the population. Compare this 
to the American situation where at the same time only 21.4% of the working population 
was engaged in agriculture. “To find figures even remotely close to those of China in 
1933, one would need to look at America in 1820 or 1830 when 70% of the labor force 
worked in agriculture” (Feuerwerker 1977: 9). He goes on to say that the occupational 
distribution in China changed little from the Qing through the Republican period. A 
large majority of Chinese households continued to produce virtually all their own food 
and market the rest to meet other needs. 
 
Duara points to changes in differentiation, while at the same time implying that there 
remained relatively little as a whole. “Although there had been a discernible increase in 
the number of families growing commercial crops and in the acreage devoted to 
commercial crops since the late Qing, notably of cotton, agriculture was still basically 
subsistence oriented” (Duara 1988: 18). With regard to cotton what was brought to 
market was only that which was left after subsistence needs had been met. It appears 
that these are changes in the direction of decreasing differentiation, if anything. 
 
Of the numerous studies of the Chinese village, most involve differentiation in one 
fashion or another. Fei Xiaotung did four comprehensive and detailed studies of rural  
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villages between 1936 and 1940 (Fei 1983, Fei 1945). He suggests that there was 
differentiation (he points to some crafts and professional services, as well as some 
subsidiary occupations, and the raising of livestock and subsidiary crops) in these 
villages but, while this was true, in reality it is a case of the differentiation being so 
relatively low that the argument for limited differentiation is only bolstered. These 
villages, where the overall focus was still on agriculture, strongly resembled the 
medieval European villages of Elias’s analysis. In general the Chinese villages, and the 
people in them, remained as always, whether out of desire, necessity, tradition, or some 
combination of the above, quite self-sufficient. The Chinese civilizing process had still, 
two thousand years after the state had formed (in Eliasian terms), not yet gotten past this 
point. The state was making increasingly strenuous efforts to break into and break down 
the local figurations, but to this point the actual impact was limited.  
 
While there were discernible signs of change in the urban scene of China during the 
Republican period, and the state-local society relationship had begun to change, this 
change had not yet broadly effected how and with whom people interacted at the local 
level. Rural China was still very traditional in structure and worldview. As part of this 
traditional social situation the people were very tightly enmeshed in webs of 
relationships within a fairly confined area usually defined by their village boundaries 
and rarely interacted with those outside them. Their figurations rarely extended beyond 
those lines, and when they did, the market town provided the outer limit. In this 
situation the chains of interdependence between people remained traditionally short. 
 
Also related to short chains of interdependence, C. K. Yang notes that the Nationalists 
tried to implement a collective responsibility system throughout China. He argues that  
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the difficulties in doing so were common to many parts of China, Fei apparently noting 
the same thing (Yang 1959: 107). The existing traditional social structure made it very 
difficult for a new social order to be implemented in which different, unnatural social 
relations were forced on the people involved. The people were being asked to interact 
with and depend upon, others with whom they had no normal relationship in the 
traditional system. This presented enormous difficulties, which were commonly noted 
where this collective responsibility system was attempted. Chains of interdependence 
were being artificially stretched, and this did not suit the people it affected. 
 
Fei Xiaotong suggests that while China had no caste system as in India, there was 
virtually no mobility (Fei 1983: 144). The opportunities simply did not exist. They 
might acquire, or sometimes due to unfortunate circumstances lose, bits and pieces of 
land, moving them up or down the social ladder within the village but the same maxim 
whereby any wealth (land) accumulated would be lost through the attrition of 
inheritance in three generations held true during the Republican period as in the past. 
These limits on social mobility entailed a certain limiting effect on geographic mobility 
as well. The average person was tightly bound to his piece of land, for better or worse. 
Fei expands on the issue of mobility: 
 
Moreover, there is no sign of people leaving their land in search of 
other occupations and meanwhile employing labourers to cultivate the 
land. This is due, first to the low degree of occupational 
differentiation… secondly to the special value attached to land… and 
lastly to the under-development of industry in the town (Fei 1962: 180). 
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As reasons for this lack of mobility he cites both cultural and social factors. Land was 
too important to one’s identity to leave it behind. In addition, there was little else to do 
with oneself, part of the reason for this being the relative lack of industry in the towns. 
 
With the following Fei makes a vital connection between mobility and differentiation 
pointing directly at cultural constraints. 
 
Change of occupation in the village is more difficult than reform of an 
existing industry. No serious attempt has yet been made to find out the 
possibility of introducing new industries to the village besides sheep 
raising. Even the latter is only a supplement to the existing productive 
system and not a change of occupation. Villagers can change their 
occupation only by leaving the village. In other words, occupational 
mobility under the present situation means a mobility of population 
from the village to the town. In the village, those who go out to find 
new occupations are mostly young girls who have not yet entered into a 
fixed social place in the community. Even in this group, such mobility 
has already challenged the traditional kinship relation and the stability 
of the domestic group (Fei 1962: 261). 
 
This amounts to a definitional constraint on differentiation, as well as mobility. In order 
to change occupation one had to leave, but in order to leave one had to violate existing 
social norms which, as we have seen, were quite powerful. The only ones who did were 
those who had not yet been drawn into the figurational web of the village. Unless 
prompted by dire need, few would make the move.  
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Henrietta Harrison refers to Ou Zhenhua, who was on the northern expedition of the 
Nationlist regime as they tried to root out the communists. In passing through numerous 
rural villages Ou noted that,  
 
‘When I talk with them about the affairs of the party-nation, they do not 
know what kind of thing the nation is; when I talk with them about 
party affairs, they also do not recognize what kind of business party 
affairs are. The cause of their ignorance is really that few people leave 
the village and not many study’ (Harrison 2001: 192 citing Ou Zhenhua 
).  
 
Not only was the mobility of the villagers restricted, but their knowledge of things 
beyond the village was quite limited as well. The revolutionaries could not arouse the 
interest of the villagers in their cause mainly because events outside the cellular 
membrane encasing the small communities in which the villagers lived were irrelevant 
to them. For the peasants, the village remained as it had been for over two thousand 
years, a self-contained world in which most of them were born, lived, and died. Only 
what happened within its borders aroused any real interest or was cause for any concern.  
 
Writing early in the Communist period, Yang sums up the traditional nature of 
Republican China in the following words: 
 
The dominant position of the kinship system in this as in other village 
communities stemmed especially from the immobility of the agrarian  
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population… The lack of occupational diversification in the agricultural 
economy and the insulating character of subsistence farming fostered a 
uniform mode of life, enhanced intimate economic and social co-
operation, restricted population mobility, and furthered the internal 
cohesion of the lineage group, the kinship organization (Yang 1959: 
80). 
 
Yang points to the lack of differentiation and mobility as guarantors of the traditional 
system, and this was still largely true during the Republican period. He continues; 
 
The lack of diversified opportunities of employment, characteristic of 
an agrarian economy, forced sons to follow in their father’s footsteps, a 
process which had gone on for over thirty generations for both the 
Wong and Lee clans... In Nanching, kinship relations represented the 
paramount force tying the individual into a tightly-knit organization 
beyond which he contracted few direct and intimate social bonds (Yang 
1959b: 80-81). 
 
Lastly he points to this traditional social situation as being characteristic of all of China, 
and not just a local phenomenon. Even as there appears to have been a relative lack of 
mobility, however, from Yang’s perspective there was also a trend of change 
specifically in the areas of economics, education and mobility. “All of these had 
profound effects on the attitudes of youth and acted to awaken the interest of the young 
in affairs of thinking which diminished the traditional strength of family ties” (Yang 
1959: 169).   
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Guanxi 
Though the word is not used much in the literature with regard to this period, guanxi 
existed during Republican China – at least in its traditional form. The traditional social 
structure prevalent in Republican China generally only allowed for guanxi relations 
with others within one’s highly localized figuration. In this sense, these relations as 
described serve as evidence that the traditional social structure had not yet broken down, 
that Eliasian chains of interdependence had not yet extended to the degree they soon 
would.  
 
Fei Xiaotong says that exchange is “necessary wherever there is specialization of 
production” (Fei 1962: 240). The specialization that he was talking about, of course, 
was quite limited; though obviously in his opinion there was enough to require 
exchange relationships.  
 
The longer the time involved and the more roundabout the transfer of 
goods and services, the stronger are the social ties in the group. The 
exchange of goods or services is a concrete expression of social ties. 
Where obligations can be fulfilled only over a long period of time the 
individuals involved tend to feel more strongly their social relationship. 
This is in consequence one of the cohesive forces of the group. (Fei 
1962: 241). 
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These are clearly reciprocal ties involving elements of affect and in this sense can 
appropriately be described as guanxi relations. The exchange involved is one of the 
binding elements for the group. 
 
A similar type of exchange is found in larger social groups such as 
extended kinship groups and neighbourhood groups. Neighbours in the 
village are often allowed to take things from each other for 
consumption or other use in case of need. Within certain limits a man is 
glad to be useful to his neighbour (Fei 1962: 241-242). 
 
The relations between these socially more distant people were developed and 
maintained through the reciprocal exchange of goods and services, through guanxixue-
type activity, but the chains of interdependence were still quite short. As guanxi is 
practised within existing social ties and figurations, as it normally was in traditional 
China, it might be thought of as simply an inherent part of the existing social system.  
 
Society was still very much ordered by traditional mores by the end of the Republican 
Period. Having said that, there were also discernable signs of change. It is held by this 
thesis that change was occurring at the local level, in that the social structure was 
changing with the centre assuming ever greater, albeit marginal, control over the 
locality. The question then, is whether or not these changes were in fact effecting the 
social relations, the figurations, of local society. The answer to this question seems at 
this point to be a guarded yes. The tenuousness of this change should not be understood 
as representing a problem for Eliasian theory in that social change for Elias is a gradual  
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process. The fact is that the state was successfully intruding into local affairs on a scale 
not tolerated since the Qin, and the local social structure was changing.  
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Chapter Eight - Intensification of the Assault on the Traditional Social 
Order under the Communists  
 
The ascension to power of the Communist regime owes at least some of its success to 
the impact of previous regimes and events on the local order. “From an institutional 
perspective, the success of political mobilization in the countryside appears to have 
been facilitated by the decline of traditional arrangements” (Kau 1974: 262). Kau goes 
on to point out that the traditional order had been shaken, that by the third decade of the 
century “the authority of the village gentry and clan heads had so declined that they 
were powerless to prevent the distressed peasants from accepting the new and 
compelling concepts of moral legitimacy and political leadership introduced by the 
Communists” (Kau 1974: 263).  
 
Yang affirms that change was in the air even at the local level (though he is referring 
primarily to the urban environment) by the first decade of Communist rule. He asserts 
that filial piety, probably the most basic tenet of the Confucian social system, had been 
under attack for some time by the middle of the twentieth century, with the clear 
implication that this assault had had some very real effects. 
 
Thus, filial piety, once the most emphatically stressed value in the 
traditional social order for over two thousand years, was subjected to 
open challenge in the 1920’s, gradually lost its sacred and binding 
character among the modern intellectuals by the 1930’s, and, by the 
time the Communists became the ruling power, was publicly discredited  
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by them as feudalistic, designed for the exploitation of the young (Yang 
1959a: 91). 
 
The important question is how all of this had effected social relations on a day to day 
basis. Yang’s understanding of this is inadvertently Eliasian.  
 
With its structural system weakened and its functional importance 
reduced, the kinship organization no longer serves as the strategic core 
of the social order. Nor is the emerging social order able to function 
with a dominant kinship system, for the rapidly developing social 
pattern is no longer composed of a loose conglomeration of 
compartmentalised local societies in which a strong kinship system is a 
stabilizing asset, but is based on a national system of functional 
interdependence of the local units and centralized control, a system in 
which a strong and dominant kinship organization would have a 
disruptive influence. (Yang 1959: 20). 
 
This, again, represents the situation as it existed within the first ten years of 
the Communist assumption of power. These trends, as has been elaborated, 
were destined to continue under the Communists. The functional importance 
of the old order had been ‘reduced’ by this time and would be further reduced 
in coming years. For the Communists, modernity could not be achieved with 
the old order in place. For this reason, further change in this order became a 
necessary part of the broader intended transformation. The kinship system 
was to be the sacrificial lamb. With the new assertion of control and authority  
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of the Communist regime a system of functional interdependence on a 
national level, as opposed to atomized local self-sufficiency, was the intended 
goal, and according to Yang, the emerging reality. In Elias’s terms, the centre 
was taking increasing control over the social functions of the locality.  
  
Furthermore “the Maoist strategy was based not only on an insight into the 
revolutionary potentialities of the peasantry but also on the realization that… 
state power was weakest in the vast swamplike countryside” (Schwartz 1966: 
190). It was here that Mao focussed his efforts at getting new recruits and 
consolidating his power base. Communist rule subsequently carried this 
attack on the traditional order relentlessly forward as they rent local Chinese 
society with at times catastrophic upheaval for three decades. This came with 
two major policy drives, under the first of which there seemed to be a 
constantly shifting revolutionary struggle in itself. 
 
In the 1950s it was plunged into revolutionary change, in which all of 
the former political institutions were overturned and the land tenure 
system was destroyed and replaced by collectives. Every village in 
China was dramatically affected by the two decades of at times radical 
Party programs that lasted until after Mao’s death in 1976. As is well 
known, in an extraordinary turnabout a second transformation ensued 
under Deng (Unger 2002: 1). 
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Harrison sets the tone for describing Communist efforts at overhauling Chinese society. 
She touches on thoroughgoing reform in agriculture, taxes, business, and education, 
basically all of Chinese society.  
 
Land reform destroyed both the corporate structures of rural society and 
the power of local elites. Communist activists, who mainly came from 
poor backgrounds, were placed in positions of power, but remained 
heavily dependent on the Communist Party and local officials. Thus 
traditional rural power structures were replaced by a structure that was 
effectively controlled by the central government. (Harrison 2001: 233).  
 
Where the Republicans before them had used many of the existing local power holders, 
and attempted to draw them into the state apparatus, the Communist regime was 
replacing traditional authority with its own based on an entirely new dynamic – that of 
the Party. In so doing they were attempting to put the state firmly in control of the local 
social situation by integrating local society into the state. This effort had clear Eliasian 
implications as “government cadres and party activists formed a new power structure 
responsive to central government control… By these means the party was able to take 
control of local society to a much greater degree than any previous Chinese 
government” (Harrison 2001: 233). 
 
The education system was forced to undergo a very similar process. The regime was 
focussed on eliminating the networks of the traditional power holders in the interest of 
destroying their power base. They sought nothing less than the complete overhaul of  
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traditional society in favour of its modern counterpart. The old was to be destroyed in 
order to usher in the new. 
 
Destroying of the Foundations of the Traditional Order  
Land Reform 
In 1947 there was a violent reallocation of land in Communist held territories. The 
peasants were generally happy with this effort: “After this ‘fanshen’ (turnover) that 
touched almost every corner of China, millions of family-based farms were created and 
the ancient family-based LAP was restored on a massive scale” (Wang 1998: 94). This 
forced reapportioning of what had always been China’s most valuable resource was 
virtually universal, and while its effects might seem to be a reversion to more traditional 
ways, it must be remembered that this was a forced change made by the central state, 
and with this the state was effectively assuming command of the nation’s most basic 
resource, land. “Through this land-reform campaign, the power of the local elite was 
effectively broken in each village, and its place taken by a new leadership of poorer 
peasants loyal to the Party” (Unger 2002: 7-8). As the state effectively took over control 
of the land, the peasant’s most basic resource, local society was being integrated into the 
state. This was the beginning of a trend of the central government reaching ever deeper 
into village life that would continue for most of the next three decades.  
 
Collectivization  
Shortly thereafter, the party changed policy, but in the process further entrenched the 
already initiated trends with the same tradition-breaking, control-oriented direction in 
mind. “To make the new, relatively egalitarian peasant smallholdings economically 
viable, seasonal mutual-aid groups were soon established under the Party’s guidance;  
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and these gradually were shaped over the following years into agricultural producer 
cooperatives, each containing about two dozen families” (Unger 2002: 8). With this 
change toward collectivization the Communist Party was continuing to assert ever 
greater control over local society, hence further integrating it into the state. The Party 
had further change in the same direction in mind.  
 
The CCP decided to adopt the Soviet-style agriculture collectivization. 
Mao very quickly and very impatiently began in 1954-5 to alter the 
restored family-based LAP and thus the overall Chinese organizational 
structure in the rural areas by launching ‘collectivization’ campaigns 
among the peasants… In literally a matter of months, five hundred 
million peasants were collectivized (Wang 1998: 94).  
 
Remoulding local society in this fashion forced people into groupings that were alien to 
the people therein. The important points from an Eliasian perspective are that peasants 
were now interacting with different others in a different fashion, and the control of the 
distribution of resources was now in the hands of the collectives, or more appropriately, 
the state. The head of the family/clan/lineage was no longer making those decisions, this 
fact forcing people to interact with different others in different ways within their 
figurations.
55 “Collectivization not only entailed an entirely new system of property 
ownership. It also gave rise to new types of work relations… this dramatically reshaped 
social relationships in many thousands of villages” (Unger 2002: 7). 
 
                                                 
55 That the structural change was to a large degree achieved, and without fomenting a revolution in the 
process, may serve as an indication that what actually happened might not have been as drastic a change 
as it on the surface appears, and/or that the society was more malleable in adapting to social change than 
it had been in the past. These issues will not be explored in this thesis.  
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It also brought the state boldly into individual households (Unger 2002: 7). 
Collectivization therefore had a broad impact on local social relations at all levels. An 
important aspect of this was the competitive relations among the villagers. With the near 
elimination of private property, competition was reduced to nil.  
 
In 1957, China’s central leadership decided it was time to kick-start their society into 
communism. This new ‘movement’ was dubbed the ‘Great Leap Forward.’ The basic 
notions under-girding it were anathema (as were most of the reforms to this point) to 
cultural norms that had not yet disappeared to the degree apparently supposed by 
leadership. “A major theme in the movement was to consolidate the ‘unified’ or 
‘centralized’ leadership of the CCP, through the state, over all aspects of the Chinese 
polity, economy, and social life, even people’s minds” (Wang 1998: 103). This 
represented, in Eliasian terms, integration on a colossal scale; this coming from a 
regime in a society where the centre had historically stayed as aloof as possible from the 
local environment. 
 
“In April of 1958 the first ‘commune’ was proclaimed” (Unger 2002: 8).  
 
Property rights over land and other ‘means of production,’ even some 
consumer items, were defined on a commune (formerly xian or 
township) basis. Labor was also allocated in an authoritarian way by the 
commune instead of the village-based collectives… Mao envisioned the 
communes as the basic cells of the PRC: self-containing and self-
sustaining complexes performing the roles of industry, agriculture,  
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commerce, education, military, and social life. The new units often had 
forty thousand to fifty thousand people each (Wang 1998: 95). 
 
These were substantial social organizations and they were, in virtually every regard, 
under central control. In this case the state was assuming direct control over the 
distribution of resources even down, in many cases, to consumer items. This was 
completely unprecedented. The family and the village were losing control over all those 
aspects of life that had for millennia made them the core units of Chinese society. This 
change in traditional figurations brings Elias firmly into the equation. With the resultant 
changing dependencies, further changes in social relations could not be far behind.  
 
It appears that Mao’s vision had the communes taking over as the fundamental social 
unit of Chinese society. The most important Eliasian point here is that ultimately the 
individual was no longer dependent upon his family or village, but in a growing sense 
was forced to look to the state in meeting his daily needs. The tight chains of 
interdependence traditionally enmeshing him in his native village community were 
being torn apart. The primary figuration of the average individual was forcibly 
reorganized as he was being reintegrated into the larger state. Unger refers to one 
important aspect when he says that where the people had been oriented toward the 
market town in terms of selling grain, now things had changed: “after the Mao era 
collectives were established, produce was sold directly to the state, and only one or two 
people in each production team needed to be assigned to venture into the market town to 
deliver it” (Unger 2002: 21). Traditional relational priorities were being realigned to fit 
an unnatural model foisted upon existing cultural forms, and it was not a comfortable 
fit.   
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Retrenchment 
The Great Leap Forward / Commune experiment had to be abandoned a few years later. 
The dislocations resulting from collectivization and the Great Leap were so severe that 
people had to be relocated in significant numbers to relieve the stress. “The disastrous 
consequences of Mao Tse-Tung’s Great Leap Forward movement (1957-61) forced 
massive numbers of starving peasants to flee to the cities” (Li 1993: 146). Most of the 
movement, however, was policy driven. “Chronic shortages and massive unemployment 
began to threaten the CCP regime… In the end, by mid-1963, more than 19.4 million 
state employees and 24 million urban hukou holders were relocated to the countryside” 
(Wang 1998: 103). Many of those relocated to the countryside at the state’s bidding had 
never previously set foot in a village.  
 
In addition, “Mess halls were disbanded and small family plots of land were restored… 
In terms of value extraction and labor allocation, however, the communes and the 
brigades (a large village or a few small villages) still had tremendous authority until 
1978-9” (Wang 1998: 95). Basically, local social units were ‘re-allowed’ to a limited 
degree as the artificially perverted social relations were de-emphasized, but control of 
resources and their distribution was not. Authority over those aspects of society was 
largely retained by the state, and local social units continued to be tightly integrated into 
the state. In this sense the trends Elias highlights continued uninterrupted. 
 
At harvest time, after paying taxes, grain and other essentials were 
distributed on a per capita basis to meet everyone’s needs. The remainder 
was then distributed according to points accumulated… In many ways, the  
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system looked more like a traditional community-based LAP with only a 
certain communist political ‘flavor’… The CCP-state tried to have more 
direct control over the peasants through the cadres in the communes and 
below (Wang 1998: 96). 
 
After all the difficulties created by land reform and the Great Leap Forward, the 
reorganization of the 60s has been described by Unger as a more realistic way of doing 
things (Unger 2002: 9). Mao largely facilitated this change by getting out of the way. 
“From 1961 Mao drew back into himself, quizzical in mood, bowing to political and 
economic reality” (Terrill 1980: 289). The most obvious example of the more pragmatic 
approach at this time was “when Deng and his colleagues were looking for ways to 
alleviate the disaster” and they came up with the household responsibility system (Starr 
1997: 115). This overall trend lasted effectively until the early eighties and, while 
becoming more restrained in some areas, allowed the central government even greater 
control in many others. It seems “this new administrative structure enabled Beijing to 
penetrate the villages and rural households with new programs and new values” (Unger 
2002: 9). The important point remains that the cadres represented the state as they 
carried out their duties, and they were still in control of rural life. The state had thus 
assumed, and continued to hold in increasing measure, control over local figurations in 
terms of the resources available on a day to day basis. The leadership allowed some 
limited freedoms but,  
 
at the same time the national leaders were unwilling to give the team 
memberships enough leeway in figuring out what crops to grow or 
enough say on how their own teams and villages were run. The system  
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ultimately was top-down. The belief at the helm of the Party was that 
…The villages needed to be controlled and prodded for their own 
good… The consequence was that… the production teams sat at the 
very bottom of an administrative hierarchy, and they were dominated 
by a top-down chain of Party rule that reached from Beijing into each 
and every village (Unger 2002: 11). 
 
In the end, even decisions about what crops were grown where and when were made 
from the centre. In fact, “villages had options to shape their own policies only in those 
spheres that the central authorities did not decide to dominate” (Unger 2002: 11). The 
state had as much control as it chose to have, and, in this sense, was virtually 
unchecked. Unger further suggests that the Party centre became even more assertive 
with time. This level of infiltration by the state into local society was unprecedented and 
destined to have serious ramifications. 
 
With each new assertive move from the centre, individuals became further integrated 
into the state apparatus and social relations took on an increasingly extended 
appearance. Peasants were dependent upon the state for decisions regarding food, living 
quarters, employment, movement, and even whether or not they qualified as a ‘good’ 
person. Where in the past (only 50 to 70 years earlier) the peasant had virtually no (or as 
little as possible) contact with a remote state, now their entire lives were dictated from 
above. Another step in this direction was the hukou system initiated in 1960 (Unger 
2002: 22). As part of that; “Every PRC citizen was required to have identification 
papers to have access to land, jobs, social welfare benefits, housing, education, party  
 
296
membership, good-character credentials, and numerous other opportunities”(Wang 
1998: 98).  
 
Control over land, education, and even ‘good character credentials’ are probably the 
most striking aspects of state control at this point. Land and education have already 
been mentioned, but they represented change in areas that were basic to what China 
traditionally was. The fact that the new government was even attempting to redefine 
what having ‘good character’ meant, and therefore who had it, is the most arresting of 
the points. Having ‘good character’ in a Confucian culture is vital for functioning 
effectively in society, within one’s figuration, and in China is measured and accredited 
primarily in terms of face. There had always been clearly defined and understood 
parameters for establishing and maintaining good character. In that it was so important 
in the Chinese world, it should come as no surprise that the Communist regime 
attempted to claim defining authority over it. The alarming thing is that they were in 
effect attempting to reach down as far as the level of individual identity. Taking aim at 
this characteristic, if the initiative were to be successful, would inevitably impact the 
way people interacted, and at a profound level. It almost seems as though the 
Communist regime was consciously trying to implement a civilizing process and, in a 
sense, that is true.  
 
The hukou system was later legislated and created a rather high wall between rural and 
urban communities (Though policies such as these seem to indicate otherwise, Mao was 
actually in agreement with Marx that the road to socialism entailed “the abolition of the 
distinction between town and country in the socialist and communist future” (Meisner 
1974: 207)). “The hukou system enabled the PRC government to control labor mobility  
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geographically and created very rigid and very contrasting urban-rural dual economic 
and social structures… All urban workers were effectively transformed to be state 
employees” (Wang 1998: 98). This is not to say that there was much mobility prior to 
these measures, but that afterwards it became virtually impossible to change location 
without authorization from the state. “This system effectively restricted migration to the 
cities and allowed the authorities to enforce the relocation of 16 million youths to rural 
areas” (Walder 1989: 410). When the social situation had deteriorated to such an extent 
that the state again felt insecure, it was forced to respond. This second coerced 
relocation would be carried on throughout the Cultural Revolution. It is impossible to 
say what amount of voluntary movement would have been evidenced had the 
Communist government not legislated against it, but it is not difficult to ascertain that 
actual mobility aside from that forced by the government was extremely low during 
Communist rule.  
 
The reach of the state’s tentacles did not end there, as additional devices of control were 
devised which related mainly, though not exclusively, to the cities. New 
“micromechanisms such as dangan (personal dossiers) and danwei (unit) were devised, 
leading to the establishment of an authoritarian state LAP nation wide. A dangan was 
set up for every state employee, required for job-seeking, promotion and advancement” 
(Wang 1998: 98-99). The dangan was national in the mid 50s, applying to “urban 
workers and most rural cadres” (Wang 1998: 99). It followed one for life and effectively 
controlled their destiny. While Wang talks about the dangan primarily in terms of 
labour allocation, the more important point here is, once again, the heightened level of 
control enabled through its use. 
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Being placed in a given danwei, or work unit, was essentially a lifetime assignment as 
well (Wang 1998: 99). “To some extent, the bond between workers and their danwei 
rivaled those within the traditional Chinese family. Instead of having families as the 
cells of the domestic organizational structure, the PRC gradually established the 
danweis in that role.” (Wang 1998: 99). While Wang goes on to say that these danweis 
preserved the old ways by, in effect, replacing the family, from the perspective of this 
thesis this has to be considered an exaggeration, albeit a revealing one. The crucial 
difference that Wang is failing to note here is that while the structural units may have 
resembled the old familial structure, the units were now being determined and 
controlled by the state in a way previously unimaginable. State workers, urban and 
rural, were guaranteed lifetime work and benefits. “In exchange, the workers became 
dependent on their superiors and lost most of their personal mobility and freedom” 
(Wang 1998: 102). And these new fathers, or older brothers, represented the state, the 
new family. 
 
“This nation-based traditional LAP restored the premodern Chinese dom-estic 
organizational structure with a comprehensive and penetrating political power that was 
unprecedented for the central government, which behaved like a traditional Chinese 
father” (Wang 1998: 103). While one might see the structures resulting from reform as 
traditional-like, one must at the same time acknowledge the intrusion of the central state 
into local affairs as opposed to the traditional distance normally assumed between state 
and locality, a distance in fact enabled largely by those very same traditional structures. 
This traditional distance, maintained by previously inviolable cultural norms, had finally 
broken down and the state was clearly moving in to take control of those social 
functions that it had not touched for well over two thousand years. Wang’s analogy to  
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the Chinese father is apt in that traditionally the father was the person to whom the 
greatest filial allegiance was owed and who controlled all of the family’s resources. By 
assuming this position of control in the lives of the peasants, the state was effectively 
breaking the ties binding the people to their normal figurations and hence forcing a 
change in interdependencies. In so doing, as the Chinese state took the place of the 
‘traditional Chinese father,’ further encroaching in local affairs, it was in effect kick-
starting a long stalled Chinese civilizing process. These particular mechanisms would 
remain in force, to a greater or lesser degree, to at least the beginning of the 1980s. 
 
Cultural Revolution 
Initially it had been the ‘Self-Strengthening Movement’ followed by the reform of the 
late Qing, then reform under both the Republicans and the Nationlists. Now the same 
efforts to destroy the traditional Confucian social order continued under the 
Communists first in the form of land reform, then collectivization, followed by The 
Great Leap Forward, and now, finally the Cultural Revolution. From the 1890s through 
the 1970s it had all been a conscious effort aimed at replacing the old with a new social 
organization more amenable to modernization in the interests of enabling China to fend 
off the foreign threat and control her own fortunes. Mao’s ideas on what this 
organization would look like certainly differed from those of the reformers before him, 
but its starting point was basically the same. All of the reform efforts aimed, in the final 
analysis, at breaking down traditional social relations as the first step toward 
modernization. To achieve this goal once and for all, it was felt that radical steps had to 
be taken. When Communist leadership held the initial manoeuvres to be stagnating, 
subsequent actions only became more radical. 
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Next in the line-up of assaults on the traditional order was the Cultural Revolution. 
“Mao’s last decade - from 1966 until his death in 1976 - saw a domestic political 
struggle that convulsed China, constantly amazed the outside world, and achieved 
appalling destruction... directly involving something like 100 million people” (Fairbank 
1992: 383)
56. Mao’s intent through this latest initiative was more or less a continuation 
of the same drive towards modernization initially spurred on by defeat at the hands of 
the West and Japan. Mao seemed to see (among other more personal things) that his 
new Communist bureaucracy was basically just “taking the place of the local elite of 
imperial times. He feared a revival of the ruling class domination of the villagers” 
(Fairbank 1992: 384). It seems that, “Even Mao Tse Tung… apparently failed to 
prevent the crystalization of a new establishment within their society” (Wouters 1977: 
448). Were this to take hold the old social order would simply remain in place, 
obstructing any transition to modernity. In an important sense this amounted to a deep 
unease with the belief that the preconditions for the process of modernization had not 
yet been met but had, in fact, stopped developing. As Grasso et al put it,  
 
the Chairman and many of his supporters believed that revolutionary 
development of all aspects of Chinese society had stagnated. For them, 
China was still mired in enervating traditional cultural conventions – 
customs and habits that were millennia old…What was needed, 
according to Mao, was nothing less than a thorough revamping of 
Chinese culture. By culture Mao was referring not only to how people 
were educated, what they read, how they created their art and music… 
                                                 
56 Valuable insight might be gained by exploring the Cultural Revolution period from a decivilizing 
perspective. This will not be done in this thesis.  
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but also to how people interrelated, what they thought, and even how 
they amused themselves (Grasso 1991: 204). 
 
“The Cultural Revolution lasted nominally three years, from early 1966 to April 1969, 
but many point out that its type of activities really continued for a whole decade to 
1976” (Fairbank 1992: 385). The entire period was one of violence and confusion in 
which authority was attacked in all its forms – except that of Mao, who has been 
appropriately described as ‘an updated emperor’  and in that sense was virtually 
untouchable (Fairbank 1992: 385). In fact, this was the one aspect of traditional culture 
that remained inviolable throughout. “The Chinese conviction that all power should 
reside in the central authority – a fact that is acknowledged by the entire population – 
has been one of the most powerful factors in shaping Chinese history” (Pye 1985: 184). 
But all other aspects of the social order were fair game.  “For four years Communist 
China had no Communist Party, except that which existed within the military. Proud 
youngsters with ‘Red Guard’ bands on their arms and pistols in their belts entered any 
office they wished” (Ladany 1988: 290). In August of 1966 in a party plenum “Mao got 
nominal legality for stirring up a mass movement against revisionism in the party 
establishment. This soon took the form of the Red Guard movement” (Fairbank 1992: 
392). These loyal youth were urged to rebel even against their own families. “The 
official voice in Peking said that the revolutionary youths should rise up against their 
‘bourgeois’ parents” (Ladany 1988: 290). In the past, to curse one’s father was 
punishable by death. Now it was to be rewarded. Nor was the sibling relationship 
spared, with “brothers and sisters finding themselves in fiercely opposed camps” 
(Ladany 1988: 290). Mao’s revolution was intentionally turning all of the old ideas on 
proper social relations on their head.   
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The whole Cultural Revolution movement was aimed primarily at urban areas and “did 
not greatly affect the peasantry except in communes near cities” (Fairbank 1992: 392). 
In Unger’s study he points out that “more than one-third of the villages of 
interviewees… rode out the Cultural Revolution without any serious eruptions from 
below” (Unger 2002: 51). The countryside was not left untouched, however. From 
Unger’s own reckoning, two thirds of those rural interviewees were affected, some 
seriously. A lot of the animosity resulting in violence in the countryside during the 
Cultural Revolution had been manufactured by the Party through class labels (and other 
means) which, of course (and very importantly), crossed family lines. Loyalties were 
continually being realigned toward the centre and away from the family. Then there was 
also the issue of some 18 million  youths who were sent down to the countryside in the 
late 60s and 70s, a policy which was only reversed in 1978 (Unger 2002: 44). They had 
to be housed and fed on very limited resources in an environment in which most of them 
did not belong, further disrupting local social relations. The Cultural Revolution under 
Mao would be the final dart aimed at the traditional order but it was a devastating one. 
 
The primary overriding goal of the Communist regime during the Mao period, and 
especially the Cultural Revolution, was to destroy the social foundations of traditional 
Chinese society. This effort was centred on the assumption of control of local life, a big 
part of which was the control of the distribution of resources. This, of course, dovetails 
well with Eliasian thought. During the 1950s the Communist regime had, according to 
Rozman, replaced the old Confucian order in rural areas with networks of devoted 
people, an ideology persuading those newly appointed party members of the importance 
of  their leadership responsibilities, and aspirations for a career similar to that through  
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the examinations (Rozman 1981: 359). The central government continued this intrusive 
process through the 1960s. “In the 1950s and 1960s the CCP seized control of the levers 
of society, that is, the distribution of such factors as land, labor, income, and education” 
(Rozman 1981: 359). After this the series of campaigns waged against the old order 
merely “tightened the leadership’s grasp over societal resources” (Rozman 1981: 359). 
 
Unger describes an aspect of this social context in a way that may help clarify the extent 
of this penetration. By the 1970s local bureaucrats were no longer taking any initiatives. 
Generally they simply jumped on the then current bandwagon.  
 
They were vying nervously to avoid seeming laggard compared to 
officials in the regions next door... What is striking… is the similarity 
of such bureaucratic responses over vast distances. Even when the Party 
Central Committee did not issue specific national directives, far flung 
villages were forced to shift in the same direction at the same time… 
Nationwide, the same coercive pressures were at work everywhere 
(Unger 2002: 21). 
 
The local Party leadership was dancing to the centre’s tune, often before it had even 
been played, and further orchestrating the lives of the villagers at their command. Later 
in the same publication, Unger mentions how the end of collectivization had been a 
similar unplanned, undirected phenomenon (Unger 2002: 104). This ‘method’ 
frequently led to disastrous consequences in which entire regions, and even the entire 
nation, were involved, through decisions made at the centre that went directly against 
the better judgement of the individuals on the periphery. In terms of penetrating local  
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society, it seems that the government’s efforts were decisive. They had gotten into the 
heads of the entire nation. 
 
Conservative Impact of Communist Policy 
This does not tell the whole story, though. The Communist government, through their 
policies on rural versus urban residence, actually reinforced some aspects of traditional 
culture in that social and physical mobility were, if anything, even more highly 
restricted than in the past. While their stated intent was to smash the old ways through 
their unremitting campaigns and policies, they may in fact have done just the opposite 
in some areas. In terms of mobility the hukou system is a classic example as it tied 
family members to the land, tightly restricting their ability to move anywhere beyond 
the village of their birth. In other words, the Gordian knot of cultural norms in place for 
millennia, but possibly loosening as a result of the previous 50 years of revolution, was 
very effectively re-tightened.  
 
In fact, it is not difficult to argue that during the Maoist period the traditional village 
structure as a whole was reinforced in some ways. “Thus, the deep structure of the old 
lineages was perpetuated. It could even be argued that the solidarity of the traditional 
lineage village was actually reinforced during the Maoist collectivist period” (Potter 
1990: 262). Not only through the hukou system but also with collectivization, many of 
the regime’s policies if not strengthened at least did not break down traditional 
structures as thoroughly as intended.  
 
So the basic structural idea that property should be owned by groups of 
co-resident, patrilineally related men, has persisted unchallenged, and  
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has been the basis for all the collectives implemented in China since 
Liberation. Whatever the form of the collective - whether team, brigade, 
or higher-level cooperative, commune, or, now, lineage village - at its 
core was a group of patrilineally related men owning and managing 
property (Potter 1990: 262). 
 
This understanding, while no doubt containing some truth, misses a very important 
element that this thesis has focussed on. In the newly developing social situation of 
Communist China, the ‘groups’ the Potters refer to were making decisions about the 
distribution of resources at the behest of, and in direct connection with, the central 
government. The control of resources was no longer in the peasants’ hands, and, from 
an Eliasian perspective, this is a crucial point. Those in need of access to and use of 
those resources had now to look to the state in a way never before necessary.  
 
Local Social Relations - An Eliasian Perspective 
That there was change seems clear, but it is also true that there remained a good deal of 
continuity with the traditional past. It is important to point out again that when Yang 
talks about the change that had occurred by the first decade of the Communist period he 
is primarily referring to urban China. There is a ‘disconnect’ regarding the trends 
discussed, between the rural and urban environments in China at this point, and from 
this time forward this disconnect grew. Modernizing trends were definitely making their 
impact on the urban social environment by the beginning of the Communist period, but 
the rural situation at the same time, according to Yang, appears rather different. Here 
“the requirements of an agrarian life, with successful agricultural production as a  
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constant guiding objective, exerted a shaping influence on the village’s socio-economic 
structure” (Yang 1959a: 23).   
 
Since the peasantry constituted over 80% of the nation’s population, it 
is fully understandable that agrarian well-being was of major 
consideration in the social and political principles of the Confucian 
orthodoxy which still dominated the thinking of those in this village 
who were over forty years of age. Thus the agrarian economy had bread 
the characteristics that marked the life of Nanching as well as the 
Chinese national culture of which this village was a part. Of decisive 
importance to the agrarian economy were the land itself and the ways of 
its exploitation which bore the closest relationship to the existence of 
the community (Yang 1959: 23-24). 
 
Social change is implied here, for it was primarily those over forty to whom the 
traditional Confucian orthodoxy applied. Yet the fact is that Confucian orthodoxy 
remained dominant. This was four decades after the 1911 revolution and in this village, 
as well as in Yang’s estimation most others, the inhabitants were still quite traditional in 
many of their orientations. While there had been many more or less spontaneous 
changes to the basic social structure since the revolution, at this point rural people still 
relied heavily on the land for their support. This agrarian life impacted most other areas 
of the life of the peasants, who made up ‘over 80% of the nation’s population.’  
 
This is true with regard to filial piety, the most basic of Confucian virtues, and hence in 
the Chinese case, the family/kinship structure, self-sufficiency, differentiation and  
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integration, and finally mobility and guanxi at the village level, as well as on a national 
basis. All of these areas of course have a direct bearing on our Eliasian analysis. 
Through the first decade of the Communist period, traditional social mores, under attack 
for the past half century, were still operational in rural communities, indicating that the 
modernizing trend obvious in the cities had not yet impacted the countryside to the same 
degree. As long as the traditional social structure remained dominant, the civilizing 
process that Elias described was stymied, as it had been for two millennia. Immense 
pressure had been exerted on those social relations central to this process, but to that 
point they had not broken, and the traditional order was still in place. 
 
There is ample evidence to indicate that through the 1970s considerable 
continuity with the past remained. Where else has modern growth 
proceeded so far with so little urbanization, or with so little movement 
of individuals away from their longstanding genealogical roots, or with 
so great a state-enforced hold over the individual allotted to the still 
powerful family unit? Persistent traditional factors of this sort give a 
distinctive cast to China’s course of modernization and enhance the 
significance of the past (Rozman 1981: 353). 
 
It appears that much of the traditional ways were still in force at the end of the decade 
despite the often dramatic incursions by the state since the early 1950s. The revolution 
may indeed have reached the countryside, but it had not yet managed to transform it as 
these voices from the past had not yet been silenced. “Traditional China has not passed. 
It is present, although in many respects it has been covered by modifications and by 
novelties... The essential pattern of social structure is functioning as ever” (Fei 1983:  
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146). The comparison is to the same village in the 1930s, from the perspective of the 
1980s. Clearly in Fei’s opinion the Confucian social structure had not been eradicated 
and/or replaced. It was still what ordered society, whether on, or underneath, the 
surface. 
 
While there is plenty of evidence that the traditional nature of Chinese society 
continued, and even that it had been reinforced, it is also clear that significant changes 
were affected by the Communist regime, as well as those regimes immediately 
preceding them. These changes had especially impacted the city. In the countryside, the 
old, traditional ways were still, to an uncertain degree, intact, however, even if as Fei 
says, they were submerged. Of vital importance for an Eliasian analysis, however, is the 
fact that the majority of the peasants had been living and working within new and 
different figurational patterns for much of the communist period. Their relational world 
had been altered, albeit forcibly. 
 
One thing that the Communists clearly affected was the peasants’ relationship to the 
land, at least in the sense of the peasants not being in control of the land which they 
inhabited or the ground they tilled
57. In that the peasant’s relation to the land was so 
central to traditional Chinese society, this change was significant.  The land was now 
‘collectively’ owned by the state and very little, if any, of the produce from it actually 
belonged to the tiller of the soil. In this sense the state was intruding into local society in 
the profoundest of ways. As a result, the changes made by the Communists impacted the 
local web of relations, the primary figurations, starting with the family. The family head 
was no longer responsible for those vital resource decisions on which everyone had 
                                                 
57 That they still largely relied on the land goes without saying, but their relationship to it was definitely 
altered.  
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depended for millennia. In this most fundamental way people had to look elsewhere for 
direction and sustenance. While the detail is different, the course of events in general 
terms fits the Eliasian understanding of a civilizing process. Control over the 
distribution or resources, including the land itself, had been assumed by the centre, and 
local figurations were being affected. 
 
Integration 
Stockman, drawing on Habermas with regard to integration, says that as society 
becomes more complex “systemic modes of societal integration... become ‘uncoupled’ 
from the lifeworld, the world of interpersonal interaction governed by shared language 
and shared morality in which individual identities are formed” (Stockman 2000: 208 
citing Habermas). This had not happened in China to that point - at least not to 
anywhere near the same degree as occurred elsewhere. “Utilizing this approach, it is 
possible to suggest that in Chinese society systems became only partially uncoupled 
from the lifeworld” (Stockman 2000: 208). They never became further uncoupled 
because the social system that was so successful for so long simply did not allow them 
to. China’s social structure only allowed for change within given boundaries. In fact, 
with the system operating effectively, as it did for most of Chinese imperial history, it 
worked very much against the uncoupling of the lifeworld and systemic modes of 
integration, and to the promotion of the opposite. Integration on a broader statewide 
level was not likely until this traditional social system was broken down.  
 
As has been noted, the Communist regime made strenuous efforts in this direction, with 
significant success. The main thrust of most of Communist policy was geared toward 
the integration of local society into the state. In their view this was central to the whole  
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modernizing effort. As a result, peasants were forced to look to the state far more than 
in the past in ensuring their own subsistence, in that the state had effectively assumed 
control over the distribution of resources. The state had successfully intruded in the 
local life of the peasants and in so doing, integrated the peasants into the overarching 
state apparatus on a scale likely surpassing that of even the Qin. This was so even 
though traditional structures were still in place in many areas. 
 
Differentiation, Chains of Interdependence 
It has already been noted that differentiation had not progressed very far through the 
Republican period despite the efforts to change rural social organization. According to 
Fei, “the traditional forces operating in this institution are strong enough to resist any 
significant changes” (Fei 1962: 118). In Fei Xiaotong’s study of Luts’un in 1945 he 
points out the relatively high self-sufficiency and low differentiation of the community 
(Fei 1945). His other studies suggest the same relative lack of differentiation, though he 
does suggest that there was some. 
 
Given the drive to destroy China’s traditional ways and become a modern state, more 
differentiation might have been expected under the Communists than was evidenced.  
“Mao’s emphasis on the need to build socialism on the ethical principles of selflessness, 
self-reliance, persistence, honesty, and faith… is evidence of a social theory which, 
consonant with Confucian traditions, prefers to operate at the level of the lifeworld 
rather than that of systems” (Stockman 2000: 215). Ironically, the very traditional social 
structure that the Communists were tying to break down and relegate to history, they in 
fact reinforced in ways that worked against further differentiation. “In some respects 
revolutionary de-differentiation reinforced pre-revolutionary tendencies to a  
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homogenous social structure, while post-revolutionary developments have begun to 
result in increased social complexity” (Stockman 2000: 226). This was done largely 
through the Communist regime’s tight restriction on mobility by virtue of the hukou 
system, and the equally tight restriction of competition through the collectives and the 
virtual elimination of private property. The contrast with the ‘post revolutionary’ 
environment could not be clearer. An additional contributing effect of the hukou, was 
the strict separation of rural from urban areas. Qian says that even before the advent of 
the hukou system, and certainly after, “the current of rural-urban migration in China… 
was almost totally stopped” (Qian 1996: 53). What differentiation did occur did so 
mainly in the cities where traditional social relations were hardest hit and industrial 
development was focussed. These changes were very significant but did not generally 
translate directly to the countryside where the overwhelming majority of the people 
were and where the traditional order largely continued to hold sway. This entailed 
relatively low levels of differentiation. The people continued to be, for the most part, 
tied to the land, albeit at this point through state control.  
 
There seem to have been two countervailing trends; one directed intentionally towards 
greater differentiation and one unintentionally away from differentiation and towards 
more traditional social characteristics. Much of what was happening would seem to 
represent, from an Eliasian perspective, stumbling blocks to the civilizing process but 
with the state assuming such direct control over the distribution of resources, as well as 
most of the rest of local life, local social relations were coming under great stress. As a 
whole, there was an increase in the level of differentiation in the villages. The primary 
activity of the Chinese people remained overwhelmingly agriculture and they remained 
remarkably self-sufficient by modern standards. The conclusion must therefore be that,  
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yes, an increase in differentiation had occurred, but that it had remained at a relatively 
low level up to 1978. 
 
With the dramatic shifts in social relations, whether forced or not, the chains of 
interdependence between the peasants can be said to have extended. This is true in a 
technical sense due both to the integration of local society into the state, hence forcing 
new dependencies, and the increase in differentiation, even if only marginal. Peasants 
had to look farther down an extended chain to see all the people upon whom they 
depended for a living. This was necessarily true in that the state had assumed control of 
the distribution of resources at the local level. Peasants were dealing with state 
representatives, cadres, in a chain of command running all the way to the centre, as 
opposed to ending with their family head or at the village boundary. This runs very 
much parallel to the extending chains of interdependence in the European context that 
Elias describes. The peasants had to interact with different sets of people in different 
ways than in the past. This was especially true during the collective era and later during 
the Cultural Revolution when the youth were sent down to the countryside (Mosher 
1983: 146).  
 
The following quote from Lin provides another indication that, starting shortly after the 
revolution and continuing with the reforms, there was both a growth in differentiation 
and extending chains of interdependence in China, and that it was in some ways similar 
to the German situation described by Elias.  
 
The massive absorption of rural laborers into the urban workforce in the 
1950s further increased the social networks between rural and urban  
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areas. A survey conducted by the policy research office of the CCP's 
Secretariate in 1972 revealed that 70% of those who joined the urban 
workforce before 1957 were recruited from the countryside… The local 
personal contacts that they have accumulated over time also provide a 
major stepping stone for their relatives in the countryside to explore 
access to the loci of state authority in urban areas (Lin 2002: 70-71).  
 
In the above, the connection between differentiation, mobility (in this case forced), 
lengthening chains of interdependence, and guanxi relations is evident. Social relations 
were changing due mainly to policy dictated from the centre, however. These changes 
were, therefore, neither spontaneous nor natural. For this reason, it has to be judged that 
the actual lasting effects on social relations at the local level remain uncertain up to 
1978. An examination of the Post-Opening period will show that these social relations 
were indeed impacted significantly, and that this impact was what allowed for much of 
the change that has occurred since the opening. 
 
Mobility 
There is an important distinction in the way that migration must be viewed in China 
under Communism.  “In Western societies human migration is usually treated as a 
matter of individual choice. People are free to move elsewhere in search of better 
socioeconomic opportunities... Regional redistribution under Mao involved a type of 
forced migration” (Li 1993: 148). Under the Communists it was never a matter of 
choice but of compulsion. Mobilization of the masses was a key component of Mao’s 
social engineering project. According to Mao, “traditional Chinese religious and family 
doctrines had seriously handicapped his country’s industrial development” (Li 1993:  
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150). If Mao was to lead his country into a new era, these traditional ways would have 
to be broken. “The way to do this was to effect a massive redistribution of the 
population” (Li 1993: 150). Outside of this program, voluntary movement was 
proscribed to an exceptional degree. Through the tight restriction of mobility the 
Communist Party kept the peasant masses on the land, where they had been for 
centuries. Essentially, what mobility there was, through the forced mass shifting of 
population was thoroughly controlled by the state. Aside from that, the almost complete 
lack of voluntary mobility was also enforced by the state. Where culture had been the 
determining factor in the past (and this factor had likely not been eliminated), once 
again, the state had inserted itself as a decisive force. 
 
Guanxi  
Guanxi relations had been restricted to traditional figurations in the past. This was part 
of the nature of the traditional reciprocal social ties that grew out of the Confucian 
order. If the Communist efforts to destroy the old social order had had any effect on 
social relations, one might expect these reciprocal ties to change as well. If these social 
ties had been broken, or at least loosened, one might expect a corresponding 
lengthening of these reciprocal dependencies.  
 
Andrew Walder talks about instrumental-personal ties: “it refers to an exchange 
relationship that mingles instrumental intentions with personal feeling” (Walder 1986: 
178). From the interviews he conducted it becomes clear that these types of 
relationships existed in the fifties and sixties after the communists came to power, as 
they had in the Republican period before, but became considerably more prominent 
with the advent of the Cultural Revolution initiated in 1966, and as the 1970s  
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progressed. Mei Hui Yang says that guanxi is indeed linked to the Cultural Revolution, 
but is clear in reaffirming the point made earlier that the Chinese gift economy comes 
from the more ancient gift and etiquette practises founded in the Confucian social order 
(Yang 1994, 208-9).  
 
 Walder quotes one informant: 
 
Workers could use all kinds of methods to get around regulations. After 
the Cultural Revolution there was a back door for everything, and it 
became very serious… Before the Cultural Revolution things were 
generally run according to strict procedures… [Q: Why did the situation 
change after the Cultural Revolution?] Conditions were like this: wages 
were low, material things were scarce. So people used whatever 
advantage they had, given their position in society… [People] were 
willing to exchange favors with others and cultivate guanxi to live 
easier, and for mutual advantage. [Q: Didn’t this kind of thing occur 
before the Cultural Revolution, too?] Of course… you can’t say that it 
didn’t occur at all. It’s just that before the Cultural Revolution it was on 
a smaller scale, and less open… But after the Cultural Revolution it 
became much more widespread, much more open, and used commonly 
in everyday situations. People say that after the Cultural Revolution, 
ganqing replaced policies [yi ganqing daiti zhengce]” (Walder 1986: 
211 parentheses his). 
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As a result of Cultural Revolution policies it became more difficult to acquire scarce 
resources and, in general, to get things done. In order to fulfil needs Gold says “one’s 
network ideally should contain everyone from store clerks who control scarce 
commodities, to cadres who have final say over such things as housing allotments, 
residence permits, job assignments and political evaluations needed for Youth League 
or Party membership” (Gold 1985: 661). In other words, anyone who controlled any 
kind of needed or desired resource was a logical target for cultivating guanxi relations 
with. This situation made officials even more powerful and important than they 
otherwise would have been. Guanxixue was rapidly being recognized as a valuable skill 
in manipulating those balances of power (social relations) involving increasingly scarce 
resources and the people in the controlling position were now almost exclusively 
government officials. “Officials in these communities therefore not only had a 
formidable political apparatus at their disposal, but they also had wide discretion in the 
distribution of housing, consumer items, wage raises, and promotion” (Walder 1989: 
411). As the government had taken over these functions from the family and the 
locality, the need arose for cultivating relationships with formerly irrelevant others in 
the interest of acquiring needed resources. This represented a significant extension of 
chains of interdependence at the local level. This same process of extending chains of 
interdependence directly involved guanxi activity, making guanxi a good barometer for 
the civilizing process. Guanxi activity grew into a broad based phenomenon that cannot 
be called new, but that was ironically encouraged by the Communist system. Walder 
continues:  
 
Moreover, the dependence upon administrative distribution at the 
workplace, along with official discretion in allocating goods and  
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material scarcity of the period, gave rise to an active subculture of 
personal ties, upon which people relied for the attainment of scarce 
goods, services, and opportunities (Walder 1989: 411). 
 
From 1949 to 1978, resort to a gift economy of sorts became more common, largely due 
to material deficiencies caused by the Communist system and its policies. It might be 
suggested that this same phenomenon had probably occurred at other times in the past, 
when resources were scarce, and while this may be true in some sense, it must be 
remembered that the government had never before been in this position in the local 
community. The Party was in control, at the local level, of whatever resources there 
were. If one wanted access to those resources, the path lay through Communist Party 
officials who were often, though not always, different from those with whom locals 
would normally deal. After 1978, this same ‘gift’ economy transformed into something 
much more broad-based and far-reaching. At this time, as will be seen, there was a 
coarser, more instrumental form, first in the cities, according to Yang, and then in the 
rural areas as well (Yang 1994). And since the time of Yang’s seminal work on the 
subject, it has expanded considerably further. 
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Chapter Nine - Withdrawal of the State from Local Society: Post-Opening 
Period  
 
Introduction 
It has already effectively been shown in this thesis that during the course of the past 
century there has been an intensifying struggle within Chinese culture and society to 
overthrow the traditional social order. This attack was focussed on social relations at the 
local, primarily village level, and on the traditional family. It was carried out ostensibly 
in the interest of modernization, but for all practical purposes survival was its root 
motivation. The traditional order proved highly resilient and resistant to change, 
however, and, as has also been established, in 1978 it was still widespread across most 
of rural China. 
 
The question being addressed is whether this century-long assault on the old order 
actually had any lasting impact on social relations at the local level. It must be 
determined whether the figurations of the peasant masses had been impacted in a 
fashion exemplifying a civilizing process. In previous chapters we saw that some 
change in these areas did seem apparent, but this assessment has to be judged 
inconclusive. This change was largely top down and in that sense superficial. For 
example, resulting from the ‘Four modernizations’, “marriage and the family have 
shown significant changes. It is necessary to point out here, however, that some of these 
changes are new, but some are merely the resurgence of ‘traditional’ patterns that had 
been forced to hide until now” (Tsai 1989: 235). There had been changes in mate 
selection techniques and divorce had increased significantly, but with a nod to  
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traditionalism, family size had also increased. In other words, both a re-emergence of 
the traditional, and shifts in a civilizing direction are evidenced. 
 
In approaching this question, the thesis returns to some of Elias’s central concepts 
applied to the period after 1978 when state control was reduced. Examining an 
analogous development in the black American ghetto, Waquant comes to the conclusion 
that the problems there were directly related to the withdrawal of the state. This is his 
explanation for what he refers to as a decivilizing process in that environment. He 
suggests that Elias would have expected the dedifferentiation and “shortening of 
networks of interdependency” that have occurred in the ghetto (Wacquant 2004: 104). 
In the Chinese context, on the other hand, where with the same logic Elias might have 
expected to see the reversal of civilizing processes originally tentatively brought on by 
the intrusion of the state one sees instead their expansion.  
 
This might be seen as problematic for an Eliasian analysis in this situation as the state 
extricated itself in many areas, but in the end, this is not the case. Elias dealt with 
simultaneous countervailing, sometimes overlapping and/or lagging trends within 
civilizing processes. Wouters points out that “in accordance with one of Elias’ 
theoretical models… long-term processes in one specific direction, which one can 
observe, go almost invariably hand in hand with counterprocesses in the opposite 
direction” (Wouters 1977: 448). This is what has been happening in the Chinese context 
with a similar withdrawal of the state, as well as some reversion to the traditional order. 
More important and dominant has been the continuation of civilizing trends including, 
as will be evidenced shortly, increasing competition, differentiation and extending 
chains of interdependence.   
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Mobility and guanxi represent the two concepts through which the existence of a 
Chinese civilizing process can best be established. Historically, as has been shown, 
mobility in Chinese society has been relatively low, or restricted, although there has 
been some movement. But for the most part this movement has been forced, due either 
to privation or policy. Absent these compulsions, the culture has been strong enough to 
hold the people on the land within their primary figurations. If evidence is found of 
there being a significant increase in voluntary mobilization, this will be held up as 
strong supporting evidence for the breaking down of the traditional social order at the 
local figurational level and of extending chains of interdependence. If people are 
choosing to move outside their traditional figurations in large numbers, it follows that 
the culture is no longer strong enough to hold them on the land as it had done for 
millennia previously. 
 
Guanxi and mobility are related as they are manifested in the Chinese context. After the 
Opening, when movement had become more a matter of choice than compulsion, 
making the decision to move was based on having guanxi connections (facilitating 
employment and residence) at the destination. But guanxi relations are much more than 
just this. Reciprocal relations have always been a part of traditional Chinese culture, but 
it is also true that under normal circumstances they have been restricted to within a 
person’s normal figuration, their family and/or village, and have not really been guanxi 
relations in the strict sense. With interpersonal relations so tightly constrained to within 
one’s figuration, it makes logical sense that any relationship based phenomenon would 
be constrained in like fashion. If one only very rarely had relations outside their 
localized figuration, one obviously could only equally rarely have had guanxi relations  
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outside those same barriers (While guanxi relations can probably be accurately 
described as existing between the literati elite of imperial China, those relations were 
already discussed both as  the exception and as part of the traditional order). The guanxi 
relations of Post-Opening China, as an extension of the traditional reciprocal relations 
beyond traditional boundaries, serve as strong evidence that the nature of social 
relations was in fact changing, and doing so in a fashion indicating an extension of the 
chains of interdependence.  
 
It has also been established that part of the nature of guanxi is that there be a significant 
amount of affect binding guanxi relations. This affective aspect is both sought and 
cultivated through guanxi activity, or guanxixue. It is possible that renqing and/or 
ganqing feelings associated with guanxi relations were changing as the relations 
themselves extended to others beyond traditional barriers and with whom one might 
have no other reason to interact than the purely instrumental. This would indicate a 
depersonalizing, or distancing, of guanxi relations. It is posited that if this is the case, it 
too represents chains of interdependence that are extending well beyond traditional 
boundaries. 
 
Historical Survey 
1978 marks the beginning of the Post-Opening period. After the death of Mao, 
numerous changes in the economic and social structure opened opportunities for rural 
people on a significant scale. “The Chinese domestic organizational structure prior to 
the 1980s was basically the unchanged premodern institutional arrangement” (Wang 
1998: 106). After the reforms, things were to change in ways heretofore unseen in 
China.  
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The ten years from 1966 had been a very difficult time throughout China and some 
positive change was overdue. Deng Xiaoping had actually begun to take “the bull by the 
horns” in the spring of 1975 (Garside 1981). Generally he was following the principles 
outlined in Zhou Enlai’s Four Modernizations. “According to Deng’s vision, mainland 
China must adopt a two fold policy of opening up to the outside world and revitalizing 
its domestic economy” (Tsai 1989: 232). This basically meant that he was encouraging 
change in virtually every area of society. “He made it quite clear that he thought that the 
country was in a mess, and that it was suffering from too much empty politics” (Garside 
1981: 64). ‘On the General Program’, one of the three controversial documents 
produced by Deng in 1975, “called for rectification in every area of life in China, 
spelling out each field of activity by name lest there be any misunderstanding” (Garside 
1981: 78). Deng was gradually assuming power over, and responsibility for, many 
important areas of government. “From the summer of 1977 to the end of 1978, Deng 
was directly responsible for education, science and technology, military affairs and 
foreign affairs” (Evans 1993: 225). These were areas central to the changes he was 
planning and he was very active in all of them, from raising the standards of education, 
while stripping it of ideology, to dealing with the moral and professionalism problems 
in the military, and even normalizing relations with the United States (Evans 1993: 225-
226). Deng’s efforts were directed at “getting the party to repudiate the ideology” that 
had been responsible for the Cultural Revolution as well as other disasters (Evans 1993: 
228).  All of this change of course had an impact on Chinese society, as the artificial, 
top-down pressure was relaxed. 
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“In 1976, a campaign to set things to rights was launched throughout the country. The 
Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held 
in 1978 made a decision on reforming the rural economic structure” (Fei 1989: 233). 
Salisbury describes the meeting as a situation where “Deng cut loose” (Salisbury 1992: 
389). In doing so he was separating himself, and China, from Mao. It was the decisions 
at this session that allowed for “a) moving toward decentralization; b) rewarding hard 
work and discouraging egalitarianism,  or ‘everyone eating from the same pot’; c) 
instituting flexibility in management; and d) placing authority in laws and institutions 
rather than in individuals” (Etheridge 1988: 8). This represented essentially a casting off 
of much of what Mao and his cohorts had put in place.  
 
One of the rallying cries “of Teng’s [Deng’s] development strategy [was] ‘let a minority 
get rich first’” (Li 1993:145). This was primarily directed at the cities where, “Dramatic 
measures have been taken to ‘open up’ (k'ai-fang) the eastern coastal cities to 
international investment, in the hope that the benefits of such development will 
gradually filter through to the interior” (Li 1993:145). In succeeding years and in 
response to the above changes, foreign investment would become an important factor in 
economic growth. “From a level of $57 million in 1980, FDI [Foreign Direct 
Investment] drifted upward, reaching $4 billion in 1991, and then accelerated at a 21% 
annual rate, reaching $70 billion in 2006” (Greenspan 2007: 12-13).  
 
Reform was not directed solely at the urban areas. When encouraging a liberating of the 
forces of production, Deng and his allies were talking about all of China. “The 
household-responsibility system was resurrected in 1978, once again as an experiment 
in one or two locations” (Starr 1997: 115). By end of 1983 it had been adopted by about  
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95% of the people across China (Ling 1991: 13). The idea in the countryside was to 
give the peasants control over their own land and a share in any profits it generated. 
Everything produced over and above what the state required was to be theirs to dispose 
of as they saw fit.  
 
The government was not taking its hand completely out of the rural pie, but was 
releasing its stranglehold of the previous thirty years. State involvement in the farm 
economy was dramatically reduced. This represented a step toward putting the control 
of the distribution of resources back in the hands of the peasants. Theoretically, 
assuming the traditional cultural system was still intact, even if submerged, these 
changes might allow for a snapping back into place of the old social relations and 
institutions. This did occur to some degree, but so too did significant change in the 
opposite direction as the old relations had been forever altered. 
 
Also effecting initially the urban but eventually including the rural environment was 
China’s new stance toward foreign relations.  
 
By the spring of 1978 Deng Xiaoping had achieved a position where he 
could set in train a series of foreign-policy initiatives that would make 
the next twelve months the most creative, sophisticated, and confident 
period of diplomacy China had ever known, and within those twelve 
months the Chinese people would see how the new activism could 
enliven and enrich their lives (Garside 1981: 339). 
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After the momentous decisions of 1978, things started to happen very quickly. One 
often heard phrase of the time reveals a lot: 
 
“As early as 1979 a verse began to sweep China: 
                   Yao chi liang 
                             Zhao Ziyang. 
                        Yao chi mi 
                                 Zhao Wan Li 
(“If you want wheat, go to Zhao Ziyang; if you want rice, go to Wan Li” (Salisbury 
1992: 383)). 
 
Zhao Ziyang and Wan Li were two of the gifted early reformers of the Deng era. In 
Anhui Wan Li quickly took control and acted decisively. “He gave each family its own 
plot of land and instituted what he called a household contract responsibility system… It 
gave each family a share in the profits… the peasant had a motive to cultivate his plot 
well” (Salisbury 1992: 385). Zhao Ziyang did much the same thing in Sichuan. “He got 
fast results with a spectacular rise in food production” (Salisbury 1992: 388). This new 
movement was taken up in varying degrees and methods but as a whole it became 
universal within Chinese borders. The people were starting to eat better, and make 
money in the process.  
 
At this point the stage was set for significant and rapid change. The traditional order had 
been under intense attack for eight decades. The old social relations had been torn 
asunder and rebuilt; forcibly destroyed while at the same time constrained in perverted 
form. Now with the artificial constraint of the state receding, and the traditional social  
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order altered to some unknown degree, the potential for change was possibly as great as 
it ever had been. 
 
Local Social Relations - An Eliasian Perspective 
Differentiation 
Significant increases in both competition and differentiation have accompanied 
increasing economic activity. Within the traditional agrarian based economy, there was 
little chance for a significant amount of either in the countryside. This remained the case 
through the Qing dynasty, and in relative terms, to the opening in 1978. Generally, there 
had been neither the opportunity nor the desire to branch out. The off-farm work that 
was engaged in (both Fei and Potter have shown that it was not insignificant in some 
areas of the country) was generally pursued out of necessity; the land could not produce 
enough to support the family through agriculture alone. But even this activity remained 
within individual families or villages and did not foster or represent significant 
differentiation. During the Communist period and previous to the opening, rural areas 
had usually not been allowed to have factories that competed with the state enterprises. 
The new policies that started in the 80s changed that. They effectively opened the 
floodgates for the rural industrialization that became the fastest growing segment of the 
fastest growing economy in the world. (Unger 2002: 147-148). 
 
As markets began to expand, the peasant farmers were encouraged to make the best use 
of their resources. This required significant adjustment, “strongly promoted by the 
government through a strategy of developing a diversified economy instead of one-
sidedly steering grain production” (Ling 1991: 16). Grain output, which had increased 
3% between 1952 and 1978, increased 9% from 1978 to 1984. In 1987 over 80 million  
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farm workers were employed outside normal farm jobs, most of them in the new local 
community-owned enterprises. Even more striking was the changing distribution of 
output value. By 1986 with less than 20% of labour in town or village enterprises they 
had surpassed agriculture in output value (Ling 1991: 17-18). Between 1978 and 1985 
non-farm income grew by 855% as compared to an increase in farm income of 131% 
(Ling 1991: 79). Another study has the agricultural population decreasing from 85% of 
the total in the fifties to less than 70% in 1993. During the same period, Industrial 
output increased from 43% to 83% of the total, while agricultural output decreased from 
57% to 17% of total output (Changmin 2000: 190). Industrial enterprises were taking 
over an increasing share of economic activity in rural areas. This is evidenced by the 
employment figures for rural areas. “Non-agricultural employment increased by nearly 
30 million, resulting in a nearly 13 million net increase in total rural employment… 
agricultural employment dropped from nearly 90 percent of total rural employment in 
1978 to about 72 percent in 1995” (Xuejin 2000: 138). In rural areas by far the strongest 
employment growth has been in the non-farm sector. From 1985 to 1990, “non-
agricultural sectors accounted for 40 percent of the total absorption of 50 million rural 
labourers; the figure increased to 133 percent of the 30 million absorption between 1992 
and 1995” with much of this increase having been offset by losses in agricultural 
employment (Xuejin 2000: 138). The peasant population was becoming less dependent 
on agriculture for subsistence as increasing differentiation provided them with ever 
increasing opportunities. 
 
A survey done in 1999 indicates the obvious in saying that there were simply a lot more 
and different jobs to be had (Xinxin 2001). Obvious or not, however, this is another 
clear indication of the growth in differentiation. Another study by Qian describes  
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several population centres and geographical areas where industrial production has 
grown dramatically since 1978 absorbing most of what had been the agricultural labour 
force (Qian 1996). There had apparently also been a newly emerging group in China 
since 1978, made up of businessmen and the self-employed, and their numbers were 
significant. Wu points out that “more than 100 million former peasants are now in the 
process of becoming workers” (Wu Zhongmin 2000: 85). This represents a dramatic 
shift in social organization. Increasing differentiation has been a fact effectively since 
the opening. 
 
Xiqiao Township in Guangdong province was a place that “was almost entirely agrarian 
until the mid-1980s and that has experienced a surge of entrepreneurship in the years 
since. Today it boasts well over 2000 factories, including more than 1600 textile firms” 
(Unger 2002: 132). “In some of the township’s villages, close to half of all the families 
owned factories” (Unger 2002: 133). Most of these factories have specialized in 
synthetic fabrics. Regardless of the average size of these industrial establishments, this 
represents both increasing competition (which was often extensive and fierce, and was 
growing ever more so) as well as rapid and dramatic differentiation. Also interesting 
here is the fact that as technique and know-how improved, vital information “easily 
circulated within the bounds of the local township, but did not so readily spread beyond 
the township’s localized social networks” (Unger 2002: 134). With key civilizing trends 
intensifying, old attitudes toward social relations still remained in place. Channels of 
communication were still dictated to some degree by the old social norms and relations. 
 
“Xiqiao is not unique in the degree to which it specializes successfully. Xiqiao lies in 
Nanhai county, and each of the rural townships in the county has similarly developed a  
 
329
special niche in which it has become pre-eminent” (Unger 2002: 134). A number of 
other locations are mentioned in Unger’s study as manifesting similar economic and 
social situations. “Such local concentrations of mutually competitive enterprises are not 
unique to this corner of China.” (Unger 2002: 135). This was a growing trend on a 
nationwide basis. Differentiation was bourgeoning more or less rapidly all over the 
country.  
 
Most of these small businesses started as partnerships mainly for financing purposes, 
and when successful enough splintered into family businesses. According to Unger the 
most successful ones were those which were “able to break the mould of a familistic 
approach to business” and remain as partnerships, even to the point of intentionally 
avoiding employing their own progeny (Unger 2002: 135). The familistic approach was 
a more comfortable fit for Chinese cultural proclivities, while the partnership model was 
considerably less so. Despite this, many businesses were opting to stick with the 
partnership structure. With the competitive drive for greater success and riches, and all 
that went with it, there was a corresponding pressure to move away from more 
traditional social ties, and an increasing willingness to do so. 
 
Mobility 
What was also manifested during this post-opening period was “unprecedented social  
mobility” which encompassed “the mobility between urban and rural areas, between 
different industries, between economic sectors of different ownerships, and between 
different statuses, groups, and generations” (Wanli 2002: 53). This represented 
geographic, social, and economic mobility and differentiation to a degree that would 
have been impossible, if not unthinkable, at any earlier time in Chinese history.  
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That rural mobility has increased can be seen by the rise in urban population. Referring 
to the Communist period up through the 1980s “the annual rate of increase of the urban 
population is twice that of total population (4.2 percent vs 1.8 percent). So, China’s 
level of urbanization still is low, but the progress of urbanization has been rapid” 
(Fenggan 2000: 167). Xuejin concurs with this assessment (Xuejin 2000: 143). Urban 
population increased from 10.6% of the total in 1949 to 46.6% of the total in 1987, with 
by far the most rapid increase occurring after 1978 when it went from 17.9% to 46.6% 
of the total population (Kaichen 1991: 56). “The rural population peaked in 1995 at 
nearly 860 million. Eleven years later it was down to 737 million.” (Greenspan 2007: 
304).  Starr, in 1997, had the rural population at “900 million people, more than three 
and a half times the total population of the United States” (Starr 1997: 114). Rural 
population growth had started going negative in the eighties and nineties, eventually 
changing at a rate of -10.1% (Kaichen 1991: 57). Given the absolute size of the 
population, the numbers are staggering. The rural Chinese were on the move to a greater 
degree than ever before.  
 
Post-Opening Urbanization is largely a result of this internal migration. Most of these 
migrants seem to be coming from rural areas. In Johnson’s study of in-migrants to the 
Pearl River Delta, 92% “had an agricultural registration. Ninety-four percent were from 
rural areas” (Johnson 2007: 38). In Dongguan in 1990 there were “655,000 temporary 
residents, a population more than half the size of the registered population of 1.2 
million… By 1995, the number of temporary residents was almost equivalent to that of 
locals… by the end of 2000, 1.67 times that of the registered local population.” 
(Johnson 2007: 40). In 1991 non-local population in Panyu in Guangdong Province was  
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‘nil.’ “In 1997, the non-local population was estimated at 347,063, registering the 
proportion at 0.39” (Yow 2007: 51).  
 
Wu suggests that it is the changes made to the hukou system that have contributed to the 
increase in rural-urban mobility. “The resumption of the national college entrance 
examination has also contributed to an ever-increasing number of rural residents 
becoming urban residents with a change in their hukou status” (Wu Zhongmin 2000: 
84).  Starr seems to agree with this: “they are taking advantage of the relaxed 
restrictions on geographical mobility in record numbers, and some 100 million 
underemployed workers have left their rural homes in search of temporary work in 
China’s largest cities” (Starr 1997: 116). These changes no doubt contributed to 
allowing the increased movement of the peasants in that restrictions had been relaxed, 
but there is little doubt either that migration would have been considerably lower had 
not the traditional social relations of the countryside been broken down to some 
significant degree. Rural people were no longer tied to the land by the singularly 
successful, though rigid social and cultural system in place for most of the previous two 
millennia.  
 
Another point of interest to this thesis is the rise of a new social group referred to in 
English as the ‘floating population’. These are people who are on the move for 
employment purposes. This is something quite new in China, and its scale is significant. 
Estimates say that this population was around 50 million in 1989 and well over 100 
million by the year 2000 (Changmin 2000: 180), making their numbers alone larger than 
most countries. The trend was also for an increasing percentage of the floating 
population to stay away from home for longer periods, in the case of the study over one  
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year. (Changmin 2000: 182). To be on the move in such a fashion goes against the very 
core of what it had meant to be Chinese in the traditional sense. In the past to be in this 
situation, without a home or land, would have labelled one as something other than 
Chinese, a fate worse than death and to be avoided at all costs, except in times of dire 
need or out of desperation. 
 
Overseas migration has seen dramatic growth as well. The overseas Chinese who have 
been so important in facilitating the economic expansion through transnational contacts 
and guanxi connections generally have, or have relatives who have, emigrated at some 
point during the course of the past 150 years. “Migration creates multiple homes and 
transregional and… transnational relations. Chinese migrants [have always] maintained 
relations with their homeland, hoping to return one day… their links with the Chinese 
homeland had tremendous impacts on the economic and social life of qiaoxiang” (Tan 
2007a: 1). The literal meaning of qiaoxiang is ‘sojourners homeland’ and in China 
generally refers to “certain villages and towns that have a history of migration to Hong 
Kong, Macao, and other parts of the world.” (Yow 2007: 49). The implication clearly is 
of a place that one will ideally return to one day. Tan Chee-Beng says it is a “convenient 
term to use, because people know what it refers to even though the areas covered may 
not be precise” (Tan 2007b: 75). The importance of a qiaoxiang lies as much in the 
sentimental attachment as in the geographical location. These people generally maintain 
a fondness for their homeland, their place of origin, and for this reason, connections 
(guanxi) between the groups, even if they have never met and otherwise have little if 
any common ground, are easily cultivated and nourished. Tan further points out that as 
China’s economy grows stronger, these overseas Chinese are in an ideal position to take 
advantage “since linguistic and some cultural affinities allow them easier access to the  
 
333
guanxi networks in China, at the same time, they perform a bridge-building function 
between China and their respective countries” (Tan 2007a: 16). As they build those 
bridges, the chains of interdependence are extending in radical fashion.  
 
Mobility, Extending Chains of Interdependence and the Connection with Guanxi 
When rural residents migrated to urban areas of whatever size, they moved into entirely 
new social situations.
58 They were mobilizing in three ways; location, occupation, and 
strata. More basically, there were two fundamental changes; “One in lifestyle and in 
social connection network (from one characterized by consanguine and geographical 
relations to one characterized mainly by occupational relations); the other is the 
enhancement of social status symbolized by opportunity resources” (Peilin 2003: 141). 
These last points highlight the connection between movement and guanxi. Upon 
movement into the city, or any other relatively distant location, one was moving into a 
different web of social relations; effectively a different figuration. Wellman, Chen and 
Dong point out that the typical smaller, group-based relations of the average Chinese 
person were (and are) being extended into networks in similar fashion to those seen in 
the more developed, industrialized world (Wellman 2002: 226). In this sense the 
traditional figuration was giving way to a more modern one. Chains of interdependence 
were being extended and new relationships were being formed. Much as in Elias’s 
Europe, people were interacting with different others, often from different social 
classes, in ways they never had before. In a fashion also similar to Elias’s Europe, the 
classes themselves were being redefined.  
 
                                                 
58 The following discussion is equally true (though the details differ) for external migration, but in that it 
is not as important to this thesis it will not be explored in any further detail here.  
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This is not to say that connections with the old figuration were left behind and forgotten, 
for it was more often than not the case that connections through old figurations 
facilitated movement to the cities both in terms of employment and housing.
59 “For 
migrants themselves to go out and find work… was not very common” (Qian 1996: 
128). Peilin shows that the migration process in the post-opening period was highly 
dependent upon guanxi connections (Peilin 2003: 145).  
 
Chinese rural society takes special stock in consanguine and 
geographical relations based on family ties. Scholars of older 
generations invariably took ‘family’ as the basic unit of traditional 
Chinese social networks. Special attachments of blood and locality 
strongly influenced the way of life and social interactions, which 
ossified into ‘custom’ and displayed tremendous inertia ... This 
‘custom’ does not change with change in living place from the villages 
to the cities or with a change in occupation from farm hand to worker, 
for example, in the ‘Zhejiang Village’ on the south outskirts of Beijing; 
nor does it change when they have some productive capital in industry 
and commerce and become business owners, or even when they go 
abroad: Chinatowns exist in international metropolises like Paris, 
London and San (sic), where the Chinese live in compact community. 
Our survey of mingong in Jinan shows that their whole process of 
migration, living and mingling is permeated with the influence of 
consanguine networks (Peilin 2003: 142).  
 
                                                 
59 This had been true for a while. It was guanxi connections that often enabled economically motivated 
migration to the cities in the late Qing (Murphy 2002: 31).   
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The mingong naturally take this reliance upon ‘blood and locality’ attachments with 
them when they migrate. But there is more to it than just this.  
 
Peilin points out that the mingong often did not fit in very well once in the cities. They 
tended to use networks to secure employment in the cities; “in their migration far from 
both home and farmland, the peasants rely more heavily on a network of social relations 
based on blood and geographical ties in information gathering, hunting for jobs, modes 
of employment and associations in the cities” (Peilin 2003: 145). This new figuration 
confronting them in their new place of residence was different in that it was just that, 
new. It may have overlapped with the old (more often than not, it did, and thus 
represented expanding figurations and chains of interdependence), but in carrying out 
daily activity one was relying on, or dependent upon, a different, expanded figuration, 
usually in addition to their more traditional figuration. These new social relations were 
also, as often as not, occupational as opposed to personal. The affective component of 
the ‘connection’, while not eliminated, was necessarily changing. One simply did not 
interact with non-kin occupational contacts in the same way that one did with close 
personal ties. The community that confronted the mingong when they got to the city was 
often not very welcoming, so the old networks were vital, at least initially, but 
accommodation to the new had to be made. 
 
According to Tang Can, “The pattern of group relations with status in the city or 
countryside as a boundary is slowly breaking down” (Tang 2001: 43). In other words 
the mingong’s rigid association with the countryside among the urban populace was 
becoming less of a barrier over time. The mingong were clearly developing new 
networks, new interpersonal relations within the urban environments. Wolf draws on  
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Elias’s understanding of social relations in saying that “They sometimes proliferate like 
the runners of the strawberry plant or the shoots of the bamboo; they can metastacize 
like cancer cells; or they can leap over intervening populations” (Wolf 1977, 33). 
Wouters is referring to the effects of the civilizing process in Europe when he says that, 
“people’s identifications with each other have been expanding and may be expected to 
continue to do so as long as intranational and international interdependencies continue 
to expand, as long as processes of social differentiation and integration continue” 
(Wouters 1986: 12). This point can easily be made to apply to China. Both Wolf’s and 
Wouter’s comments combine to make a very good description of what was happening in 
China at this time. The migrants’ figurations were changing and, by definition, 
expanding.  
 
Shen, in his review of recent studies of mingong migration, makes some observations 
about their relationships as they made the move to the urban environment. He refers to 
them as consisting of two parts: the “local native relationship in place even before their 
exodus”, and “the new relationship they go into after exodus” (Shen 2003: 86). The 
mingong were indeed entering new relationships upon their entry into the new 
environment. “A survey from the Horizon Company… finds that the limited resources 
available within a homogeneous community determines that some of these people tend 
to dissociate themselves from the original community when possible” (Shen 2003: 86). 
Without over-interpreting these findings, they do suggest that these people are in some 
cases leaving old relations behind and searching out new ones. They are attempting to 
form or become part of new figurations and in so doing relating to new social others 
with whom they never would have had the chance or desire to relate in the past. Shen 
confirms this when he talks about ‘strong and weak ties’, a la Granovetter’s study. He  
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says that unlike those in the West, “Chinese communities mostly rely upon strong ties… 
contacts among mingong in the cities and the social support they rely on are formed 
basically by what we called strong ties, which, starting from consanguinity, gradually 
extends to fellow villagership” (Shen 2003: 86). This, of course, is not surprising. “At 
the same time, the mingong in the cities go through a process of learning and 
resocializing, and some of them extend their weak ties” (Shen 2003: 86). The point is 
that while the strong ties from their home village environment often helped them get 
into the city, and they often, in a sense, found their village in the city, many of the 
mingong quickly and consciously extended their network beyond their more restricted 
village figuration. In doing so they were extending their chains of interdependence, in 
Eliasian terms.  
 
Research done on Zhejiang village in 2003, a community on the southern end of 
Beijing, indicates that the idea of community has changed in the Chinese context. 
Previously it had had distinct boundaries and internal integrity.  
 
What has been found in Zhejiang village, however, is integration, 
conflict and openness, all combined... Zhejiang village has become an 
‘unbounded community’ because it keeps closely tied to other sectors of 
society while at the same time staying outside the integral social order. 
Another feature is that it oversteps not only geographical, but also a 
series of other profound, hidden boundaries, e.g., those relating to the 
organizational, administrative and personal identity systems (Shen 
2003: 88). 
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Residents of Zhejiang village have become interdependent with those beyond their own 
village boundaries. The old ties have not given up their hold, but they have weakened to 
the extent that villagers have begun to look beyond them in meeting their needs, or even 
in attempting to find a better life. 
 
“As trading activities became more concentrated, and organizations and individuals 
providing information and trading services appeared, dependence on personal 
relationships was to some extent reduced” (Wang Hansheng 1998: 30). In Eliasian 
terms, with greater differentiation came the extension of the chains of interdependence. 
The whole nature of social relations was changing. Instead of relying strictly on the 
‘personal’ relationships of blood and village these people were branching out beyond 
what was formerly acceptable in relational terms. They were no longer restricting 
themselves to close personal ties with those whom they knew they could trust, but were 
allowing themselves to interact with those with whom they may have had no previous 
relationship, but with whom it might prove beneficial to have a relationship at that 
point. In fact, it seems that they were seeking out these ties with which to do business. 
This is guanxi building, or guanxixue, and, it is argued, is tantamount to fostering the 
extending chains of interdependence that Elias’s describes. 
 
This change goes to the very root of Chinese culture. The change continued to progress 
with the second generation as they “have begun to try to identify with the society on the 
ground... their attachment to their home village is weakening, and in contrast with the 
first generation, implies mainly an attachment to loved ones back at home” (Shen 2003: 
93). This new generation was apparently becoming quite restive in Chinese terms, not 
only reaching out to the new, larger society around them, but also leaving a significant  
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part of the old - the land - behind. In traditional Chinese terms this was a radical change 
in perspective, representing a departure from cultural imperatives thousands of years 
old. They may not have been ready to leave their family totally behind, but they left the 
land. Indeed, 
 
this generation of rural migrants is a distinct demographic group, 
marked by lower age, higher levels of education and no experience of 
farming. They identify weakly with their traditional status and imbue 
the status of farmers with more social implications. The new generation 
differs from the earlier one in that some of its members are beginning to 
identify with the local society into which they have migrated. Their 
identification with their hometown has meanwhile weakened… Lack of 
identity with the rural traditions on the part of the new generation, 
Wang Chunming holds, will further give rise to or stimulate the 
‘fluidity’ of the new generation of rural youth. (Qiang 2002: 83). 
 
This passage indicates that these younger people, representing the new generation of 
mingong, are living within a very different relational world. To a large degree they are 
reaching out and finding their own significant relationships, as opposed to being born 
into them, and it is a process that has built on itself. As they found themselves in a new 
relational community, both their alienation from the old and their need for a new 
community was increased. The old social relations had broken down to a very 
significant degree. 
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The use of contacts to facilitate migration is important. It was an obviously natural 
response to a changing environment. This was an outgrowth of the traditional Chinese 
habitus based largely on the Confucian worldview where the ideal was for people to live 
a harmonious life within tightly ordered interpersonal relationships starting with their 
family and reaching outward to extended family and kin, and ultimately society on a 
broader level. This dependence on predominantly familial relations within the 
Confucian context had been extended beyond the family, first through necessity during 
the Communist era, in an effort to meet daily needs as the Communist control of 
resources became so draconian, and later through desire to take advantage of 
opportunity arising as China opened economically. This had been enabled through the 
impact of the assault on traditional social relations of the previous eighty years. These 
relations were still a central concern for the average Chinese peasant, but they were no 
longer so completely binding. Nor were the relations themselves so precisely defined. 
People could reach beyond their traditional figurations without fear of being socially 
ostracized, a fate apparently no longer so intimidating. A trend was in motion. The 
natural reliance on and  interdependence with close relations extended to people beyond 
traditional horizons until eventually the cultivation of these extended relations became 
fundamental to success, even to the point of having been described as an art form 
(guanxixue). There are unmistakable parallels here to Elias’s European ‘bourgeois’ 
context in which people were newly on the move, interacting with new and different 
other people. The advent of guanxixue was integrally related to what Elias would call a 
lengthening of the chains of interdependence in a society in a period of transition. Social 
relations were changing; it was an old game, adjusting to a new environment, requiring 
different rules. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has attempted to establish the Eliasian understanding of civilizing processes 
as an effective tool for the analysis of the Chinese social context. Part One discussed 
those aspects of the civilizing process deemed important for Part Two, on Chinese 
social development. This was a fairly broad based approach to Elias’s ideas. Its aim was 
to show how competition was the driving force behind the civilizing process. It was 
competition that was responsible for the breaking down of the traditional social order, 
leading to greater differentiation and extending chains of interdependence, ultimately 
resulting in the internalization of constraint. 
 
At first glance Chinese social development, viewed as a whole, might seem 
incompatible with the processes described by Elias, for, despite the early emergence of 
the state, China remained highly stable and traditional for over two millennia, not 
seeming to develop in a civilizing direction. Close examination reveals a traditional 
social organization which relied upon a symbiotic relationship between the state and 
local society, whereby the centre remained distant, leaving control of the distribution of 
resources in local hands. It was the strength and resilience of this social order that was 
the defining difference between the civilizing process of China and that of Elias’s West. 
This should not be construed, however, to imply that this difference was so large as to 
rule out obvious points of comparison between the two.  
 
The traditional means of ordering Chinese society was largely as it remained up to the 
revolution in 1911. Continuing with the earlier mentioned thought regarding state and 
local society, for either of them to violate the bounds of the unwritten Confucian  
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‘agreement’ between centre and locality would be to fail to fulfil their prescribed role, 
and to violate precepts deeply embedded in the Chinese habitus. This, more specifically, 
was the stumbling block that for so long stalled the civilizing process in China. With the 
state and the locality so aloof, the distribution of resources remained in the hands of the 
locality. As the system was so highly successful in traditional terms, it would take a 
powerful social force to effect change in this area, to move it in a civilizing direction.  
 
Crucial to understanding the Chinese civilizing process then is the fact that, while the 
monopoly mechanism certainly played out in law-like Eliasian fashion, whatever other 
social forces internal to the Chinese context there may have been, they were not strong 
enough or law-like enough to overcome, or even significantly alter, the existing 
Confucian social order mandating this state–local society relationship. As Weber 
pointed out, a change in emperor meant only “a different tax receiver, not an altered 
social order” (Weber 1951: 27). Once the state had formed through Elias’s monopoly 
mechanism, the rest of the Chinese civilizing process was not to proceed in quite so 
inexorable a fashion as seemed the case in the European context. 
 
The social force that did eventually result in this civilizing change was quite different in 
Eliasian terms and, in fact, initially entirely external to the Chinese world. This, of 
course, was the incursion by Western powers into the China, mandating a re-evaluation 
of their own place in the larger world order. This, in turn, was followed in the post-
revolutionary environment by the centre aggressively seeking to change the traditional 
social order through controlling and integrating local society, in the process assuming 
control over the distribution of resources. It has been argued that this development 
effectively kick-started the civilizing process, which only truly manifested itself after  
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1978. It is certainly possible that the process in China would eventually have started up 
again in any case, but there is no reason or way to be sure of that, and given the 
longevity and consistency of the then existing Confucian order, plenty of reason to 
doubt it.  
 
Given the extended time frames involved, it would seem that China underwent a 
civilizing process significantly different from that of the West, but in many ways it was 
also strikingly similar. At this point the primary difference can be said to lie in the 
resilience of the Confucian social organization. Eliasian theory need not be adjusted all 
that much in order to account for the differences, however, in that once the grip of the 
old order was broken, admittedly by forces other than Elias would have expected, the 
Eliasian process continued.
60  
 
The process of state formation began well before unification under the Qin, with the 
monopoly mechanism gradually centralizing power in fewer and fewer hands until 
finally only one ruler remained. This is much as Elias would have it. The Qin brought 
into force monopolies of the means of violence and taxation and instituted an extremely 
rigid Legalist system of governance, all of which, due to the strength of the 
longstanding Confucian social order, as well as Confucianism’s part in the Chinese 
habitus, the people quickly found too onerous to bear. After a short period of rule the 
Qin were overthrown and replaced by the Han who carried forward the Qin monopolies 
but eventually adopted the already existing Confucian social system (as opposed to Qin 
Legalism) as the ruling order of the land. If a specific, historical point of reference is 
                                                 
60 One might even posit a civilizing process on a grander, worldwide scale, whereby China was finally 
being engulfed in the same civilizing process initiated in the West at an earlier time, that the 
monopoly mechanism has been moving the entire world in a civilizing direction, but that lies well 
beyond the scope of this project.  
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sought for the differences between the civilizing processes, this would be the best place 
to look. Confucianism had already arguably supplied the guiding social principles to 
Chinese society for centuries and, once codified as the law of the land, promised to do 
so for millennia to come. It was this Confucian system that would make up the 
dominant orientations facilitating the stability of Chinese civilization, those dominant 
orientations that would prove virtually impervious to internal forces for social change in 
an Eliasian civilizing direction. 
 
Part Two of this thesis was concerned primarily with the process of breaking down the 
traditional Confucian social order. With the arrival of the West in the 1850s during the 
Qing dynasty, China was forced to acknowledge that it had fallen behind, and that it 
was now the revered the social order itself which needed to be changed. This realization 
was the powerful social force required to effect change and spawned the effort targeted 
specifically at those social relations that had for so long held Chinese society together. 
With the fall of the Qing in 1911, the Republicans, followed by the Nationalists and 
then the Communists, focussed increasingly intense pressure on the traditional social 
order, impacting it in ways difficult to determine comprehensively. Central to this 
effort, the state assumed increasing control over the distribution of resources and 
intruded into local and family life on a scale previously unseen in China.  
 
Though the circumstances and details were certainly different from those in Europe, this 
was the vital step, missing for millennia, which allowed China to continue its civilizing 
process. One vital difference that needs to be noted, however, is that in the Chinese 
case, the changing of the traditional social order was very much a conscious effort, and 
not the by-product of blind social forces. It was most definitely and quite openly the  
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traditional order that was the intentional target for change, eventually leading to the 
resumption of the civilizing process. At first glance this would seem to mark a 
significant point of departure from Elias’s European civilizing process, and indeed it 
does, but it should also be borne in mind that the eventual consequences of the 
intentional action (discussed in some detail in the body of this thesis) cannot be said to 
have been anticipated; that they were, in fact, unintentional, again forging a close tie to 
Eliasian theory. 
 
Chinese manifestation of the civilizing process 
This thesis has argued that it is only with the Opening of China in 1978, after the 
passing of Mao, that evidence emerges of a civilizing process strongly in force. This 
evidence takes the form of increasing mobility and the rise of guanxi. Brandtstädter 
argues that “… ‘socialist’ values and loyalties never managed to replace kinship and 
community solidarities” (Brandtstadter 2000: 20). While this is almost definitely the 
case, when she also argues that it was these kinship groups and alliances that facilitated 
the necessary connections for the rapidly expanding economy, she is only telling part of 
the story. One’s relational ties may have been restricted more or less to kinship at an 
earlier time as one interacted on a more geographically limited basis, essentially within 
the village, or even for a short while after migrating into a city, but after 1949 and more 
especially as the expansion truly got under way after 1978, one needed to be able to 
move fluidly and ultimately substantially beyond kinship in their guanxiwang, or, more 
appropriately, their new, expanded figurations.  
 
When the iron fist of state control had finally been lifted, people began moving about 
China, primarily (though by no means only) from rural areas into the cities. Whether  
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moving locally or to the more distant cities, they relied on connections of a more 
traditional sort through family and kin to find shelter and employment. Upon settling 
into their new environment new webs of interpersonal relations became a social reality. 
The old was not normally shunned, but the new took on increasing importance. Now 
that the traditional ties were no longer so binding, but more a safety net, relations 
beyond blood and locality became a legitimate means both of meeting needs and even 
of seeking out a better life. This made perfect and obvious sense for a people group that 
had been cast suddenly and forcefully out of a traditional world and into a modernizing 
one, and for whom interpersonal relationships had always been such a fundamental 
concern. Where in the past ganqing and renqing were defining elements of traditional 
reciprocal social relations, enabling harmonious interaction, the new social relations, 
extending significantly beyond any previous figurational boundaries, required 
something new and different. Combining elements of both ganqing and renqing and 
adapting them to the new social reality, considerably more instrumental in nature, 
guanxi, and guanxixue, were the result.  
 
Guanxi as Extending Chains of Interdependence 
The classical Confucian tradition, which is where the analysis of the Chinese context in 
this thesis began, was a social system emphasizing human relationships and the notion 
of li – proper behaviour within relations, or ritual. The thesis has also noted that 
reciprocity within social relations is central to Confucian society. Out of these 
characteristics emerged renqing, or gift relations. “This point of departure leads 
logically to the emphasis on exchange behaviour to concretize and nurture social 
relationships, and thus the notions of reciprocity and empathy also become important” 
(Yang 1994: 70 citing Jin). These conceptions, Yang argues, can be found among  
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Chinese communities everywhere and at all times as having emerged out of the 
Confucian tradition (Yang 1994: 6 citing Jin). She further states that “guanxi discourse 
has grown out of an older renqing discourse, so that although it retains many of the 
principles of renqing ethics, it also has developed new political and economic 
dimensions that were only latent and rudimentary before” (Yang 1994: 71). The word 
guanxixue, or the study or art of guanxi, was apparently rarely used or heard “outside 
the new socialist society on the mainland” indicating a changing perception of social 
relations in that environment (Yang 1994: 8). After 1949, as control of the distribution 
of resources was taken over by the government, and those same resources became very 
scarce and difficult to obtain, guanxi became one of the means by which to ‘get in the 
back door.’ It increasingly became the way to avoid an often impossibly obstructive 
bureaucracy in securing one’s daily needs. And because social relations and the control 
of the distribution of resources had been altered to such an extent, the people with 
whom one had to deal in the process were quite different than they would have been in 
more traditional times. As such, guanxi was another example of old cultural 
predispositions adapting to a new environment, and doing so in a fashion that Elias 
would have recognized. The old had not passed away. It simply resurfaced in modified 
form under different circumstances. Nor is guanxi to be thought of as a strictly urban 
phenomenon:  
 
there is ample evidence that the art of guanxi exists in the countryside 
as well as in urban society… Indeed, some urban Chinese I interviewed 
believe that guanxixue is even more pervasive in rural areas than in 
cities because its very ‘source’ or ‘origin’ (faiyuandi) is rural culture  
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where kinship ties and a tradition of labor exchange and mutual aid and 
obligation have always been dominant (Yang 1994: 76). 
 
As they see the rural areas as the source of Chinese tradition, which is the source of 
guanxi, it makes sense that rural China must also be the source of guanxi.  
 
“In the 1980s, with the dramatic rural economic reforms, there seemed to be even more 
opportunities and situations that called for engaging in the art of guanxi” (Yang 1994: 
77). This new situation represented something different again, analogous to the choice 
involved with mobility in the post-opening era as opposed to the coercion prior to 1978. 
These were opportunities, as opposed to requirements for survival, as under the 
Communist regime. Guanxi was being used by choice to achieve higher goals, not 
simply to stay alive. The people who were using guanxi were moving beyond the old 
cultural barriers more often than not out of choice, in an effort to improve their own 
situation. 
 
Huang Xiyi, drawing on Samuel Whyte, says that “the new external orientation of 
family economic activities in the post-reform [Post-Opening] era may foster alliances 
and cooperation with outsiders and, as a result, undermine patrilineal solidarity” (Huang 
1998: 178 citing Whyte). Whether or not the patrilineal structure will be undermined 
completely remains an open question, but that outsiders have been included in the 
network, or guanxiwang, is without doubt. The alliances and cooperation being fostered 
by the new external orientation are enabled by guanxixue. Kinship relations, especially 
as they grow more distant, are a part, but only a part, of the larger guanxiwang, or 
figuration, that helps one succeed in the new economy. Family and kinship connections  
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in Chinese society have always had both primacy and a considerable flexibility to them. 
This flexibility is one enabler of guanxiwang expansion. Even by traditional Chinese 
standards, outsiders might be allowed entrance into the family group, or figuration, 
under certain circumstances. It is a theoretically small (but culturally rather large) step 
from here to an expanding guanxiwang or figuration, which can accurately be described 
as a structure entailing extending chains of interdependence, and which was appearing 
with changing local social relations after reform.  
 
The key to this process was the weakening of traditional social ties. The connection 
with the civilizing process as described by Elias is clear. The post-opening period is 
characterized by the crossing of social boundaries and extending chains of 
interdependence in the form of the shifting focus of guanxi relations. The localized 
nature of individual social ties in the past was giving way to networks that now 
stretched across the country and even across the globe. Where what might be called the 
precursors to guanxi relations were restricted to within one’s primary figuration, their 
family or village, after 1978 and with the expansion of the traditional figurations these 
old restrictions were being left by the wayside. 
 
From the eighties into the nineties, there was a great deal of movement between classes 
and the lines between them grew faint as “large numbers of poor people with a 
relatively low economic status, or from marginal social groups, made lots of money and 
became members of the rich stratum” (Qiang 2005: 128). This does not mean that these 
newly wealthy people automatically associated with and became part of the primarily 
urban, upper class stratum to the exclusion of all their other social and familial relations. 
That would be exaggerating the case. What it does indicate, however, is that these  
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people were beginning to cross social boundaries that had previously been virtually 
impenetrable. The boundaries were on the move, in a manner different from, yet 
reminiscent of, the Europe dealt with by Elias. The Communists had to a large degree 
broken down the class walls or, at the every least, lowered them considerably. From the 
1980s through the mid 1990s according to Qiang, these class lines were being redrawn 
for large numbers of people. With the new status came also new social relations 
extending outward based on considerations other than simply blood and locality. 
 
As a clear example Qiang observes that, “Social intercourse among the rich has given 
rise to such new forms of social organization as clubs and guild halls with very high 
membership fees to keep lower income people outside” (Qiang 2005: 130). Another 
good example would be the expensive higher education programs, which serve 
essentially the same purpose, marking off networks from wider society.  “The process 
of studying together naturally helps interactions among these members of top enterprise 
administrators as well as forming internal social networks within the rich strata.” (Qiang 
2005:130). A major incentive for entering such programs is the connections one will 
make. In fact, educational ties are as good a starting point for guanxi relations now as 
they had been for the literati in the past, with the difference in this case being that the 
lines of entry are drawn starting at one’s wallet. 
 
By the 1990s class relations were becoming ossified again. According to Qiang, “by the 
late 1990s and the turn of the century, demarcation between the strata were becoming 
ever more clear-cut” (Qiang 2005: 128). It seemed that “life styles and cultural modes 
specific to different strata gradually took shape” (Qiang 2005: 128). This development 
seemed to represent a regression to earlier social tendencies. In a sense that may have  
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been true, but an important consideration remains. New relational lines had been drawn. 
Social relations determined by family and village boundaries were still available but 
were no longer the only social resources at the disposal of a large and growing number 
of people. Nor were they necessarily the most important. New social hierarchies were 
increasingly determined by achievement, and achievement required being adept in the 
art of guanxi – essentially (in the modern sense) the skill of extending one’s chains of 
interdependence.  
 
These new social relations represented something almost entirely new within Chinese 
society. As they were a new form of interacting, a new social lubricant was required. 
This role was filled by guanxixue which, virtually by definition, represented a means of 
securing and coping with interpersonal relations that extended beyond traditionally 
acceptable chains of interdependence. The advent and growth of guanxi relations is the 
result of a civilizing process in motion in the mainland Chinese social world. 
 
Put in more Eliasian terms, with the old order having been weakened, new figurational 
boundaries were emerging. While by no means destroyed, the historically restrictive 
traditional ties binding individuals to land and family were loosened considerably and 
the rigid hierarchy that went with them was no longer so defining or impenetrable. 
Competition became a realistic option. The phenomenal expansion of guanxixue, when 
viewed from an Eliasian perspective, represents an increase in competition for power 
chances, for control of balances of power. Much as in the European situation described 
by Elias, whereby the weakening of the traditional order resulted in changing 
figurations enabling one to effectively enter these competitions for power chances, in 
the Chinese case, the active, and even aggressive, reaching out to the unknown in the  
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form of guanxixue and guanxi relationships represents a breaking down of the 
traditional order, an extension of the chains of interdependence, and the continuation of 
a long-interrupted civilizing process.  
 
Viewed through Eliasian lenses, Chinese social development can clearly be explained in 
terms quite similar to that of Elias’s West. Using one theoretical framework in 
discussing social development for both the West and China has the potential to open 
whole new avenues of investigation. It is hoped that this fact might facilitate important 
new research and understanding of social development both in China and on a much 
broader scale. 
 
Future Research 
Having concluded its main task, this thesis turns for its final, it is hoped valuable, 
discussion, to a listing of areas for future research. By the nature of this thesis, many 
questions were raised (and usually noted in footnotes) that were beyond its scope. Many 
of these questions, however, are deemed worthy of brief mention again in this final 
section. It is felt that research in these areas would contribute significantly to 
understanding the Chinese civilizing process.  
 
At the top of the list should probably be the Chinese understanding of the relationship 
between the state and the people in comparison with that of the West. For example, a 
detailed comparison of the Confucian understanding of the state with that of not only 
Elias but also Hobbes would help in clarifying the Chinese civilizing process and why it 
occurred as it did. 
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Also with regard to the activity of the state, or lack thereof, further research into 
unintended consequences in the Chinese context would be helpful. The intrusion of the 
Chinese state into local society beginning just before the revolution and continuing 
thereafter was both conscious and intentional, with modernization being the goal. Mao, 
and the Communist Party more generally, almost certainly weren’t looking forward to a 
successful capitalist transition, however, possibly making recent events in China a good 
candidate for such an investigation. 
 
In terms of the pacification of Chinese society there obviously occurred a very different 
process than that in Europe. Where the monopoly of violence was pressed to the local 
level in Europe, it was not in China. At the centre of this question is the means of 
pacification. The source and model providers for Chinese pacification are to be found 
primarily in Confucianism and the bureaucracy, both the Confucian scholars and the 
literati more generally. A study of this process would highlight the fact of pacification 
while also making apparent the different nature it can take in different societies and in 
different civilizing processes. In connection with that it would be interesting to gain a 
better understanding of the place of the Chinese court in China’s social development. 
The court(s) clearly played a very different role in the Chinese situation, but it would be 
interesting to determine if there are points of comparison with the Europe of Elias’s 
analysis. Also related to the position of the courts, it has been noted that social 
interaction in the European courts bears close similarity to that in the typical traditional 
Chinese village. More detailed research in this area would be enlightening. How and 
why was social interaction between the people of two so distant and mutually isolated 
social groupings so similar? 
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Shame and honour are obviously central to Elias’s study of the European civilizing 
process. Face is correspondingly equally important to any study of the Chinese 
civilizing process. A far more detailed analysis of these concepts in comparison with 
each other is needed. This is fundamental to understanding the current social 
development of the Chinese context relative to that of Europe. Pursuant to that, some 
method of analyzing and tracking any possible changes in the understanding/approach 
to face in China would be valuable in observing China’s civilizing process (potential 
internalization of constraint) as it occurs. Along similar lines, a study of the ongoing 
trends in both functional democratization and rationality in Post-Opening China would 
also shed light on whether China is continuing along a similar civilizing path to that of 
Europe. 
 
With regard to counter trends in civilizing processes one might easily point to the 
Cultural Revolution for examples. Decivilizing trends were obvious throughout this 
period as children betrayed their parents and authority was questioned and rejected, 
often violently, at all levels. A better understanding in Eliasian terms of what was 
actually happening during the Cultural Revolution would be useful in understanding 
counter-trends in civilizing processes. 
 
A study of manners in the Chinese context would also be interesting and useful. For 
example, it has been noted that the act of spitting is currently approached in many parts 
of China in a fashion very similar to medieval Europe. Elias, himself, also noted the 
significant differences (not necessarily in form, but in extent) between the two societies 
with regard to the use of the knife in eating – essentially how it was moved much earlier 
and more radically behind the scenes in China. A more detailed study of developmental  
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trends in Chinese manners, past and present, in comparison with those of the West of 
Elias’s research, to see if there is any correspondence in terms of what gets moved 
behind the scenes of social life, and when, would help with this important aspect of 
Elias’s approach to civilizing processes. 
 
There are undoubtedly many other questions that can fruitfully be researched along 
Eliasian lines in the Chinese social context. These are but a few, more obvious 
recommendations. 
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Appendix 
 
China’s Dynasties 
Early Empire 
 
Shang  (first  historical  Dynasty)      1554  –  1045 
Zhou (Warring States – 453 – 221)         1122 – 221 
Qin            221  –  206 
Former  Han         206  BC  –  8  AD 
Later  Han         25  –  220 
Three  Kingdoms        221  –  264 
Western  Chin       265  –  311 
Northern  and  Southern  Dynasties      311  –  580 
(Toba  386 – 533) 
Middle Empire 
Sui            589  –  617 
Tang          618  –  906 
Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms          907 – 959 
Later Empire 
Northern  Sung        960  –  1126 
Chin/Mongol  rule  in  north,       1127  -  1225 
Southern Sung in south 
Mongols  (Yuan)        1276  –  1367 
Ming          1368  –  1644 
Manchus  (Qing)        1645  –  191  
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Revolutionary China 
Republican  China       1911  -  1949 
Nationalist  China       1927  -  1937 
Communist  China       1949  - 
  Land  Reform       1947 
  Collectivization      1954  -  1955 
  Great  Leap  Forward      1957  -  1961 
  Cultural  Revolution      1966  -  1969  (1976) 
  Death  of  Mao       1976 
Post  Opening  Period       1978  -   
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